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Television Nev;s As A Source of Political
Inforr.ation: A CcnLent Analysis of
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Directed by: Dr» John H, Fenton
Television has an obvious relevance to the study of
political behavior. Television has been cited as the
major source of information for most Americans. It has
also been cited as the most credible source. Thus, it
seems quite apparent that television -has som.e important
influences and effects on political attitudes, public
opinion, and political behavior. The problem is that v^e
do not understand the political effects of television.
In order to understand the political effects of
television
news, it is first necessary to document and understand
the
content of television nev;s. An important problem
here is
that there have been no systematic attempts to
analyze
television news over an extended period.
This study, a system^atic content analysis
of CBS
Evening News ^ith ^."alter Crcnkite, seeks to
fill the
existing void. The analysis • covers the
period of Septem-
ber, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The
analysis used xeroxed
coiDies of transcripts. The analysis
involved a multi-state
process. First, an index of each broadcast
was constructed.
Second ; a frenuency distribution coding
form was constructed
iv
and each news story was coded according to the relevant
variables. Third, the results of the quantitative analysis
were tabulated and analyzed. Fourth, subject areas for the
qualitative analysis were selected, coding rules were estab-
lished, and a qualitative coding form was constructed. Fifth,
the selected areas were analyzed and the results tabulated.
Sixth, a reliability test was conducted.
The Findings:
The following are some of the general findings. First,
CBS covered m.any news stories superficially rather than
emphasizing depth of coverage. The average broadcast had
27.35 news stories with most of these (75.6lf.)
being ^^vents^»
or news stories read by the comir.entator . Second,
CBS News
basically presented political news. Almost 75^^
of the news
stories fell into this category. Third, most (7lf^)
of CBS
News involved the United States. Fourth,
United States
political news was dordnated by coverage of
the national
government which constituted almost h% of the news stories.
Fifth, the Executive branch dominated
coverage of the
national governm.ent. Almost 63^ of the
news stories of the
national governm.ent involved the Executive
branch. Sixth,
alm.ost half (46^0 of the news stories
of the Executive
branch involved coverage of the
Bureaucracy. Seventh, the
c p^r,frr.^iccs "^he Senate accounted
Senate dom.inated coverage of
Congress, ^n :.e
for slightly over 67^. of
congressional news stories. Eighth,
^v.o '^Political*' and ''Social'* Policy
ith United States news, the
Pol al
v;
V
Issues accounted for over 46f? of the United States political
news
.
This study also involved a qualitative analysis of the
following subject areas: l) Vietnam Battle Deaths, 2) Re-
actions To The Conviction of Lt. Galley, 3) The Senate Con-
stitutional Rights Subcomjnittee Hearings on Freedom of the
Press, 4) The Son Tay Prison Raid, 5) Campaign 1970, and
6) Domestic Support and Opposition Towards the Vietnam War.
^V;^ile each subject area was analyzed, only the general
patterns of coverage will be listed. Even though they might
not pertain to each subject area, they were prevalent enough
to justify inclusion. The basic patterns of coverage docu-
mented were: 1) Inaccurate Reflection of Reality, 2) Un-
balanced Coverage, 3) Hualitatively Unbalanced Coverage,
U) Dominance of Executive Branch, 5) Balancing of
Unequals,
6) Seeking Out Opinion, 7) Creating and Determining
Issues,
8) Absence of Issues in Campaign Reporting, 9)
Institutional
Bias, 10) Subjective Role of the Reporter, and 11) Coverage of
a Nonentity,
These were all form.s of "bias- found in those
subjects
which were cualitrtively analyzed. The study
concludes with
a discussion of the com.plexity of bias as
an operational con-
cept. It is argued that instead of just one
form of bias,
there are many forms. Bias, therefore,
is a multi-faceted
concept
•
This study basically documented the
content and the
4-^^ -K-^r n"^<=; t^vpnine:' Nev.'s during
kinds of information presented by ^
^ve ti
vi
an extended period. It is only a beginning, however, tovjards
the greater task—that of understanding the political effects
of television news.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Content of the Research
V.Tiile not the main focus of contemporary political
science, the field of public opinion still remains an area
in need of more comprehensive analysis and understanding.
This is true today considering the degree to v;hich people
talk about the polarized state of public opinion. This is
also true considering the lack of understanding of the
effects of television, especially television news, on
public opinion and political attitudes. Today, television
is cited as the major source of political information.
Since people prim.arily get their political, or politically
related, information from television, it stands to reason
that television could quite possibly have a very important
influence on the formation and change of public opinion and
political attitudes. In fact, television might be very m.uch
related to the degree of polaritv which exists today. How-
ever, it is extremely difficult to estimate the potential or
real effect of television on public opinions and political
attitudes. No substantial research exists that either docu-
ments the content of television news or analyzes the
possibl
effects of television news on public opinion. Thus, it is
the contention of this proposal that there is a
justifiable
need to understand the effects of television news on public
opinion and political attitudes. And, it is a basic con-
tention that in order to understand the possible effects of
television news on public opinion, it is necessary first to
examine and analyze the nature and content of television
nev/s. ^^ithout a full understanding of the content of tele-
vision news, there can be nothing but speculation as to the
possible effects on public opinion and political attitudes.
In order to understand the state of research of the
effects of television news on public opinion, it is best to
briefly review the field of public opinion. This will help
to demonstrate why there has been so little attention paid
to the possible effects of television on public opinion.
The study and analysis of public opinion usually consists
of four perspectives. The first is basically theoretical.
Here, the emphasis is usually on the role public opinion
either does, or ought to, play in a democracy.'' The second
perspective concentrates on the opinion process itself,
basically emphasizing factors involved in the formation of
opinion. Within this perspective such factors as the family,
schools, groups, opinion leaders, and the mass m.edia are
^See Bernard Berelson, and Morris
in Public Opinion and Communication , 2nd Edo (New fork,
rree
WeiiTT966JT^hapti?s 1 and 9; Bernard C. Hennessy, Public
Opinion , 2nd'Edition (Belm.ont, California: ^^uxbury Press
T970), Chapter 2, 8; V.O. Key, Jr., M^lJ^ Q^^^^.^^'
can Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951),
Chapter 21.
3examined to determine their influence or effect on opinion
formation.^ The third perspective involves the opinion con-
text itself. Here the emphasis is on the actual measurement,
description and analysis of public opinion,^ As would be
expected, this is the major emphasis and concentration of the
field of public opinion. The fourth perspective involves the
relationship between public opinion and public policy.^
While these four perspectives all help to explain public
opinion, the emphasis of the field has been towards the meas-
urement and description of opinion. Because of this, the
other three perspectives have not received the same depth of
analysis. This is especially true with the second perspec-
tive—which is relevant to analyzing the effects of television
news. The second perspective concentrates on opinion
form-
ation—though the emphasis is primarily on initial or early
Rin^hlrF^-lS T970TTaJ5^er 1-5rHinnessy Chapters
Key, Chapters 2-11; Lane and ^^^""^ ^ J^^^^^^f/ p^^^^^^
r! Luttbeg (ed.), Oll^J^ion a^^
of Political Ij^nkare (Homewood, Illinois.
Dorsey rresb,
T^68), Chapters 2,3,5 , 6
.
^ee B.relson and ^^-^witz , Section 3 ;
Dreyjr and^
baum, Section 7; Hennessy, ^^T^.^^'ll^^^^''^
'
v; chapters l6-19; Luttbeg, whole
book.
influences—such as the family and the school as socializing
influences.^ The main point of this research has been v/ell-
established—that the family, school and peer groups are very
important factors in attitude and opinion formation. The
same point has been made concerning opinion leaders,^ Thus,
v/ith such agents as the family, school, opinion leaders,
research and analysis has documented their influence. Hov;-
ever, this same depth of analysis does not exist with respect
to the effects on opinion formation or change that mass media
might have; and this is especially true concerning television.
Tn descriptions of the influencing factors of opinion, tele-
vision, like the other forms of media-, is always included,
but there has been no documentation of the effects of tele-
vision. It is assumed to have an influence on opinion, but
this has not been documented on a comprehensive scale.
This
point is expressed by V.O. Key: "Given the limits of
know-
ledge of the Dolitical role and effects of mass
communications,
^For example see Ribhard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt,
Political Soc ialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19^58),
flilT^ton and Jack bennis, -The Child's Image of ^'overnment »,
The Annals of The Anerican Academy of Political and
Social
i^e^?i7^6T-(S^tiibiFlQ6
and Politics (New Haven: Jale University Press 1965),
Robert D ."Fis s and Judith Torrey, Tne Development oi
Political
latitude; in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company
TWrr^rbirF-FRSr; Political Socialization York. The
Free Press, 1959); M. Kent Jennings and Richard G.
Niemi,_
'^^Hterns of Political Learning,- Harvard M-|tion|l
vol. 3^, 1968; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarst
eld
,
Feroonai
Influence (Ne^ Vork: The Free Press
^^^^^^^f
V. Rosenau, Public Opinion And Foreign Policy
(New York.
Random House, 1961.
6Elihu Katz and Paul lazarsfeld Personal
Influence (Hev,
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 195iK
5about all that can be done is to make educated guesses around
the edge of the problem."''''
This lack of analysis of the role of television new/s in
the attitude and opinion process is difficult to justify
—
given that today television is the major source of information.
That television is the major source of information has been
documented. According to An Extended Vievj of Public Attitudes
Toward Television and Other Fass Media - 1959-1971 , "the first
question in every questionnaire has asked people where they
get their news. Television leads today, as it has since 1963,
and it has kept, if not actually increased, the sizeable lead
over newspapers it attained in 1966.'*^. In addition, and ex-
tremely crucial, this study also cites television as being
'"The most believable news medium. Thus, in terms of media,
television is both the major, and the most credible source of
information. Attitudes and opinions have a cognitive ccmpon-
efit—"Which is based on various types of information from
various sources or stimuli. In the context of media, tele-
vision, therefore, would be the greatest and most credible
contribution to the cognitive aspect of attitudes and opinions
The problem, of course, is to determine the amounts
and forms
"^Key, p. 345.
Te
vi sion Information Office, 1971), PP. 1-^.
%oper, p. 3o
of the information internalized and then to determine (in a
political context) the affective and behavioral conseouences
of that information. To do this, it is first necessary to
document and analyze the nature and forms of information
presented by television.
Thus, there is a need to have an understanding of the
forms of television inform.ation. This need has been stated by
others. In 1969, Robert MacNeil argued that the "field is
wide open for research. . . It would be helpful, for example,
to know, over a period of months, what consistent bias, if
any, is detected. ... And some reliable data on what in-
formation viewers really get from the news program.s would
be invaluable. No one really knows.
-""^ McNeil, ^'ho is still
involved in broadcast journalism, recently indicated that
the problem still exists: -Four years ago, after
a thorough
study, I concluded in my book . . . that 'the
real impact of
the (television) medium on the Am.erican dem.ocratic
process is
still too sparsely documented to justify sweeping
conclusions.'
As far as I can determine, that is still
the case.'^^^ Bernard
C, Cohen has written t^a t -there is a
pressing need for good
data on media coverage. Comparative data
on the context of and
the space and play given to, .foreign
policy and dom.estic .olicy.
lORobert MacNail, The People Machine (New
York: Harper &
Row, 196g) , pp. 54-55.
1lRobert I^acNeil, ':^-S^-^-\^:''\;^'^^
vision Alienate Voters?", Politics,
Vol. 1, i-o.
1972, pp. 5-10.
7over a range of issues and of redia , are called for in order
to get extensive and reliable measures of the processing of
1 2
different kinds of issues.'* And, Dennis Thompson states
that '^these theorists' diagnosis of the present state of the
media no doubt contain much truth, though content analysis
that would adequately support it does not exist/*
One explanation for the nonexistence of research on
television news stems in part from the focus of public
opinion research. Within public opinion research the em-
phasis is either on opinion measurement or description, or,
on an understanding of the opinion formation process. The
analysis of television and its role in the form.ation of
public opinion and political attitudes should be integrated
into this latter emphasis of public opinion. However,
tele-
vision is only superficially integrated into the
analysis of
the opinion formation process.
There seems to be a specific reason for this.
-Opinion
formation-, within political science, is basically
conceived
as a -past- process. Thus, analysis of the
opinion formation
process is primarily concerned with factors
which have ex-
erted their influences on the formation
of opinion in the
I2in James N. Rosenau (ed.). Domestic Sou^
Foreign Policy f^ew York: Free Press, 1^67),
n. ^lu.
13T)ennis F. Thompson, T]^ Demc^^
Cambridge University Press, 1971), P.
'lo.
past—rather than the present. Because of this, the emphasis
of analysis is primarily on the role of the family and the
schools in the opinion formation process. VJhile this is
justified, what is needed is extensive analysis of the '^on-
going^ or '^present'* influences on opinion form.ation. Once
the individual is no longer subjected to the direct influences
of the family and schools, what are the factors involved in
opinion formation? While it is known that media is one of the
influencing factors, little analysis has been conducted as to
the precise nature of that influence. Thus, not only is it
vital that the past influences on past opinion or the past
influences on present opinion be understood; but, it is
crucial that the present influences on "present" opinion be
understood.
This is not to say that there has been no work in this
area—because there has. The concept of the funnel of
caus-
ality, as conceived by Cam.pbell (et. al.) and as
modified by
Hennessy, and, Dreyer and Rosenbaum, offers a
theoretical model
and framework for analyzing both past and present
influences
on opinion form.ation.''^ But, other than in voting
studies,
this model has rarely been used in empirical
research. The
1^ee Angus Cam.bell (et. al.), I^e American Vo^_
fNew ^ork- John V'iley and Sons, Inc., 7 rk^^
Company, 1970), pp. ?3-?.7.
9concept of ^^opinion leaders*^ provides a basis for this type
of research. ^ However, even with concepts of opinion leaders
and the "two-step flow of communication,'* the research is not
extensive. The point is that since the emphasis of public
opinion research is not oriented towards "present" influences
on opinion formation—the lack of concentration on television
as a "present" influence is understandable.
Disregarding the lack of research, the role of tele-
vision in the "present" opinion formation process seemiS ob-
vious. As noted, television has been cited as being both
the major source of information and the most credible source.
In addition, television m.ay be the sole source of information
concerning the political and outside world. However, specu-
lating on the role of television on public opinion and po-
litical attitudes is one thing; documenting that role is
another. To properly understand the role of television on
public opinion, three steps are necessary. First, it is
necessary to establish a broader conception of "opinion
forr.ation." Second, it is necessary to document the con-
tent of specific aspects of television—especially tele-
vision news. Third, it is necessary to relate the content
of television vith an analysis of contemporary public
opinions and political attitudes in order to begin to under-
15see Flihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal In-
fluenro (re>, York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1 955); Ja^-es
N.
£|fHi^ , ^ Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Few York: Random
House, 1961).
10
stand the effects of television on public opiniono This
third part is the most difficult and complex as attempts to
understand the effects of any mass communications must take
into consideration a variety of intervening social and psycho-
logical variables,''^ The research proposed in this proposal
will concentrate on the first two steps, but will only, based
on the analysis, speculate on the third step—that of trying
to explain the effects of television on public opinion and
political attitudes.
As mentioned, it seems necessary to establish a broader
conception of the "opinion formation'* process. Actually, this
is more of a change in emphasis. "Opinion form.ation" is re-
strictive in that it has the connotation of actually forming
an opinion. Within this context, "opinion formation" refers
to a process where previously there was no opinion on a subject
and now (at a certain point in time) there exists an opinion
on the subject. However, in opinion description and measure-
ment, the emphasis should be on more than just the "formation"
of opinion since in dealing with "present" influences on
"pre-
sent" public opinion, the opinion has already been formed.
Therefore, to understand the effects of television, it
is
necessary, in addition to understanding how opinion
was formed
on a new subject, to understand how an existing opinion
is
The
T^OTT
^^?ov the best summ.ary of this see Joseph
T. flapper,
ffects of Mass Communications (New York: The
Free Press,
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changed, maintained, reinforced, strengthened, or weakened.
The point is that television could be very influential in
changing, or reinforcing or strengthening opinion relative
to direction and intensity. If "opinion formation'' is
narrowly conceived in terms of "forming'* a new opinion on a
new sub;iect, then much of the potential influence of tele-
vision may be lost through a conceptual limitation. There-
fore, it will be best to conceive of "opinion process" as
a process which involves the addition of new information
stimuli, or cognitions which function to create, form, in-
fluence, reinforce, maintain, alter, change, intensify or
weaken an opinion or set of opinions. _ This conceptualization
does have the advantage of being more precise in the attempt
to understand the effects of television on public opinion
and political attitudes. In many cases television news may
not have "formed'* many opinions, but it may have had a great
effect on changing, reinforcing, or strengthening already
existing opinions.
The second step in understanding the effects of tele-
vision on public opinion and political attitudes entails
documenting and analyzing the content of television. Rela-
tive to television news, most people have an intuitive
notion
of the content of television news-since they experience
it
quite a few times a week. However, for purposes
of analysis,
there exists no long term, systematic analysis
of the con-
tent of television news. As will be demonstrated,
most re-
search concerning television is of a very
limited and super-
12
ficial nature.
Kxistinp; Research o A brief survey of the literature
relevant to possible effects of television on public opinion
and political attitudes indicates that the field is v^ide open
and in need of research. As mentioned, most of the relevant
literature assumes that the media in general do have an in-
fluence on public opinion, but they do not document or ana-
lyze the specific nature of the influence. Also, there have
been very few attempts to document and analyze the content of
television. In order to explain the effects of television on
public opinion and political attitudes, it is first necessary
to understand what kinds of inform^ation are being presented.
Very little available research has done this.
Perhaps the best book to begin with to appreciate the
complexities involved in the political effect of
television
is Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of N^ass
Communications.^'^
In reviewing and analyzing mass communications
and attitude
research of the 1%0^s and 1Q50's, Klapper demonstrates
the
complexity of the intervening social and
psychological vari-
ables inherent in a communications situation.
The complexity
f the situation is such that Klaprer notes
that there is
'^widespread pessimism about the possibilitv
of ever bringing
bout any order to the field.-^^ In
discussing the complexity
of the comj^unications process Klapner
stresses that -mass
0
a
'•'^Ibid.
''^Klapper, p. 2.
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communications ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and
sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions
among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influ-
ences."^ Thus, in dealing v/ith television or any other
media , the nature and causality of effects are difficult to
extrapolate and understand. It is often tempting to assume
the existence of a causal relationship in dealing with the
effects of mass communications. However, because of the
presence of social and psychological variables and "^screens'*,
actually verifying this relationship is extremely difficult.
For some, though, who actually use the media the communi-
cation-effects relationship may not bs so hard to understand.
Based on his experiences, Yippie leader Jerry Rubin has writ-
ten that 'Must being on TV makes it exciting. Even picket
lines look exciting. T\^ creates myths bigger than reality,
. .
.the media does not report 'news,' it creates it. An
event haooens when it goes on TV and becomes myth. . .
.The
media is not 'neutral.' The presence of a camera
transforms
a demonstration turning us into heroes. One, of
course,
can dispute the validity of Rubin's perceptions
as to whether
or not demonstrators are received as "heroes",
but Rubin may
be very representative of those who seek to
use television to
''^Klapner, p. Bo
^^Jerry Rubin, Do It! (Few ^ork: Simon
and Shuster,
1970), pp. 106-107.
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attain "political visibility.'* Political visibility, ex-
posure and publicity are valuable commodities. This explains
why there have been increases in the attem.pts to attain 'Apoli-
tical visibility'* through the use of television. One of the
main devices novj employed, and now being used by nongovern-
mental actors as well as governmental actors, is what has
been referred to as a '*ps eudo -event A '*pseudo-event"' is
an activity which is staged first and foremost to gain tele-
vision coverage. The nature of the activity is secondary to
the main function—securing television coverage. Generating
publicity is, of course, a natural function of government.
Today, however, there is keen competition to attain 'Apoliti-
cal visibility.'^ This emphasis on ''pseudo-events" and attempts
to achieve "political visibility'*, especially by people out-
side of government, does serve to indicate that miany people do
feel that they do understand the effects of television. Also,
they feel that they can manipulate television to achieve their
desired effects.
From the above, two different perspectives emerge. One
is that, because of psychological and sociological compli-
cations, the effects of mass media or television are
almost
impossible to know. The other perspective assumes that
the
effects of television are capable of being understood.
To
put the general problems of the effects of
television on public
opinion and oolitical attitudes into a better
perspective, it
is necessary to examine the relevant work
done within political
science.
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As might be expected, within political science, there has
been speculation about the potential effects of television;
however, there has been a minimum of empirical research con-
cerning these effects. Vfithin political science and poli-
tical analysis most of the speculation concerning the effects
of television news involves its relationship to voting be-
havior. DeVries and Tarrance argue "that for several reasons,
the 1970's will see more ticket-splitting, not less. People
under thirty years of age are oriented to audio-visual media,
principally television, because they are the first generation
to grow up in the environment of this media. They view tele-
vision as a more authoritative news source than print media.
They learn most about politics from television T^'' The authors
contend that ^^ticket-splitters make up their minds mainly on
the basis of the information they get from television news-
casts, documentaries, and specialsl*^^ The idea here is that
television may have much more important effects in the period
between elections—rather than the actual campaign period.
This same idea and appreciation of the importance of television
is expressed in Polls , Television And The New Politics.
Mendelsohn and Crespi argue that "the real political game is
being played m.ore and more between formal cam.paigns rather
^''vralter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket
-
gr)litter (Orand Ranids, Michigan: William B. Eerdman Pub-
lishing Connany, 1^72), p. 117.
22DeVries and Tarrance, d. 11S-119.
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than during them. The playinp: field is the television screen,
and the name of the game is 'exposure."^ Again, the em-
phasis is on television nev/s rather than on exposure during
the campaign period.
Tv/o recent books, The Hidden Crisis In American Politics
and The Real Majority , also discuss the potential effects of
television. _In The Hidden Crisis of American Politics , Samuel
Lubell discusses the im.portance of 'Apolitical visibility /'^^
Lubell argues that ''political visibility" is a "new structure
of political bargaining in that it enables individuals and
25
groups to gain attention for their views and interest."
Lubell contends that the "net effect is likely to be a greater
26
distrust of politics and our political leaders." Specifically,
Lubell asserts that "visibility tends to politicize what it
touches. It is more likely to increase rather than reduce the
public's expectations of what politics and government should
do."^'^ Scamm.on and Wattenberg, The Real Majority , speculate
on the specific effects of television on the 1968 election,
^^Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls , Television
And The New Politics (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Fub-
TiiliiHl TIFT, IQ70, p. 307.
^^Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in Am.erican Politics
(New York: Vf.W. Norton, 1 970 ) , p. 65.
^^Lubell, p. 65.
^^Lubell, p. 67o
^'^Lubell, p. 67-68.
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To them, "The real action is where the real actions isn't
—
where a man just home watches a two minute film clip of
Hubert Humphrey being baited by student militants.'*
Central to their analysis of 1968 is what the authors refer
to as the '*Social Issue.'* The Social Issue is defined as
'*a set of public attitudes concerning the more personally
frightening aspects of disruptive social change. '*^'^ It
should be noted that much of people's experience with the
many dimensions of the Social Issue has approximated a first-
hand experience because television m.akes it a oersonal ex-
perience. Television penetrates. The volatility and in-
tensity of present forms of social cha'nge are not abstract.
They are very real and television has m.ade them very real
for the nonparticipants . It is interesting to speculate on
whether the Social Issue would have had the same degree of
all-encompassing volatility if there had been no television
during this period.
As everyone knows, the last decade has been a period of
intense social conflict. Television has played an influential
role in the scope and direction of the conflicts. A key to
any conflict or the volatility of any conflict is visibility.
Without discussing television Schattschneider discusses this:
2^Richard M. Scammon, and Ben J. V/attenberg, The Real
Majority (Few "^ork: Coward-McCann , Inc., 1970), p. ^'J.
^^^Scammon and Vfattenberg, p. 43.
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"visibility is a factor in expanding the scope of conflict
Television has provided this ''visibility.*' A better perspec-
tive of the role of television is offered by an analogy used
by Schattschneider. He argues that . .the distinctive
quality of political conflicts is that the relations between
the players and audience have not been vjell-defined and there
is usually nothing to keep the audience from getting into the
game."-^'' Extending this analogy, it seems proper to argue
that television has been a major stimulus in increasing the
number of players who get into the game. It has also been a
major stimulus in intensifying the emotional and partisan in-
volvement of the audience. And, if Scammon and Watenberg are
correct in their assessment that the "Social Issue'* was the
most important issue in the 196S Election, then television
may have been the major stim^ulus in determining why the
audience "cheered" some players and "booed" others.
Vietnam, of course, has been one such area of intense
political conflict. VThile the role of television in relation
to attitudes and opinion concerning Vietnam will be discussed
in more detail, two perspectives on the possible effects of
television will serve to indicate that speculation, but little
empirical research, exists concerning the effects of television.
30e.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Vfinston, 1960), p. 16,
•5 "1
Schattschneider, p.
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The authors of Vietnam and the Silent Majority discuss attitude
formation and contend that the great visibility given certain
32issues and conflicts by the media does have important effects.
They argue that greater visibility functions to decrease atti-
tude ambivalence.-^^ Specifically, they assert that the "debate
over Southeast Asian policy has risen to so high a level of
media preoccupation and political struggle that members of
the general public probably feel increasingly compelled to
•31
decide which side they are on." This may be true. A dif-
ferent perspective of the sam^e phenomenon of media preoccu-
3 5
pation with Vietnam is presented by John G. Morris, Morris
develops a theme which seems extremely- important. He notes
.
.that public sympathy seems to lie on the side of Lieu-
tenant Galley, (that this) makes one wonder if the public's
daily diet of televised war coverage has increased public
understanding of the Vietnam ^-"Jar to any noticeable degree.
Perhaps we have had image fatigue?"^ VJhile there is an im-
plicit value assumption inherent in Morris' 'increased
public
32Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verbit, and Phillip Converse
,
Vietnam And The Silent I^aiority (Mew York: Harper and
Row,
1970).
^-^Rosenberg (et. al.), p. S9.
^^Rosenberg (et. al.), pp. 89-90.
35john G. Morris, "This We Remember," Harpers, September
1972, pp. 72-78.
36^orris, p. 77.
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understanding/" it is important to realize that he is dis-
cussing a potentially valid concept. Tlaybe the vivid cover-
age of the v;ar has really done nothing but dull the senses,
or make the war commonplace—rather than increase awarenesso
Maybe there is no incompatibility between these two perspec-
tives. Maybe the political visibility of the Vietnam debate
has served to commit people to a point of view while the
actual visibility of the war has served to dull the salience
and horror of the war. Thus, perhaps television coverage
made the war, per se, less salient and made the debate, and
the manner of the debate, more salient. The point is that
we do not know. There is no empirical research to really
provide a guide,
Vfhile political science has provided little empirical
help in understanding either the content or the effects of
television, it should be noted that journalistic studies have
also not been of much help. Two specific works do deal with
the content of television news. The most relevant work in
this context is The News Twisters by Edith Efron.^"^ The
importance of this book will necessitate further discussion,
but briefly the book is a content analysis of the three
evening network news program.s during the 196^ election
period
Based on her analysis. Miss Efron contends that "all
three
networks clearly tried to defeat Mr. Nixon in his
campaign
^'^Edith Efron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles:
Nash
Publishing, 1971).
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for the presidency of the United States. ''•^^ She documents
how the three networks were '*anti-war'* and ''pro-black militant"
in their coverage during this period. VHiile Miss Efron does
docurrent a "liberal bias"' in the news, the main importance of
the book is that it is the only extended, systematic analysis
of television news. Eve On The V^orld, by Walter Cronkite,
discusses contemporary problems from the perspective of CBS
television news coverage .^'^ This book is not systematic and
it is not meant to be. It does, however, give an insight into
how CBS news perceives the world and its problems.
Other books, written from a journalistic perspective are
worth mentioning—even though they will be discussed in
greater detail. Harry J. Skornia, Television And The News,
discusses, analyzes, and criticizes the news,^"^ Skornia
discusses an aspect of news which is vital to an understanding
of the effects. He argues that television has redefined news:
"'in the newsland of television, where the showman is king, news
is expected to entertain rather than primarily to informT^''
This perspective of news—as entertainment—could yield im-
portant results in trying to understand the effects of tele-
3^Efron, p. 50.
39v:alter Cronkite, Eve On The V^orld (New York: Cowles
Book Company, 1971 )
.
^^Harrv J. Skornia, Television And The News, 1 Critical
Appraisal "(Falto Alto, California: Pacific Bocks, Publishers,
Skornia, p. 29o
22
vision. If people approach, or relate to, news as entertainment,
then the effects are going to be different than if people re-
late to the news in terirs of its information content. This
concept of television as escape and pleasure is discussed in
William Stephenson's The Play Theory of Mass Com^iunication .^^
Robert MacNeil's The People Machine also considers the nature
of television news.^^ MacMeil, who has television news ex-
perience, criticizes television news for its emphasis on the
visual and the trivial, rather than on substance. But, he
is also critical of news coverage of Vietnam. He contends
that television deleted the most '^unbearable" scenes of the
war and that this helped to build up tolerance for the war.
He contends that". . .by cutting out what is m.ost unbearable,
it may be that television has built up a tolerance for the
frightful, a feeling that war really is bearable. '"^^ Politics
And The Press , edited by Richard W, Lee, and President Nixon
And The Press, by Jamies Keough, both give interesting perspec-
tives and interpretations of television journalism and some
^^William Stephenson, The Play Theory of Mass Comm.unication
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^).
Robert MacMeil, The People Machine (Few York: Harper &
Row, 1Q6g).
^SlacNeil, d. 3 5.
^%acFeil, p. 66.
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effects. The latter is especially interesting since it
discusses television news fron the perspective of the Nixon
Administration. Finally, and worth mentioning, is an insight
found in July, 1972, Harpers , '*Is Kennedy The One?"^'^ This
article contained an Oliver Ouayle poll which asked '^;!hom do you
trust the most?'* Possible responses include Nixon, Agnew,
Humphrey, Kennedy, Muskie, McGovern, and Walter Cronkite. In
three different polls, VJalter Cronkite emerged as the '*most
trusted."^ Appreciating the significance of this is perhaps
the best way to really begin to understand the potential
effects television news might have on public opinion, poli-
tical attitudes, and political behavior o Unfortunately, there
exists neither extensive systematic research documenting or
analyzing the content of television news nor systematic
attempts explaining the effects television might have on
public opinion and political attitudes.
Research design . The need to understand the political
effects of television is both obvious and justified. Justi-
fication for this type of research is related to two factors.
First, as made evident by the above discussion, television,
^%ichard V/. Lee (ed.). Politics And The Press (Washington:
Acropolis Books, 1970) and James Keough, President r^ixon and
The Press (Tew York: Funk and V/agnalls, 1972).
^"^"Is Kennedy The One?'" Harpers , July 1972, pp. 39-40.
^^Ibid. p. 40.
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since it is the >ajor'» source of information, has to be one
of the prime influences on present public opinion, political
attitudes and political behavior. Second, while there has
been speculation on the possible effects of television nev^s,
there has been no system.atic, extended analysis of television
news •
It is the contention of this proposal that in order to
begin to understand the effects of television, it is first
necessary to understand the content of television. An under-
standing and an analysis of the content of television news is
the subject of this research proposal.
Specifically, the subject of this proposal is a content
analysis of ''CBS Evening Mews With V.^alter Cronkite.^ This
will be an extended analysis and will cover the period of
September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. This analysis will
be based on xeroxed copies of the actual transcripts of the
CBS Evening News; and, this explains why this analysis in-
volves only one network. While local television stations
are important, their basic news orientation is local news.
Thus, it is the three network evening news programs which
present the most comprehensive summary of national and inter-
national news. Ideally, to properly analyze the effects
television news might have on public opinion and political
attitudes, it would be necessary to analyze the ABC, CBS,
and NBC Evening News Programs. In addition to being the
most comprehensive type of analysis, an analysis of this type
would be of value since the three network Tews Programs could
be comoared to each other. This comparative analysis could
give a different perspective on what kinds of information are
being presented on the Evening News Program.
However, for Dractical reasons, the analysis will only
concern CBS Evening News. The only practical way to analyze
the Evening News Programs is to acquire xeroxed transcripts
of the actual broadcasts. Taping the broadcasts and then
typing the transcripts would be too inconvenient and too
expensive—considering the analysis would extend for one
year. Also, two of the news programs are broadcast at the
same time. Thus, transcripts were needed. In order to ob-
tain transcripts the cooperation of the three networks was
needed. \#iile CRS and ABC did cooperate, NBC did not. This
meant that the analysis would be without NBC—the second net-
work in terms of viewing audience. At this point, other con-
siderations became important. The first consideration was
money. V/hile CBS would permit xeroxing at their facilities
(at ^0i a page), ABC would not. Thus, the cost of xeroxing
the ABC transcripts at an outside agency was estimated to be
anywhere from 15?^ to 25i a page. This would mean, as esti-
mated by the ABC manager of Public Relations, Don Alloway,
that the cost of xeroxing the ABC transcripts would be over
5fe500. This, plus the cost of xeroxing the CBS transcripts
would be too much to assume. The second consideration was
the volume of work involved. Analyzing two news programs
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simply V70uld have been too much work—considering that the
analysis was to be an extended one.
Thus, the decision v/as irade to analyze only CBS Evening
Nev/s. As it was—the cost of xeroxing the CBS transcripts
was $427.00. V.T^.ile double-spaced, the total number of pages
involved with the CBS transcripts was over 4200! This gives
an indication of how much work would be involved in analyzing
two network news broadcasts. The use of CBS seems to be the
best choice since CBS has the biggest audience and since
Walter Cronkite is the most respected and most popular news
commentator. CBS Evening News is acknowledged as being number
one. Thus, the analysis involves only CBS and covers the
period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971 » There is
nothing sacred about this period. Originally, the analysis
was to cover the September 1, 1970, to September 1, 1971,
period, but the xeroxing was not done until October 1971.
By having a longer period of analysis than a year, the analy-
sis will be able to include both the 1970 elections and the
revolt at Attica.
While the nature, scope, method and objectives of the
analysis will be discussed, it should be stated that the
m.ain objective of the analysis of CBS Evening News is to
document and analyze the news. V.Tiile the focus of this anal>''-
sis is not primarily oriented towards an understanding of the
effects of television news in general and CBS News specifically,
it is anticipated that others, with better backgrounds in
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psychology and mass corrmunications could use the findinp:s of
this analysis in their attempts to understand the effects of
television news.
Since the emohasis of the research v/ill be on documenting
and analyzing the content of CBS Evening News, it is important
from the beginning, to make clear the limitations of this
type of analysis. The first limitation has been mentioned.
This is that the analysis includes only CBS—and not the other
two networks. V/hile CBS does have the biggest audience, it
obviously does not have the total evening news audience.
Thus, one has to be very careful in trying to discuss the pos-
sible effects of television news—since with this research,
the only segment of the population directly involved is the
CBS audience. Of interest here is whether or not the CBS's
is similar to the audiences of NBC and ABC News. Also, of
interest is whether or not the CBS audience is representative
of the people of this country. V/ith an audience of over
15,000,000, one would expect a certain degree of representa-
tiveness, but the fact that only one ''audience'* or "public"
is directly involved is important » Also important, is the
degree to which one can assume or generalize that the news
content on CBS Evening News is similar or dissimilar with
the news content of ABC or NBC. Again, this has to
limit the
degree of generalizing about the possible effects of
tele-
vision news, since the nature, emphasis and content of
CBS
news does differ from that of ABC or NBC. Watching
t'wo
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different news programs the same night will verify this. The
main point is that caution should be used in generalizing
based on CBS Evening News and the audience of CBS News. How-
ever, it can be argued that news events are basically covered
in similar ways by the three networks and that the CBS audi-
ence, because of its size, is similar and representative of
the other evening news audiences. Alsc, one could adopt the
Agnewian approach to television news—that they are part of
the "Liberal Establishment/' These two limitations should be
kept in mind.
In addition to only using CBS, there are other limitations
to this research v^hich must be considered. First, the analy-
sis only covers week nights. It was felt that Saturday and
Sunday viewing habits are different from regular week nights
because people are involved in more activities during the
weekends. Also, the weekend format of CBS Evening News is
different, the most important being that V.'alter Cronkite does
not do the weekend broadcasts. V.Tiile this is a technical limi-
tation, the second limitation is crucial. This limitation is
simply that an analysis of the transcripts of a television
broadcast can in no way capture the emotion and feeling and
preciseness of that broadcast. This is the same with an ana-
lysis of television news. Television is a visual medium.
Television news is prim.arily visual. If it were not, the
news would consist of a commentator m.erely reading the news.
Rut, the emphasis of television news is visual description
of what has hannened. This emphasis on the visual is ex-
tremely critical. For many people, the mental and emotional
absorbing of the pictures may be the only real internalizing
they do. The pictures require less effort to absorb and they
make a deeper and more lasting imprint. Also, the types of
social change v^hich have emerged during the 1960's have been
very dramatically captured by the visual medium, A person
reading the newspaner during this Deriod would have a totally
different perspective about v/hat was going on than would the
person who saw and "experienced" the news on television. With
television, one "experiences'* the news; v;ith newsnapers, one
reads the news. Thus, the transcripts can indicate what is
said, but they cannot document how it was said or how it was
shown. For many people, the latter is most important. The
transcripts will, however, catalog the nature and direction
of coverage as well as docum.ent what was said by v;hom. A
knowledge and understanding of this will be an improvement
over the present level of analysis.
Other limitations on this type of research involve the
audience rather than the broadcast. This concerns some of the
major difficulties of mass cominunications research. For ex-
ample, while the transcending question of this research will
be "'-•/hat kinds of information are being presented?", it is
important to consider a second question—"V/hat kinds of in-
formation are being received?" An analysis of television
news has to consider this second question since different
peo]iple "receive" information in different wayr:. Diffcr-n--3
30
in intelligence, interest, motivation, perception, personality,
ideology and frequency of exposure all "cause'' different
individuals to internalize and absorb different amounts of
information in different ways, shapes and forms. It is
important not only to consider hovi much information is re-
ceived, but to consider under what psychological terms the
information is received. Related to this is the nature of
the transcripts. The transcripts only document the audio
portion of the broadcast. As mentioned, television is a
visual medium, and thus, transcripts can only capture one
dimension of the multi-dimensional medium. Since television
is a visual medium, it is important to consider just how
much of the audio portion will actually be internalized. In
considering the possible effects of television news, it is
important to know that perhaps most people really listen to,
or pay attention to only half of the broadcast. Some people
simply do not have the interest or background to be fully
attentive to both the narrated news—and the visual news.
While these limitations on research based upon an analy-
sis of transcripts of news programs are important, they are
not severe enough to counter the value of such research. The
point of this discussion has been to indicate that any analy-
sis of the media should be well aware, in advance, of the
potential problems and limitations. Vmile the proposed analy-
sis of CBS Evening News is far from comprehensive, it will be
comprehensive enough to provide a good insight and understand-
ing of the nature and content of television news. This alone
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seerrs to be Justification for the research. The basic justi-
fication, hov;ev^~-r, is sirply that for most people, television
is the FC.ior source of inforrr.ation
; yet, there exists no ex-
tended, systerr.atic analysis of television news.
As irentioned, the actual analysis is based on xeroxed
transcripts of CBS Evening News. The period of analysis is
September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The basic and pri-
mary objective of the research is to document and to analyze
the content of CBS News during the period of analysis, A
secondary objective v;ill be to discuss and try to relate the
findinfrs of the analysis to some of the public opinion in-
dices of this period, V.T^ile this secondary objective will be
interesting, it should be noted again that the main function
of the research is to docum.ent and analyze the nature of CBS
News, The secondary objective does lead in the direction of
considering the effects of television on Dublic opinion and
political attitudes. However, within the scope of this
research there will only be speculation and discussion, based
on the findings of the analysis, of the possible effects.
This analysis will address itself to three major ques-
tions. The first concerns the frequency and nature of the
news. The first question is: 'mat amounts and forms of
information are being presented?" The m.ain objective here is
to describe, document, and analyze the frequency of occurrence
of different subject areas and stories, vmile this will be
quantitatively and qualitatively superficial, it will not be
without value. It will give a superficial indication of -what
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has actually been presented. In addition to documenting the
quantitative frequency, it will be possible to document the
qualitative frequency. \Jh±le it is important to know how
many stories were about Vietnarr, it is important to know
substantially how many reports were negative towards Vietnam
and how many were positive. Also, a quantitative-qualitative
frequency distribution will give a good indication of how CBS
sees the world. It will give a precise indication of what CBS
sees as important; and, by omission, what it does not consider
to be important. VTiat CBS conceives as being important and
unimportant is not a neutral decision without political con-
sequences. That CBS has considered, and given much exposure
to ''protest" groups has not been a neutral act
—
given the one-
dimensional direction of most ""protest'* groups. And, the amount
of exposure given to them has very possibly had effects on
public opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior.
Mews broadcasting involves selectivity. Selectivity, according
to David Broder, '*is the essence of all contemporary journalism.
, . .Nov;, selectivity, which is the essence of the procedure,
involves criteria. Criteria mean value judgments. And value
judgements are just fancy words for pre judices . A fre-
quency distribution will give an insight into the "prejudices'*
of CRS and will give a summary of what actually has been pre-
sented,
^^David S. Broder, ''Politicians and Biased Political
Inform.ation,'^ in Richard V/. Lee, ed. , Politics and Tl_e PrzJJi
(Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1 ^70 ) , p . 62.
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The second transcending Question of the analysis is re-
lated to the value imnlications involved v/ith selectivity
and frequency of presentation. This second question deals
directly vjith values. The second question is: ^fT^at are
the directions of information and opinion?" As Mr. Broder
asserts
,
the presentation of news is based upon selectivity
—
which itself is based on value judgments. News is not neu-
tral since it is a reflection of some of the major political
and social conflicts of the day. Since news is not neutral,
it is important to measure and document the direction of
the news. This involves two dimensions. One is simply the
direction of the nature of the story or the report. Reports
on the corruption of Thieu's regim^e , the Watergate episode,
McC-overn's problems with his campaigns are all examples of
stories—which by their very nature and which without ex-
pressed opinion do have an obvious affective or Dro-con
direction. In the three examples, the reporting may be
totally "factual^' and objective.''" This does not mean that
there is no value content or direction to the stories for
there obviously is—especially if one is, respectively, a
defender of our Vietnam effort, a Republican, or a McGovern
supporter. For all three, the inclusion of these stories
would be dissonant creating. The second dimension of mea-
suring direction involves opinion. Opinion manifests itself
in different ways. It can be expressed by the commentator,
it can be expressed by the participants of the story,
or it
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can be expressed by the reporter. All three are extremely
crucial and have to be measured qualitatively and quantita-
tively. All three are vital elem.ents of the nature of tele-
vision news. According to Edith Efron, 'It is the opinion
element in a story that contains the evaluative element. It
is the element in the story that states not .lust what is , but
also what ought to be; that states what is good and bad about
the situation being reported on; that positions pro and con.
It is the most emotionally loaded of all the elements in a
story. '"5^
The third transcending question is very much interre-
lated with the expression and measurement of opinion. The
third question is: '*\'/hat are the patterns of frequency and
access of opinion or point of view?'* The interest here con-
cerns the selectivity of opinion. The concern is—which
groups, people, philosophies, opinions have access. Is
there an equality of access—or do some points of view and
philosophies have an easier time receiving exposure while
other groups and philosophies have a much more difficult
time? This selectivity of direction or opinion is crucial.
First, television by '^selecting'" what or whose opinion will
be expressed helps to shape and define the debate of major
issues. Second, in this age of protest, and publicity, it is
vital for many oDinions and philosophies to acquire '*politica
^^Efron, pp. 24-25.
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visibility.'' >/ho acquires "political visibility" is deter-
mined by the news programs. Third, it might be the patterns
of access of different philosophies and groups is related to
the effects of television on public opinion and political
attitude. People respond to what they have seen on television:
they do not respond to what they have not seen. Therefore,
their responses are, in part, a function of the selectivity
decisions of television. VThat should be determined by the
analysis is whether or not the selectivity process is an
eauitable and fair one. Do the ""major'* groups and philo-
sophies have a relative equality of access? Or, do certain
groups and philosophies have easier access? The analysis will
answer this and will also determine, if there is an inequality
of access, the nature and direction of that inequality.
Inherent in the above questions is the problem of bias.
From the beginning, it should be strongly emphasized that
documenting bias and unbalanced coverage is not the basic
objective of this resenrch. The basic objective is to docu-
ment and to analyze the nature and content of the news. A
mere docum.enting of bias would be too superficial and would
not tell very much about the totality of the news. However,
within the scone of this research, it is imoerative to ex-
amine CBS' view of the world. The CBS view of the world is
obviously important since it is the one viewers are exposed
to. Thus, while documenting bias is not the main
objective,
it is crucial to discuss it and to examine the
effects it
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might have on public opinion and political behavior.
The concept of bias will be discussed in r.ore detail in
further sections. At this point, however, it is important to
discuss the two forms of bias—institutional and ideological.
Institutional bias is bias which emanates from limits of tele-
vision. Because the evening news is less than thirty minutes,
there obviously has to be a high degree of selectivity. There
is neither time for all stories and reports nor time for de-
tailed analys^es or explanations. The emphasis of the evening
news is on the visual—and this structures the news in certain
ways. Thus, the very nature of television will impose limits
on the presentation of news and will function to structure the
news and news coverage. Vfhat is often exciting, dramatic, or
emotional will receive precedence over the less visually ex-
citing stories. It is quite possible that this type of in-
stitutional bias does have some important effects. It makes
the news ^^fun.'* The news becomes entertainment. It is pos-
sible that the entertaining aspects of the news function to
subordinate the legitimate stories both in terms of impact and
importance. For example, it was extremely difficult to think
seriously of the world and its problems while the evening news
was totally immersed in the Howard Hughes-Clifford Irving
fiasco. During this period, news was "fun" and entertaining,
but it was not necessarily relevant. Also, if viewers per-
ceive of something like the Hughes-Irving situation as news,
there may be less of a tendency to consider the real stories
(Vietnam) as being realo
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The second form of bias, ideological, is the more
comjnon form. This involves vjhether or not there is a rela-
tive equality of both sides of an issue, a controversy, or an
opinion. The Fairness Doctrine of the FCC states that there
should be this relative balance. When there is bias, there
is an inequality of coverage—which is manifested in various
ways. One way concerns the selection of stories. By empha-
sizing certain stories (Am.erican atrocities in Vietnam) and
not covering other stories (Viet Cong atrocities in Vietnam.)
,
CBS can give a certain view of the world which has definite
ideological content. Another form concerns the selection of
subjects within a story. A good example of this is a story
CBS had concerning the student vote in the 1972 election.
(The date of the story was October 23, 1972.) CBS used four
universities as being indicative of college students. The
four were Harvard, the University of Wisconsin, the University
of Ceorgia, and Berkely! Obviously, these schools were not
representative of U.S. colleges and would thus give 'distorted
or unrealistic views of student opinion. A third form of bias
is a oucntitative one involving which point of view receives
the greatest amount of coverage or exposure. Both the quan-
tity and the direction of opinion in this case can be mea-
sured and documented. Related to this is a qualitative form
of bias. This is when both sides of a controversy are
pre-
sented, but one side has knowledgeable, credible, and
well-
known spokesmen whereas the opposing side is represented
by
3d
unknown and less credible spokesmen. Another form of bias is
that of the reporter or the comm.entator
. They can, and often
do, include editorial comments of their own. Opinion is often
part of the reporter's repertoire. While there are various
forms of ideological bias, the importance of it is that it
conveys certain benefits—such as exposure and qualitative
and quantitative superior coverage—on certain ideological
groups, issues, or opinions
i
If it can be documented, and it appears that it can, an
understanding of the nature and direction of the CBS view of
the world is imperative to an understanding of the effect of
the news on loublic opinion and political attitudes. V/ithin
the context of this research, it is hypothesized that there
is a definite '*liberal^'' bias, direction, or sympathy to CBS
news and that this can be documented. V.'hile this will be
discussed in more detail, some of the dimensions of this
"liberal" direction can be mentioned. Based on (1) viewing
of CBS Evening News during the period of analysis and (2) a
reading and classifying of the transcripts of CBS Evening
News for this period, it does seem clear that there is an
obvious ideological direction to CBS News. Some of the
dimensions of this are that CBS has been "Anti-Vietnam",
pro-"Social Protest," pro-liberal point of view", and anti-
Nixon Administrationo VTiile these are just general cate-
gories, they will attain more substance and significance as
they are related to the analysis. Based on exposure to CBS
Evening News, it does seem that CBS does separate the world
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into "^Good Guys'' and ''Pad Guys^ and that the "Good Guys" have
quantitatively and qualitatively superior coverage and ex-
posure. Some examples of this will demonstrate the nature of
CBS coverage.
As mentioned, CBS seems to be very much against the
Vietnam War. One possible effect of this is that their
coverage of Vietnam may convey an unrealistic picture of
what is actually happening in Vietnam. For example, and this
can be measured, it seems that the nightly news clips on
Vietnam battle action have a tendency to emphasize and to
concentrate on situations where U.S. and/or vSouth Vietnamese
troops are being ambushed, attacked, or defeated. Thus, the
view is that the ^'orth Vietnamese and Viet Cong are "winning.'*
However, this view seem.s at variance with the weekly casualty
reports (even given their inaccuracies). The weekly casualty
reports show the l^^orth Vietnamese and Viet Cong as "losing."
V/hich is real?
Another example of this involves the CBS view of youth.
Samuel Lubell has asked the question: "Is what becom.es vis-
ible truly representative of the whole?"^'' Mews, by its very
nature, deals with the "unrepresentative." However, this has
some imDortant consequences in relation to youth since most of
the coverage of youth is presented in an ideological context.
This is important because of the intense competition for
"political visibility." Are the youth who receive coverage
in a political context, representative of all youth? The
5lLubell, p. 66.
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answer is no in two respects. First, it is usually only
college sLudents, who are a minority among youth but who are
loud, vocal and organized, who receive coverage. Second,
among college youth, those who receive the coverage are those
of a liberal or leftist persuasion. How often does television
give exposure to noncollege youth or conservative college
students? If the reply is that they are not "news" because
they neither demonstrate nor "protest", then this is a good
example of institutional bias—where only those who are active
deserve coverage. This view, however, has important conse-
quences in that it is both misleading and unrepresentative.
It is misleading in that the leftist views expressed by those
who receive coverage do not coincide with those of all youth.
It is unrepresentative in that those who receive coverage
are not representative of all youth. Youth are not mono-
lithic; yet, the view of youth on CBS News seem.s to present
just one segment of youth. This can be m.easured.
A further example of the CBS view of the world, which most
likely has had effects on public opinion and political atti-
tudes, is the emphasis on social protest and the techniques of
social protest. Regardless of the motivation, it does seem
that television in general, and CBS, specifically, may have
been sym.pathetic to the "protest movement." Protest, espec-
ially anti-war protest, involving scenes of chanting, marching,
and sometimes disruption, are familar scenes to television
viewers. To some, the protesters have received a dispro-
portionate amount of coverage. This emphasis on protest
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seems to have had two different political effects—one func-
tional and one dysfunctional, depending on one's point of view.
One effect is that television has Dublicized the manner
and efficacy of different forms and techniques of protest.
This coverage has been a learning experience for those who
would later use the same techniques. Without television
coverage, would the shape, form, and amount of social pro-
test have been the same? The answer is probably no. A
second possible effect involves the public's reaction to the
demonstrations and social protest. Has the public's reactions
been generally favorable or unfavorable? In their national
1971 public opinion study, Cantril and Roll state that "our
most startling finding, however, was a new and urgent concern
over national unity, political stability, and law and order.
Vmile one cannot ''blame'' television for this concern, is it
unrealistic to speculate that the dimensions and inte^-isity of
the "concern" would have been different if television
had not
been so svmpathetic and accessible to organized protest?
V.'hat
is interesting is that television still emphasizes
social pro-
test while giving no coverage to those who are
"concerned"
about protest and stability. Thus, television
has structured
the debate, but it has left out some very
important players-
those who do not have political visibility
because their form
5?Albert H. Cantril, Charles V.^ Roll, Jr.,
Hones and
Of The American People (New York: Universe
Books, 19711, p.
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of expression is not amenable to television coverap;e. Tele-
vision emphasizes dramatic and organized behavior or m.odes of
expression. The average ran is neither dramatic nor organized.
Thus, he is not politically visible. He does, however, seem
to be very upset about what he sees the politically visible
doing on television. Isn't it quite possible that the popu-
larity of Nixon, Agnew, and VTallace has been related to what
the average man and woman have seen the politically visible
doing on television? It seems that this excessive exposure
has bred sympathy and identification for the various forms of
social protest—but it has also bred contempt. The extensive
coverage m.ay have been dysfunctional since the extent of antag-
onism may have exceeded the extent of identification.
From the above, it should be obvious that while bias is
not the main concern of this research, the CBS view and inter-
pretation (whether "biased'^ or not) of the world is central
to an understanding of "what forms of information are being
presented?'* V/ithin this context, there are three important
questions which can be answered by this research. V/ho are
the politically visible? Is there a consistent political or
ideological direction to those who are politically visible?
Is there a sense of proportion between those who are visible
and the strength of the ideology or point of view they
represent? A brief examination of some of the events and
units of analysis will help to relate these questions to
the
actual researcho
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The following are some of the events which occurred
during the period of analysis—vSeptember 1, 1970, to
October 15, 1971: Vietnam, Paris Peace Talks, Vietnam Debate,
My Lai Trials, 1970 Elections, Attica, political trials, SST,
Pentagon Papers, wage-price freeze, and China trip announce-
ment. In addition, there are many subject areas which will
be examined. Some are: coverage of the President, Congress,
congressional spokesmen, Presidential-congressional relations,
Presidential-press relations, busing, social protest, civil
rights, coverage of Blacks, Black spokesmen, visible groups,
youth, students, middle class. Southerners, law and order
syndrome, ecology, pseudo-events, Fixon Administration spokes-
men and critics, themes and symbols. IVhile some of these will
pose problems, it does seem that they can be defined, identi-
fied and measured. V^ithin these events and subject areas,
the concern will be on access, opinion, and direction. V/ho
has access? \^fho is the source of opinion? V/hat is the amount
and direction of coverage and opinion?
With these events and subject areas some very important
questions can be asked. For example, in the Paris Peace
Talks, who receives the most coverage—the U.S. or the North
Vietnamese? Vmo speaks for Congress? V.Tnat is the balance
between coverage of the President and coverage of Congress?
Who speaks for the Blacks? Does television actually rein-
force stereotypes? In the Vietnam debate who has received
the most coverage? Is there a relatively equal balance of
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coverage given to conservatives and liberals? V/hat is the
view of youth, the South, the middle class? V/hat type of
coverage did the "presidential" candidates receive? An
important area to examine v/ill be the "political" and mili-
tary trials. Is the coverage similar between the two types
of trials? The 1970 election and interpretation are impor-
tant. V.^as the coverage balanced? V/as it important that CBS
said that the main issue in 1970 was the economy—when their
own poll indicated that law and order was more important?
Does protest have to be organized, dramatic and visual to
receive coverage? Is "nongovernmental" opinion balanced or
is it primarily negative or critical?- V.T-io receives more
coverage—Senators or Representatives? These are some of
the questions and problems which can be examined by the
research. While all are not of equal importance, the events,
subject areas, and questions discussed do give an indication
of the types of information and opinion presented by CBS. A
knowledge and understanding of this will contribute to an
understanding of the effects of television news on public
opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior.
A final point concerns the m.ethod of analysis—content
analysis. Content analysis is a "systematic technique for
analyzing message content and message handling— it is a tool
for observing and analyzing the overt comjnunication behavior
of selected communication."^^ The standard communication
Ana
p. 2,
53pichard Budd, Robert K. Thorp, Lewis Donohew, llcntont
Ivsis of Communications (I^^ew York: The I-acmillan Co., iVo/;,
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process consists of the Source, the Message, the Channel,
and the Receiver, Content analysis focuses on the Message
as its unit of analysis, but does integrate the other three
elements into the analysis. For example, in this research,
the Source, ^'^alter Cronkite, is extremely important. He
projects an image which is obviously related to his high
credibility and which would be related to how the audience
perceives some of the news. Cronkite is well-known, has
celebrity status, has a kind, fatherly image, and is trusted.
These comm.odities would contribute to how the audience does
perceive the news. It is quite possible that people choose
their evening news program solely on the basis of who the
commentator is—rather than using the format, perspective or
direction of the program as the criteria. Also crucial to
this research is the Channel—television.
Television, as a Channel, is crucial because of its
authority. Using circular reasoning, people seem to per-
ceive that what is on television is true and accurate
—
because it is on television. Thus, what is on television
becomes authoritative and credible—again because it is on
television. \Jhat is seen is believed—especially by those
who primarily use only television as their source of in-
formation. Because television is a visual medium, there is
very little basis to question or doubt what is seen. Tele-
vision is also a factor because of the way it structures
the message. Again, because television is a visual medium,
certain types of coverage—the visual—are emphasized. This
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in turn can provoke certain types of behavior in attempts
to gain ''political visibility. '» And, television is imDor-
tant because of its immediacy. Television makes the audience
seem as if they are there—with a minimum amount of effort
or imagination.
Vfhile the Receiver is not the immediate focus of this
research, his perceptions, opinions, and political behavior
in the context of television are the ultimate orientation of
this type of research. Important to note is that there are
many types and qualities of Receivers. It is vital to stra-
tify them in relation to v/ho they are, how they perceived
the Message, and, what they do with it. For example, CBS
News will have different effects on: the Mixon Administration
other government leaders, opinion leaders, average people,
students, and noncollege youth.
The actual analysis will focus on the Message of CBS News
This entails two interrelated levels of analysis
—
quantitative
and qualitative. ¥±th both levels there will be the problem
of construction of categories. This is vital. Budd (et al.)
assert that '"no content analysis is better than its categories
for a system of categories, is, in essence, a conceptual
scheme .""^^ Vfhile some of the categories have been constructed
more will be devised. Related with this is the problem of
direction. Direction will be measured by such qualities as
—
positive-negative, pro-con, balanced-unbalanced, favorable-
neutral-unfavorable. These Qualities will be defined and
54Budd, (et al.) d. 39.
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explained as to what they actually signifyo
V/hile the quantitative and qualitative analyzes focus on
different elements, they are interrelated. Quantitative ana-
lysis is concerned with frequency of categories or analytical
units. For example, the amount of coverage given to such
categories as Social Protest, Fixon Administration, and
Vietnam War can be measured. This is the lowest level of docu-
menting the kinds of information which is being presented. A
more abstract level will be documented by the qualitative
analysis. This will measure the qualitative nature, tone, and
direction of the coverage and will give a more precise under-
standing of the forms of information being presented. For
example, this will document the positive, neutral, and nega-
tive coverage of Nixon's Vietnam policy. In addition, the
research will combine certain quantitative and qualitative
elements. This would document the frequency of certain types
of coverage. Thus, it would be possible to determine the
frequency and percentage of "pro"- and "anti"_ Vietnam coverage.
V/hile this research may be unique, there are certain
procedures which are endemic to any content analysis. Cate-
gories and Qualitative measurements will have to be defined
and explained, '^ests of reliability and validity will have
to be m.ade. The uniqueness of this research, though, will
have consequences. Use of a computer would not be of value
—
because of the size of the analysis and because there will
be so many different units of analysis. Sampling will not
be used. The focus of the research is to document the
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the coverage of different units and subject areas over an
extended period. It is anticipated that, by documenting the
quantitative and qualitative nature of "CBS Evening News" over
an extended period, a more precise understanding of the forms
and directions of the information being presented can be
attained. This will also give an indication of the patterns
of access on network television news. From this, with further
refinement, it may be possible to determine the effects of
television news on public opinion, political attitudes, and
political behavior. Research such as this can lead the way©
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CHAPTER II
REVro^ OF THE LITERATURE
The previous chapter has indicated the need for ex-
tended, systematic analysis of television news. It is
obvious that an understanding of television news content
does not guarantee an understanding of the political effects
of television news. It is the argument of this paper, how-
ever, that an understanding of the content of television news
is requisite to an understanding of the political effects of
that news. It is the purpose of this_ chapter to review the
literature relevant to the nature, content, and effects of
both television and television news. This will give an
accurate indication of the nature and extent of this type
of research. It should be noted that it is not the function
bf this chapter to examine the literature in depth. Rather,
the concern is to document the literature and to give brief,
superficial impressions of what others are saying about the
content and effects of television. Thus, while the number
of sources examined will be extensive, the analysis of
each
will be limited. The review will concentrate first on the
content of television and television news and second,
on the
effects of television and television news.
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Nature and Content of Television and Television Nevjs
Analytical approaches to television, in a political con-
text, seem to consist of one of tv/o types » They are either
very general or very specific. Works dealing with the press
(including television) are usually general in nature while
studies of television news are very specific—usually dealing
with a very short period of analysis. The more general liter-
ature will be discussed first under the categories of (1) The
Press and Television, (2) Television and Politics, and
(3) Television News. To understand the nature of television
news, it is imperative to examine it from these perspectives.
The press and television . Some books discuss television
from, the perspective of journalism. V/hile the main orientation
of this type of work is journalism, these are important in
that they involve aspects of broadcast journalism, or they
examine elements which are common to both the paper and the
electronic press. Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering In V/ashington , is
one example.'' Although dated, this study of newsm.en's atti-
tudes and perceptions does include more than the usual anec-
dotal description of newsmen. VThile not differentiating be-
tween paper and electronic newsm.en, the main subject of the
study pertains to both. James Aronson, The Press and the
Cold War, analyzes the role and the behavior of the press
as
^Dan Fimmo, Newsgathering In Washington (New York:
Atherton Press, 1964.
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it relates to the cold v.-ar.^ The period of 1945 to Vietnam
is covered. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy
, centers
rrainly on the parser press. ^ Bagdikian does, though, include
discussions of television as the President's medium as well
as Johnson's and ''^ixon's Dress relationships. About Tele-
vision, by T'^artin Payer, is similar to the many general works
on television in that it devotes only a small portion to
television nev;s.^ Mayer does provide a good description of
the actual operation of CBS Evening News,
Television and politics . Much of the current writing
about the press discusses the relationship between the press
and various aspects of the political process. Even though
many of these are general, in that they pertain to much more
than television news, they are valuable since television in
a political context has sim.ilar characteristics with tele-
vision news.
The perspective of many books dealing with the press
(and television) and politics involves the natural tension
which exists between the political and journalistic worlds.
^James Aronson, The Press and the Cold I'rt (New York:
Bobbs -Merrill Company, Inc. , 1 ^70)
.
^Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspira cy (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 197'2T^
' Vartin Thayer, About Television (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers,' 1972).
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This adversary relationship is the subject of VJilliam L,
Rivers, The Adversaries
, Politics and the Press . ^ Rivers
discusses this adversary relationship in terms of a 'Melicate
balance.'* He concludes that ''the proper role of a political
reporter is that of an adversary."^ One problem, and one
discussed by Rivers, entails the nature and extent of this
adversary relationship. An excellent work which also dis-
cusses this adversary relationship is George F. Wills (ed.)
Press, Politics, and Popular government ."^ Since this is
based on a panel discussion, it involves diverse points of
view. Robert Bartley argues that the liberal-conservative
dimension is not the best way to classify journalists and
reporters. Instead, a more meaningful perspective is an
"idealist-practical axis,"^ Bartley contends that
journalists tend to be representative of an idealistic
elite, which presum.ably functions to articulate values
and ideals for the larger society. Perhaps because
others are rejecting the values and ideas the idealistic
elite has been offering, a significant gulf has grown
between it and the rest of society.^
The press, he continues, ought to re-examine its role. It
5T;^illiam L. Rivers, The Adversaries , Politics and the
Press (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970),
^Rivers, p. 47
'^George F. V/ill , Press , Politics and Popular Government
(Washington, D.C,: American Enterprise Institute for Public •
Policy Research, 1972).
%ill, p. 11.
.
\ill, p. 14.
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should concentrate on the '^competing elites that are discus-
sing policies and on the policy-makers themselves In
responding to Bartley, Rowland Evans contends that there
always will be a credibility gap and that this gap between
the ''producers and the consumers of the news is healthy "^^
Other points of view discuss the actual content of news.
Cater argues that
. .most reporters are not much con-
cerned with personality and conflict."^ ^ Kristol mentions
other problems. He states that television is the ^slave of
13
the . . . camera.'* It is, he says, the camera which dic-
tates what is and what is not television news. This usual
criterion oversimplifies complex issues and mobilizes ''the
audience's emotions around a vivid, simplified, essentially
melodramitic vision of a political world, in which praise and
blame are the magnetic poles.'* ^
A similar work is Richard W. Lee (ed.), Politics and the
Press.'' ^ Examined here are such subjects as: '*the role of
the press in presidential politics'*, press coverage of poli-
tics, ''biased political information'*, selection, credibility
^^will, p. 26.
''"'will, p. 30,
"'^Will, p. 34.
''^Will, p. 4B.
Hviii, p. 51. •
''^Richard V^ Lee (ed). Politics and the Press (V/ashing-
ton. D.C.: Acropolis Rooks, 1^70).
and ^television distortion in political reporting." In this,
Cornwell refers to the press-politics relationship as an
"antagonistic one."''^ He notes the importance of "image
capital" to the President. Rovese, in "Inhibitions of the
Truth," examines such inhibitions as the journalists' selec-
tive processes, the notion of a journalistic elite and the
adversary nature of the press-politics relationship. ^ All
these combine to inhibit the "truth." According to David
Broder, however, there is no such thing as "truth":
.
.we have to realize that there is no such thing as a
totally neutral, objective portrait of the world that can
emerge from contemporary journalism."^ Journalists, there-
20fore, should be aware "of our prejudices and built-in biases."
In discussing the press-politics relationship, Broder asserts
that this cannot be a "neutral" relationship, ' instead, it
is a "manipulative" relationship—one in which both attempt
22to exploit or manipulate the other. '
Other writers in this work are concerned with problems
of selection. "News," argue Lang and Lang, "becomes increas-
Lee, p. 18,
^'^Lee, p. 19.
''^Lee, p. 3^.
''^Lee, pp. 62-63,
20t AOLee, D. d2,
21
Lee, P. o3,
22
Lee, D. 156,
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ingly—for millions of Americans—that which is televised.
That which is televised, however, can be a function of the
camera, emphasis on the visual, or the behavioral effects of
being televised. Television, the Langs contend, is a ''medium
of confrontation. People become agitated over issues with
which they have little familiarity, and react to them as if
they really knew.'*^^
Other important books deal with the press and politics
from different perspectives. From the perspective of CBS,
William J. Small has written two relevant books: To Kill a
Messenger and Political Power and the Press . '^5 Of the two,
the former is the more relevant. James Keough, President
Nixon and the Press , examines the press-politics relationship
from the perspective of the Mixon Administration. 2^ V/hile on
may not agree with the interpretations of the book, the book
is important because it gives a different perspective of
events covered by the media. Thus, it is possible to con-
trast the Administration's interpretation of an event with
with the media's (including CBS) interpretation. The major
23Lee, p. 156.
'
^^Lee
,
p. 1 61
.
^^'/illiam J. Small, To Kill a Messenger (New York:
Hastings House Publishers, 1970), and Political Power and
the Press (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972).
^^Jam.es Keough, President Nixon and the Press (New York:
Funk and V/agnalls, 1972).
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thesis of the book seems to be that
there was that overriding, deep concern that the
Washington news corps and the staffs of the major
national media were so biased that the Administration
would not get a fair break through them. As the
months went by, there was considerable evidence to
support that point of view.py
A related category of works worth examing entails those
which, while not concentrating on television news, do ex-
amine television in a political context. Often, much of what
they do say about television in general does incorporate
important elements which do pertain to television news. Their
orientation, however, is usually towards the political cam-
paigning aspect of politics.
Two such books are: Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television
and American Politics and Bernard Rubin, Political Television .^
Whereas Chester presents an historical analysis of radio and
television, Rubin discusses television in the context of the
early 1960's. A similar, though more specific work is
2Q
Robert E. Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics .
As the title indicates, the work concerns itself with the
impact of television or presidential campaigning. This does
present a good review of oast presidential campaigns from the
perspective of television impact.
^'^Keough, p. 60.
^^dward Chester, Padio , Televisi on, and American
Politics frew ^ork : Sheed and ^''ard , 19o§T, Bernard f^ubin
,
Politic? ! 7'^levision ' (Belmont, California: V/adsworth Publish-
Uompany, inc., 1^07 ).
29Rob°rt K. Gilbert, Television and Pre siden-y,.al politics
(No. Ouincy, Mass.: ChristopherTubTTshmglTouse , 19/'^)
Lang and Lang also analyze the impact of television on
events and politics in Politics and Television
. In dis-
cussing the impact of television on such events as MacArthur
Day, the 195? conventions and the I960 presidential campaign,
they argue that television "presents a refracted image of
the events it reports. Of more relevance, however, is
their analysis of the '*television personality" and the"in-
timacy" of television. The "television personality" is ana-
lyzed in the context of (l) television performance,
{?) political role, and (3) personal image. While their
concept of "intim.acy" is discussed basically in terms of
political campaigning, it does have relevance to television
news, since television news does convey this same sense of
intimacy. For many, this sense of intimacy is their basic
contact with the political world. In an extended passage
worth citing, the Langs discuss the nature and importance
of television's intimacy,
. .
.there is widespread belief in the intimacy of
television, and this, in itself, makes a difference.
V/hen the formats of political telecasts are adapted to
this belief, they 'Emphasize the personal qualities of
the politician rather than his purely political quali-
fications, or how well equipped he is to handle a par-
ticular role. At the same time, viewers believe that
they have "seen for themselves," and their visual im-
pressions suggest to them the "real" personal qualities
of the familar face. In all of this, the contribution
^^Kurt Lang, Gladys Lang, Politics and Television
(Chicago: Ouadrangle Books, 1 968 )
.
^^Lang and Lang, p. 295.
of television is made through its sensory realism,
through the errphasis it places on symbols directly
accessible to experience. The heterogeneity of
views on complex policy matters and public problems
can be factored down to simple alternatives. The
search for "truth" becomes a search for "trust."
Principles and methods become less important than
"sincerity
."^2
Vfhile the Langs approach television from a scholarly
perspective, an inside perspective is offered by Robert
Mac^^eil and Slg Michelson. MacMeil was associated with NBC
News while Michelson worked for CBS News. Of the two works,
Robert MacNeil, The People Machine, The Influence of Television
on American Politics and Cig Michelson, The Electric Mirror
,
Politics in an Age of Television
,
MacNeil is more important
in the context of television news,-^^ MacNeil, in referring
to network news, argues that
their content demonstrates capricious selection, due not
only to lazy news judgment, but to the unshakable belief
that the picture must com.e first, '"/hen good picture and
hard, important news happily coincide, the result is
often powerful. V/hen there is important hard news and
no relevant picture, then television is in trouble.
In addition to the analysis of television news, MacNeil dis-
cusses such topics as consensus journalism, political adver-
tising, campaigning, anu presidential access. Michelson,
hov;ever, is more oriented towards the political aspects—
^^Lang and Lang, pp. ?1 0-211.
33Robert MacNeil, The People Machine (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1^6?^) and 3ig Michelson, The Electric Mirror
(New "^ork: Dodci , Mead and Company, 1972).
^^MacNeil, p. 54.
conventions, campaigning, and advertising—of television. He
devotes little attention to television news.
Still, within the context of television and politics, a
related category is worth exar.ining. This involves works
concentrating on the ^'new polities'* and modern political
campaigning. V/hile the motivation and style of political
campaigning differs from television news, the .fact that they
both deal with, and are concerned about, the visual aspects of
the medium justifies its inclusion. Especially important is
that a new trend in political advertising is the attempt to
create commercials which appear less "comriercial'* and instead
appear more in the form of a news-type documentary. Also, the
political effects of campaign advertising could be both re-
lated to and similar to those of television news.
Gene Wyckoff
,
The Im.age Candidates
,
presents various des-
criptions and examples of new styles in political campaigning.-
Important here is the notion and process of image building.
According to V/yckoff , '^television apparently does more than
just present political candidates. Television transfigures
candidates into personal images or characterizations that can
be ouite unique to the medium, '*^^ And, reinforcing what the
3 5Gene Wykoff, The Im.age Candidates (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1 9b8 )
.
^^Vckoff, p. 216,
An
Langs said about intimacy, Y'yckoff states that
a ^candidate's appearance and demeanor apnear to provide
viewers with the most substantial clues to his character.
The rational import of what the candidate savs on tele-
vision, as long as it is not blatantly offensive to the
great central cluster of the electorate, acDears to have
very little influence on viewer's perception of image
.^^
Even though television news, unlike political advertising,
covers uncontrolled situations, similar results might emerge
—
appearance and demeanor being the most important criterion.
Also, there could be a vital interrelationship between the
images of political advertising—each one exerting an influ-
ence on the other. For example, the image one has of a
politician derived from television news could influence one's
perception of the politician in an advertising situation. And,
the image one gets of a politician from advertising could in-
fluence subsequent perceptions of the politician in uncon-
trolled news situations. Candidates, of course, do try to
control their exposure. This strategy was described in The
Selling of the President
,
1963, by Joe McGinnis.^^
Three works are representative of the literature of the
"new" politics and mode"n campaign techniaues. These are
Dan Nimno, The Political Persuaders , The "^echnioues of
Modern Election Campaigns ; Ray Hiebert (ed.) The Political
Image P^erchants : Strategies in the New Politics ; Robert
37wyckoff, p. 217
3^Joe McCinnis, The Selling £f the President , 1968
(New York: Pocket Books, 1970.
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Apranoff (ed.) The New Stvle in Election Campaigns .39 All
three are excellent in their descriptions and analyses of
contemporary campaign techniques. Much of what they say
interrelates with elements of the content and effects of
television news,
Nimmo, for example, describes the importance of tele-
vision and television news. Television is discussed in
terms of visibility, simplicity, image and substance. For
a candidate,
. . .exposure on a news program legitimizes
the candidate; anyone can buy commercial advertising,"^*^
In addition to this legitimizing function, television func-
tions to create a sense of involvement and participation in
a campaign:
The remarkable capacity of television to convey the
images of conflicts, candidates, and political moods,
yet allow the viewer to perceive in those images what
he expects to see, to '^see for himself,'* results in
citizens who are electronic participants in political
events rather than mere targets for campaign messages.
But the character of television itself shapes what
they expect to see.^^i
Jay Weitzner, in Hiebert (ed.), continues with this same
theme
:
that which I see and hear involves me more than that
which I just see. Once I am involved, I become a
Dan Nim.no, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: PrentTce-Hall
,
1970); Ray Hiebert (et al.), ed.
The Political Image Merchants (V/ashington , D.C.: Acropolis
"Hooks, Ltd., 1971); Robert Agronoff, ed., The New Stvle in
Election Camnaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972).
^^Nimmo
,
p. 1 55,
Nimmo, p. 1^6o
participant and add something of myself to what I see
and hear. I add my own impression's and attitudes. I
have become a part of a circle of communication. I
see a politician and add something of what I believe
a politician should be.ji^2
This quality of television, of course, pertains to both tele-
vision news and political advertising. As mentioned previously,
exposure with one would "condition" the perceptions and ir.ages
towards the other. This interrelationship between television
news and political advertising is worth examining.
Television news . There is very little good literature •
which deals solely with television news. Usually, description
and analysis of television news is incorporated into either
works on television or works on journalism. Television news,
as the unit of analysis, has received very little scholarly
examination. In this section the literature of television
news will be divided into (1) Interpretation and Analysis and
(2) Empirical Studies,
Interpretation and analysis. Two basic sources provide
a good introduction into the literature of television news.
Irving E. Fang, Television News , presents a good account of
A- 3
the technical aspects cf television news and its production.
^^Jay V/eitzner, "Handling the Candidate on Television,"
in Ray Hiebert (et al. ) , ed. ,. The Political Image Merchants ,
p. 105.
^-^Irving E. Fang, Television News (New York: Hastings
House Publishers, 196gTT
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This is not an analysis of television news—rather it is an
insight into such processes as filming, reporting, editing,
and producing the news. Also, this is one of the few works
which actually includes transcripts of network news programs.
A basic analysis of television news is provided by Karry J,
Skornia, TglQvigj.oa anl tlis. News
, 1 Critical APDrai salM
Although the book is dated in that it does not incorporate
some of the more contemporary criticisms of television news,
it does have utility since many of his criticisms are basic-
Also important are his descriptions of the inside aspects of
television news. Skornia contends that television "magnifies
small, even microscopic objects until they fill the entire
screen as completely as the largest objects. Television daily
makes unequals equal, and equals unequal, as it pleases.
This is crucial considering that a vital element in today's
political process is the contest for "political visibility."
Most of Skornia 's criticisms reflect the shortcomings of both
the medium and the philosophy of news. He discusses such
things as: emphasis on the abnormal and superficial, the lack
of real information, th em.phasis on "firstness and recency,"
the use of the star" system., the influence of financial con-
siderations, and the problems of "fragmentation and discon-
tinuity."^^ Also, although his examples are dated, Skornia .
^^Harry J. Skornia, Television and the News (Palto Alto,
California: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1 968 )
.
^^Skornia , d. 22.
^^Skornia, pp. 30-45.
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does give an interesting account of news blockage and sup-
pression—a situation most would be totally unfamiliar with.
Many good analyses of television news are found in works
of a slightly more general nature. V.'illiam Wood, Electronic
Journalism
,
is an example of this.^*^ Television here, as in
other sources, is analyzed from such perspectives as immedi-
acy and intimacy. While television is intimate, V7ood argues
that "involvement does not insure that the viewer will be
informed and enlightened by what he sees."^^ Wood discusses
television in terms of different forms of news. crpt.oVaoni no-
.
the role of television news, objectivity and bias. Because
of the '*personalness'* of television, V7ood contends that there
is less chance of objectivity than with other media. Em-
phasized here are such things as "a raised eyebrow, a pause,
a tone of voice, a three-word aside. "^'^ Also vital are the
emphasis of stories and the ordering and presentation of cer-
tain scenes. One way to view television news is as an
"originator.^ By this, Wood means that "the men of television
journalism have made news by getting newsmakers to say somie-
thing newsworthy on the air before they say it anywhere else.'*'
^A'illiam Wood, Electronic Journalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1 967)
.
^%ood, p. 7.
^S/ood, p. 73.
,
5^/7ood, p. 73.
^\'ood, p. 92.
An excellent work, which deserves extended comrrentary
is Phillip Creyelin and Douglas Cater, American Media :
52Adequate or Not? ' Ceyelin asks if the media "do as good a
.lob as they could in presenting an accurate, balanced, com-
prehensive, unprejudiced picture of society—which is to say
our problems and what we are doing or not doing about them?"^'
His own response:
The answer is no, not only because the job is probably
impossible, or because there can be nothing but the
most arbitrary standards for judging what an accurate
picture of society might be, but because the errors
and weaknesses and failures in the performance of the
media are plainly there for all to see,^^
He goes on to discuss the liberal orientation of most re-
porters and thinks that most would agree with Howard K,
Smith's criticisms of reporters and their liberal bias. This
liberal orientation, however, Geyelin argues, does not really
explain the shortcomings of the news media.
As might be expected, a discussion of bias or orien-
tation would be followed by philosophy on the notion of
objectivity. Geyelin asserts that objectivity and fairness
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are '*in the eye of the >^eholder." Vfhat most people want,
he insists, when they ask for less bias is in fact a better
picture of society... a picture of society more congenial to
^^Phillip Gevelin, Douglas Cater, American Media : Ade-
quate or Tot? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise In-
stitute for Public Policy Research, 1970).
^^Geyelin, pp. lO-llo
^^Geyelin, p. 11.
^Vreyelin, p. 13.
what they think it is or wish it was. ''56 G^yelin could be
quite right about this, but it does not answer the problem
of a liberal bias—which Geyelin admits exists. The fact
that people do want a more congenial view of society does not
cancel out the existence of bias ,
—xvh ether it be conservative
or liberal. Geyelin does argue that the press is really too
diffuse to be monolithically liberal.
Cater, in his section, responds to Geyelin 's comments.
He argues that the news media do not take '^themselves and
their role seriously enough. "57 \vhiie noting that the media
do play an obvious important role. Cater asks how dees '*one cf
us judge whether the images we see are an adequate picture of
American society today?"58 v/hile Cater is critical of Agnew's
"devil theory"* of m.ass media, he does ask some questions which
seem to reinforce Agnew's complaints. For example, he asks,
''Does TV's coast-to-coast range give the dissenter publicity
advantages which the voice of reason is unable to combat?"59
In addition, Cater discusses other aspects of media—such as
its power to both influence and ignore, its gatekeeping func-
tion, and the fact that it is attacked from all sides,
Charles Daley (ed.), in P-^edia and the Cities , centers on
the role of the ne^vs media in relation to Black and racial
60problems Here Bennett argues that American journalism
^ Geyelin, p. 24.
57Geyelin, p. 3 5»
^^Geyelin, p. 35.
^"^Geyelin, d. 45.
^OCharles Daley (ed.), The Media and the Cities (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1 968 )
.
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is white, middle-class, and opposed to radical change.
He talks of Blacks being
-smothered by extremists of the
middle, extremists of the status quo.-^^ Hamilton discusses
the lack of media coverage of the '^invisible" poor while
Bagdikian argues for the inclusion of extreme views. Bag-
dikian contends that
Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown should not be excludedirom the news solely on grounds that they disturb thepeace. Ideas are not always propelled into the public^
consciousness by quiet voices speaking in tranquility.^^
Bagdikian reinforces this by stating that there were times
when such people as v"nitney Young, Roy V/ilkens, Thurgoud
Marshall, and Dr. T^artin Luther King were considered radicals
who did not 'Represent the Negro community,
Just as the Black upheaval and racial problems of the
1960^3 produced, among other things, a re-examination of the
role and perform.ance of the press, Vietnam and the resulting
dissention also produced a similar re-examination and re-
evaluation of the news media—especially television. One
such work which specifically discusses Vietnam is TTichael J,
Arlen, The Living Room ^'^^r. The title indicates the nature
^''lerone Bennett Jr., "The V/hite Media" in Daley, p.
62
Bennett, p. 9, in Daley.
63 Ben Bagdikian, ''Editorial Responsibility in Times of
Urban Disorder'*, in Daley, p. 20,
^^Bagdikian, in Daley, pp. 20-21.
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of coverage of the war—the type coverage, of course, v;hich
is faniliar to most everyone. Another ^ay to refer to Vietnam
is "television's war." His basic criticism of the Vietnam
coverage is that it is an "excessively simple, emotional, and
military-oriented view of what is at best a mighty unsimple
situation,
Arlen also discusses television in the context of accu-
racy and balance, politics, personality and pseudoevents
.
Similar to others, he notes that it is television which
"certifies" things as being "real."^*^ In discussing the
importance of intimacy and personality, Arlen notes that
. . .people nowadays, for whatever reasons, seem to
want so terribly to touch and be reassured by person-
ality—not just by its presence but by its implications
(the hope, for example, that one attaches in one's ovm
feelings to a leader, and that is still so much a realer
things on any issue), and TV simply happens to affect
that.
.
.^jg
Also interesting is Arlen's contention that
^^fhat people really and mostly receive from television,
it would seem, is a sense of themselves—the same sort
of sense, perhaps, that people once received by looking
into the faces of their neighbors, when neighbors still
had faces and in turn looked back.^^
-^Michael J. Arlen, Living Room V.'ar (^^ew York: The Viking
Press,
^^Arlen, pp. 7-8o
^'^Arlen, p. 191
»
^^Arlen, p. 13^.
69Arlen, p. 17'^.
One of the complaints about television news, however, seems
to be that people do not really get a ^sense of themselves'*
from it. Instead, they get a vision of America which seems
to be alien to them
Dale Minor, The Information VJa
r
,
an interesting work
similar to Arlen, reiterates a familiar theme: "people in
general want the press to tell it like they think it should
be."'''^ Minor basically concentrates on two aspects: the an-
tagonistic government-press relationship and the presentation
of news. After criticizing both and arguing that it is easy
to blame the press and to make it the scapegoat of today's
problems. Minor states that to '*the white racist it is the
^ integrationist' or 'liberal^ press. To the black militant,
it is the 'white' press. To the Right, it is the 'Leftist*
press; and to the Left, the 'Establishment' press. For all,
however, it is the enemy's press. The two reactions to
this, of course, are (l) thnt the press must be doing some-
thing right since it antagonizes everybody or (2) the press
obviously must be doing something wrong since it pleases
nobody. Also discussea here are such relevant things as the
role and effects of television, definitions of news, govern-
ment deceit and manipulation of news, pseudo-events, objec-
tivity and balance.
70Dale Minor, The Inform.ation V/ar (New York: Hawthorn
Books, Inc., 1970) , p. xi.
Minor, p. 93
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Also relevant are Minor's criticisms of "the press. He
argues that
the critical factor, however, is the relative comDetence
of the press with respect to the demands made uoon it by
contemporary society. The truth is that compared to the
past, it may make a very good showing, but its performance
has fallen seriously behind the requirements and responsi-
bilities of the present day.y2
Other criticisms oertain to such things as Ws reliance on
the Few York Times, the emphasis on speed, and action, the
lack of depth, the star system, the failure to really inform,
and the entertainment orientation of television news. On
Vietnam coverage Minor argues that
on television,
. . .it has often seemed that Vietnami's
importance as a news event is outweighed by its im-
portance as a dramatic event. How else explain the
displacement of perhaps significant news and analysis
—
a political story, for instance, that might presage a
change in the situation—by the coverage of search and
destroy operation number 3,A-68. .
.y-^
In addition to this. Minor also discusses the shortcomings
of the press in general; shortcomings such as—having a
business and conservative orientation, reflecting the views
of the Establishment, and failure to provide a real under-
standing—which would pertain to television.
Another critical perspective of television news is pro-
vided by Joseph Keeley, The Left-Leaning Antenna - Political
Bias in Television. '^^ Other than reflecting conservative
7?
' 'Minor, p. xii.
'^-^Minor, p. 155.
''^^Joseph Feeley, The Left-Leaning Antenna (New Rochelle,
New York: Arlington House, 1971.
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criticisms of television news, this is not really that valu-
able in that Keeley's analysis is not that extensive. Even
the chapter on Vietnam coverage is not that substantive.
Of more relevance is the yearly editions of Marvin Barrett
(ed.), Survey of Broadcast Journalism
, 196^-1969
,
1969-19^0 .73
V/hile it is relevant, it does have limited utility since much
of it concentrates on local broadcast .lournalism. V/ritten
from the perspective of broadcast journalism, the Survey often
quotes the top names in broadcast journalism. For example,
Walter Cronkite is quoted as saying . .what we're defending
is the people's right to know and we have to be in the front
line of that battle all the time."'^^
Another perspective in the literature of television news
is offered by the personalities themselves. Two short maga-
zine articles give an indication of the views of V/alter Cron-
77kite, 'nr/hat Does Walter Cronkite Really Think?" is one.^
The other is "'A Conversation VJith VJalter Cronkite. '^^S Meither
has much utility—other than to give a superficial descrip-
tion of Cronkite and some of his opinions. More important is
'^^Marvin Barrett (ed.), Survey of Broadcast Journalism,
196^-1969 (?'ew ^ork: Crosset and" Dunlap, Inc., 1 969 )
,
Survey of Broadcast Journalism , 1969-1970 (New York, Grosset
and Dun 1 a p, Inc . , 1 970) ,
~"
'^^Barrett (ed.), 1969-1970
, p. 3?^o
'77oriana Fallaci, '^\Tiat Does Walter Cronkite Really Think?'*,
Look , November 11, 1970, pp. 57-62.
'^^^'A Conversation with Cronkite, TV Guide , March 1972,
pp. 15-20.
Cronkite's The Challenges of Chan^e.^^ This" collection of
speeches and lectures is good; all but one, hov^ever, v;ere
delivered before 1970. Thus, they are not a response to
some of the real contemDorary journalistic problems
-such
as the /gnew criticisms. But the book does give Cronkite's
perception as to the role of journalism:
The public fails to realize that what is at stake is nota narrow pride of product on the part of the Dublisheror broadcaster but the citizen's own unquestioned r^ightto know. go
Another interesting insight is provided by CBS' Charles'
Kuralt, ^'Reporting on the 'Little People. '"^^ Kuralt's re-
marks, which are worth quoting, deal with the diversity of
the country, a diversity and tone not evident on television
news. From the perspective of ^On the Road," Kuralt states
that
To read the papers and listen to the news, to be a re-
porter working in the midst of the great movements which
are sweeping the country and trying to make sense out of
them, one would think that the country is in terrible
trouble. You do not get that im>Dression when vou travel
the back roads and the small tovms . You find many
strengths you weren't aware of. You find Deople who
are courteous and neighborly and who really care about
their country and wish it well, and seek for leadership
to heal the wounds of the country. You do not get the*
feeling of a countr^^ on the brink of revolution or torn
apart by hatred—the kind of impression you might get if
you only read the page one stories. g2
Iter Cronkite, The Chal] enges of Change (V/ashington
,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971T7
^^Cronkite, p. 97,
^''charles Kuralt', '^Reporting the 'Little People'", Colum-
bia Journalism Review (Jan. -Feb., 1972), po. 17-22.
^^-Kuralt, p. 20.
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What Kuralt is saying also pertains to television news; and,
he seems to have captured a basic dissatisfaction that most
average people have toward television news.
Although there are not many scholarly analyses of tele-
vision news, three, two of which are excellent, are worth
examining in detail. One is Walter Goldstein, "Network Tele-
vision and Political Change: Two Issues in Democratic Theory.''^
Arguing for a better understanding of the mass media, Goldstein
is interested in two basic problems. They are (l) "the re-
sponsibility of the networks and their staffs in handling
complex and controversial issues," and (2) '^the inevitable
manipulation or shaping of values which the networks cannot
hope to evade.
.
."^^ Within this context, Goldstein discusses
news selection, presentation, and treatment. Goldstein asks,
with concern for more diversified views.
Whose decision, it must be asked, is it that the m.ass
viewers shall be exposed to a particular set of values?
vJho shall sanction the choice of deviant values that
are to be made visible, and .just how wide is the ranee
of deviation that is acceptable?c^c
In answering this latter question, Goldstein is critical of
network news for failing "to act outside the area of perceived
social consensus ."^^
S3
•^Walter Goldstein, "^'etwork Television and Political
Change: Two Issues in Democratic Theory", V/e stern Political
Quarterly
, Vol. 20, 196?, pp. ^75-8^7.
^Vroldstein, d. ^77.
^^Ooldstein, p. 881.
^^Goldstein, p. 882.
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Paul Weaver, in a more contemporary article, also dis-
cusses the Derfornance of network television news in '*Is
Television News Biased?^^'^ The article is in part a response
to Edith Efron's finding that television news is biased.
Weaver, however, asserts that
The real question is not: Are the media biased? They
are, by definition and of necessity. The question is
rather: How are the media biased and what is the con-
sequent effect on our interest and values?gg
Weaver has both positive and negative things to say about
Efron's The News Twisters
. On a positive note, V/eaver argues
that ''properly interpreted, this evidence reveals a great deal
about how television news is biased and thus about the di-
rection of its influence on public opinion,
Weaver, in addition to his extensive analysis of Efron,
analyzes the nature of television news. Important is his
90
concept of the '\iournalistic model or theory of politics.'*
This, he asserts, is the framework within which television
news views politics, Vfithin this model
politics is essentially a game played by individual poli-
ticians for personal advancement, gain, or power. The
game is a comoetitive one, and the players' Drincipal
activities are thost; of calculating and pursuing stra-
tegies designed to defeat competitors and to achieve
their goals (usually election to office). g-)
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Paul V/eaver, "Is Television News Biased?'', Public
Interest
,
/^26 V/inter, 1972, pp. 57-74.
^^Weaver, p. 57.
P» 60.
^^'.'eaver
,
p. 69.
Weaver p. 69.
weaver employs this model in his analysis of
' television's
coverage of the 1968 presidential campaign. He argues that
television basically presented each candidates within the
context of a particular theme, and that analysis of the can-
didates was based on interpretations reflecting these themes
He contends that
W.Ti'or^'.J^^ underdog, Mixon, the front runner andallace, the sower of discord and violenc6--thP<^P wlothe central themes which the networks repeated dayM Z ?\^hey looked beneath the surface of eventsto plumb what was really happening in the cLpaign!^^
What is needed. Weaver argues, is a pluralism of themes or
stories; an "expansion of the journalists' vision. "93
Another excellent article, the best and most contem-
porary scholarly analysis of television news, is Gary L.
Wamsley and Richard A. Pride, "Television Metwork News:
Rethinking The Iceberg Problem. "94 After a review of the
literature of mass media effects, they ask".
. .can a case
be made that TV news is qualitatively different in its
effects from other news media ?"95 The authors think that
television is different and argue that it should be ana-
lyzed within the context of these different, or unique,
characteristics. Some of these characteristics are: the
9%eaver, p. 72,
93,V^eaver, td. 74,
^^Garv L. Wamsley, Richard A. Pride, "Television Network
News: Re-Thinking the Iceberg Problem", V/estern Political
Qua rterlv
.
Vol. xxv ^^^3, September 1972, pp. 434-450;
"^^Wamsley, p. 43 5.
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audience size, the mix, the trust, the unavoidable nature of
television and its video effects.
In addition to arguing that television news is quali-
tatively different from other forms, V.,'amsley a nd Pride also
reject the conventional wisdom concerning the political ef-
fects of the news media. V^ereas previously it was held that
the media had reinforcing political effects, the authors as-
sert that "television news may have profound non-reinforcing
political effects.'**^^ This "non-reinforcing" effect of tele-
vision news is discussed in such terms and concepts as
"potent symbols affecting a broader audience, altered per-
ceptions of reality and delayed attitude change, great issue
awareness than previously believed. "'^'^ On a specific note,
and one of interest to the research of this paper, Wamsley
and Pride conclude by saying that the "characteristics out-
lined in this essay may mean that W news presents the author-
ity figures of the American political system, in more of a
negative light than a positive one." If this is true, it
could raise some interesting questions relevant to both the
content and effects of television news.
Empirical Studies. This section reviews som^e empirical
studies of different aspects of television news. Almost all
msley, p. 443.
^''^VJamsley
,
p. 449o
^%amsley, p. 450.
-e
le
of these studies involve either a short period of analysis
or a snail sample of a longer period of coverage. The
following studies do give a good indication of the nature
and extent of er.pirical research dealing with the content of
television news.
The most comprehensive examination of the content of
television news is Edith Efron's The Fews Twisters . .^.-^^
her analysis covers all three networks, it is limited to the
196g campaign period—September 16, 196^, to November 4, 1963.
And it only concentrates on coverage of the three presidential
candidates plus selected "issues.'' Still, it is the most
am:bitious attempt to document television news' content. V^ile
Efron has been criticized on methodological grounds, her study
does give a good account of the nature of television coverage
during this period. ''^'^ Efron's technique was to select, in
addition to the three presidential races, ten "issues'* pre-
valent during this period. Some of these "issues" were:
Vietnam policy, the Viet Cong, Black militants, conservatives,
liberals, left and demonstrators. After recording and trans-
cribing the news programs, she then identified, isolated and
coded the opinion source and the nature and direction of that
opinion source and the nature- and direction of that opinion
"^Kdith Efron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash
Publishing, 1971).
For example, see VJeaver,
7a
From this, she concludes that
tLt^nJ^^'J ^^^'^ descriptive statistics, it is clear
^^.^ Republican-conS^?:;at?ve-r.i,ht
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She continues:
actively slanted their opinion coverageapamst U S policy on the Vietnam vrar.
. . .The net-works actively favored the Democratic cancJidateV Hubert
Znl^r^' Presidency, over his Republican op!poneno
•
^
As might be expected, the Sfron study has provoked vari-
ous reactions. Charles Winick discusses the methodological
shortcomings of the study. ''^^ He criticizes the study on such
grounds as the lack of clearly defined categories and con-
cepts, the absence of any form of coder reliability, and the
importance of the visual effects. Even with these and other
methodological criticisms, the book is important since more
methodological precision would not destroy her basic findings.
In addition to the analysis of television coverage, Efron does
present a good discussion of the nature, type and extent of
opinion and bias. And, she discusses the different techniques
of opinion expression,
Vmile the Efron study documents the ''liberal'* bias of
^"^^Efron, p. 47.
"•^^Efron, p. 47.
""^^Charles V/inick-, '*Critiaue of the Methodology of Edith
Efron's 'The News TwistersV Congressional Reco rd. October 26,
1971, pp. E112S3-E11286.
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television news, another study by Robert Cirino, Don't Blame
the Media
,
reaches different conclusions J Based on an
analysis covering the period of July 10, 1969, to September
10, 1969, Cirino discovers a lack of objectivity and fairness
and concludes that
Those who control access to mass media clearly and
unmistakably select, exclude, edit, and distort
interviews in such a way that Establishment viewpointshave a decided competitive advantage over 'those view-
points critical of the Establishment.,^-
1 05
Even though Cirino only devotes a portion of the book to
television news, and although his analysis is not as
systematic or comprehensive as Efron's study, his analysis
is still valuable. V/hile Efron obviously comes at her ana-
lysis from a conservative perspective, Cirino comes at his
from a liberal perspective, ^•uch of what he says about the
techniques of bias— such as news selection, omission,
emphasis on the visual and editorializing—has been cited
by others, including Efron. V.Tiat is different, however, are
Cirino' s conclusions as to the nature, direction, and causes
of the bias.
Other similar, though short, emipirical studies exist.
The most recent study, one still in progress, is an exanu-
106
nation of network coverage of the 1972 presidential campaign.
''^^Robert Cirino. Don ' t Blame the People (New York:
Vintage Books , 1971 )
.
^•^^Cirino, p. 152
^^^See Edwin Diamond, "Fairness and Balance in the Evening
News", Columbia Journalism Review , January-February, 1973,
Dp. 22-23.
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This study, to be finished in April, 1973, vdll seek to
document
-some definite patterns of campaign coverage .-1 ^7
Dennis T. Lov/ry,
-Agnew and the Network TV Mews: A Before/
After Content Analysis," analyzes ninety newscasts from the
three networks J 0^ Analyzing two periods, June to August,
1969, and June to August, 1970, Lowry wanted to see if Agnew's
1969 Des Moines speech had any effect on subsequent news con-
tent. He concludes that the speech did influence network
treatment of news. Specifically, he notes that there was a •
''9^ in report sentences attributed—the category which is
the 'safest' of all categories a network can use.'""^ Another
study bv Lowry, "Oresham's Law and Network VJ News Selection'*,
is based on a sample of the 1970 July and August broadcasts ."I ^ 0
The purpose here was to document the extent of "Bad News'*
covered by the networks. Lowry concludes that "Bad News'*
does not drive out Other News.
. . However, while
"Bad News" and "Other News" received the approxim.ate same
length of coverage, it is important to note that ''Bad News'*
11?m general received more visual emphasis than ""Other News." '
^'^'^Diamond, p. 22.
1 0S
Dennis T. Lowry, "Agnew and the Network T^f News: A
Before/After Content Analvsis", Journalism Quarterly
,
Summer 1971, pp. 205-210.
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Lowry, p. 210.
1 1 n
'^Dennis T, Lowry, '*OrGsham's Law and Network TV News
Selection'*, Journal of Broadcasting
,
Vol. xv, ^'4, Fall 1971,
pp. 397-405.
''"'''Lowry, p. 405.
lie
Lowry
, p. 406.
other studies document different subject areas. For
example, Frank Russo examines Vietnam coverage in "'A Study of
Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam V/ar: 1969 and 1970."'^^5
Using a total of ninety-six broadcasts, Russo examines bias
within the context of the Nixon Administration's Vietnam
policy. Defining bias as "that quality of opinion or of
actual or supposed fact that would influence one to support
or oppose a President or his policy," Russo concludes that
there was no bias. He asserts that his results "provide
'
factual evidence that there was no bias against the Nixon
Administration's policies in Vietnam in the 1969 and 1970
broadcasts of either NBC or CBS.'»^''5
Two studies compare American television network news
with CBS during a twenty-one day period covering broadcasts
in 1970-1971.''''^ They discovered differences which reflected
"the different political positions of their relative coun-
tries m the world." ' For example, international news on
113
-^Frank D. Russo, "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the
Vietnam ^-'ar: 1969 and 1970'^ Public Opinion Quarterly
,
Winter 1971-1972, pp. 5''^-543.
^"•^Russo, p. 539.
115^Russo, p. 542.
1 1
6
Chris J. Sheer and Sam Vf. Filer, '*A Comparison of
Canadian and Am.erican Network Television News", Journal of
Broadcasting
,
Vol. xvi
,
-''^2, Spring 1972, pp. 1 59-164.
'''sheer, p. 163,'
•'.erica
.
NBC was related to political or domestic situations in Arr,<
Ben.i'amin D. Singer, 'Violence, Protest, and the V.'ar in Tele-
vision News: The U.S. and Canada Compared, analyzes
-ag.
gressive items '^-events dealing with violence, protest and
the War during the period of April 20, 1970, to May 10, 197ol''^
One of his conclusions is that the '^American television news
show exceeds the Canadian program in aggression items for
every one of the 21 consecutive days monitored o ^ The
percentage difference was almost two-to-one. Even controlling
for Vietnam coverage, which would be more salient to the United
States, CBS still devoted a significantly higher proportion of
time to "aggression items.
^
Other studies examine different elements. Adnan Almaney,
"International and Foreign News on Network Television News,"
examines during a four-week period the priority of different
1 20types of news. In terms of priority and coverage, the
order of ranking was national nev.-s
, international news and
foreign news. Almaney states that generally "international
and foreign news are reported only when they reach the 'crisis'
''^Ben.iamin D. Singer, "Violence, Protest, and the V/ar in
Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared", Public
Opinion Quarterly
,
Vfinter 1970-1971, pp. 6II-616.
119o.Singer, p. 613.
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Adnan Almaney, "International and Foreign Affairs on
Network 'television News", Journal of Broadcasting , Vol. xiv
(Fall 1970^ pp. 4^9-509,
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point. Events that remain below that point are scarcely
reported."^ Specific television news' coverage of the 1965
Dominican Crisis is analyzed by Harney and Stone in "Tele-
vision and Newspaper Front Page Coverage of a Major News
12?Story
-
The authors argue that the emphasis of the tele-
vision coverage was on the dramatic and colorful—rather than
on the reporting of actual news. They conclude that "on
every network less than half of the Dominican film segments
contributed directly to the reporting of the major events of
the crisis, "''^^
There are studies worth mentioning which do not directly
involve network television news, but which do relate to the
concerns of this research. For example, Doris Graber, "The
Press as Opinion Resource During the 1968 Presidential Cam-
paign," examines newspaper coverage of the candidates.''
This study provides a good framework for a similar study
based on television coverage. Could it be documented that
television, like the newspapers, emphasizes the candidates'
personal Qualities while de-emphasizing their philosophies
Alma ney, p. 509.
1 2?
'Russell R. Harney, Vernon A. Stone, "Television and
Newspaper Front Page Coverage of a Major News Story, Journal
of Broadcasting , Vol. xii ^"2, Spring 1969, pp. 181-188.
''^^Harney, d. 187.
''^^Doris Graber, "The Press As Opinion Resource During the
1968 Presidential Campaign", Public Opinion Quarterly
,
Summer 1971, po. 1 68-1 82
»
on.
or abilities? Rogers and Clevenger provide a good example
of the form and method of content analysis of television in
"The Selling of the Pentagon: Was CBS The Fulbright Propa-
ganda Machine?''^ ^5 Another example of television ne.s con-
tent analysis is James A. Anderson,
-Broadcast Stations and
Newspapers: The Problem of Information Control: A Content
Analysis of Local News Presentations
Two other works which are systematic analyses are worth
mentioning, One is Waiter Cronkite, Eve on the World.''
^'^
In this, Cronkite, using pictures and excerpts from his
program, discusses and describes the major contemporary issu-^
and events. The book does give some indications of Cronkite'
s
perspective toward these issues and events. Finally, Dan
Menaker, "Art and Artifice in Network News," provides a short,
light description and analysis of television news.''^^ Among
other things, he discusses the entertainment function of
television news.
The effe cts of television. As might be expected, there
is much speculation but little understanding of the political
effects of television and television news. This section will
^ l^^'^iF^^^- f^o^ers, Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "The Sellingof the Pentagon: Was CBS the Fulbright ProDa ganda Machine?"?
Ihl Quarterly Journal of Speech , Vol. LVII
,
:-"3
, October 1Q71,
1 J^mes A. Anderson, "Broadcast Stations and Newspapers:
The Problem of Information Control: A Content Analysis of
Local News Presentation." (Ohio: Ohio University Broadcast
Research Center, 1 Q71 )
.
''^'^Walter Cronkite, Eve on the V^orld (Tew York: Cowles
Book Company, 1971 )
.
''^^Dan Menaker, "Art and Artifice in Network News", Harpers
Magazine
, October 1972, pp. 40-47.
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briefly review some of the empirical research, speculation,
and discussion concerned with television's political effects.
General works. Two works serve as the best introductions
to the broad area of the effects of mass media. The first,
Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications
, exa-
mines the psychological screens, variable, and effects in-
volved in the communication process. ''29 Klapper's pessimism
as to the possibility of understanding the complexity of the
effects has been discussed. Although written in I960, Klapper
is still cited as the most important work dealing with comr.uni-
cation effects. The second important general source is w?^iter
V/eiss, ^»Effects of the Mass Media of Communication'* in The
Handbook of Social Psychology . 30 V.^ile Weiss does provide a
good summation of the research and literature of media effects,
one of the problems with his article is that it has very little
utility in terms of contemporary political effects. The
problem is that his analysis of the political effects of the
media is conducted within the context of the voting studies
of the 1940's and 1950's. Thus, he analyzes media's political
effects from the perspective of The People's Choice
, The Voter
1 29See Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications
(New York: The Free Press, ',9S0)~ ~
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V'alter V.'eiss, 'Effects of the Mass Media of Comrunication,''
in Oardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, The Handbook of Social -
Psychology
, 2nd edition. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co.), Vol. 5, 1969, pp. 77-195.
ou
ce
Decides, and Voting. Obviously, the political significar.
and impact of television has greatly changed since these
Studies.
A short article, which provides a good perspective for
both empirical and intuitive analysis of the political effects
of television is Leonard Berkowitz, "Sex and Violence: V/e
Can't Have It Both V'ays.-131 ^he purpose of the article is to
discuss the important part values play in media research.
Citing both the conclusions of the President's Corrjr.ission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Berkovdtz dem.on-
strates how one argued, in effect, that the media did have im-
portant effects whereas the other Comr.ission argued that the
media did not have any real effects. Thus, the Violence Com-
mission concluded that media violence will have effects while
the Pornography Com.mission concluded that media exposure of
sex has very little overt effect. As Berkowitz says, "you
can't have it both ways." He argues that values and ideology
had important influence on these two contradictory conclusions.
Empirical studies
. Four empirical studies indicate som.e
of the directions of the research of the effects of television.
Harvey K. Jacobson, "Mass I-^edia Believability : A Study of Re-
ceiver Judgments^ reinforces the findings of the Roper studies
concerning the credibility of the news m.edia , -^'^ In this study
Leonard Berkowitz, *VSex and ^'"iolence: '''e Can't Have It
Both Ways,"" ^svc r-i ology Today, December 1971, pp. 14-23.
132Harvey K. Jacobson, "Puass Iledia Be-L.ievability : A Study
of Receiver Jud^m.ent s , '* Journalism. Quarterly
,
Soring 1969,
pp. 20-2B.
"
television did e.er.e as '^the most believable news source. 33
Lament and ^^estvold
,
^^Television Fe.s and Status Conferred,"
conclude as would be expected, that exposure on network tele-
vision news does confer status upon those receiving cover-
age. ''34
Timothy P. Meyer, "Mews Reporter Bias: A Case Study in
Selective Perception", compares the effects of an Agnew inter-
view on the David Frost show with the effects 'of the New York
Times' report of the program. 13 5 v/hile this does not involve
television news, it is relevant since it demonstrates that
direct television exposure of a political actor will produce
different effects than a newspaper account. While there were
obvious differences, this direct coverage of the Frost show
would have similarities with the direct coverage of tele-
vision news. Meyer states, "In brief, students who saw the
program judged Agnew in a more positive light, while students
who read about the program saw Agnew in a more negative light^^
The Frost program, of course, was not edited whereas the news-
paper report could have been selective in many ways. Another
study by Meyer, "Some Effects of Real Mewsfilm Violence on
^^Jacobson, p. 26,
^^James B. Lemert, Karl J. Festvold, "Television News and
Status Conferred", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. XV, i^L,
Fall, 1970, pp. 491^^:97^:
^'
1 3 S
-'Timothy P. Meyer, "New Reporter Bias: A Case Studv in
Selective Perception", Journal of Broadca sting, Vol. XVl'r2,
Spring 1972, pp. 195-203":
'
^^^vieyer, p. 199o
the Behavior of Others-, attempted to examine the "effects
of television news reporters' descriptions on the viewer's
perception of a news event.
.
."^3? Using newsfilm of a
stabbing of a North Vietnamese soldier, Meyer concludes that
the news reporters
» descriptions of a 'Veal violence'*news event can substantially affect the viewer's oer-ception of the violence in that event.
. .And, the newsreporter can, by himself, determine whether the violencewill be perceived as justified or unjustified.
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Most of the analysis of the effects of television, how-
ever, are not the product of laboratory experiments. This
final section will examine some of the scholarly and journal-
istic analyses and interpretations of the political effects
of the news media.
Scholarly and journalistic interpretations
. One excel-
lent source, already discussed, is Lang and Lang, Politics
a_nd Television
. Since this is one of the best extended dis-
cussions of concerns relevant to this paper, their ideas will
be extensively discussed and quoted.
They concur with others that the vote decision is the
culmination of a process; a process in which television does
pay an important role since it helps to create and shape the
"political imagery" of the vote decision. ^39 Specifically,
^37Timothy P. Meyer, "Some Effects of Real Newsfilm
Violence on the Behavior of Viewers", Journal of Broadcasting
,
Vol. XV, ^'3, Summer 1971, pp. 275-285.
''3%eyer, p. 2^5.
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f.ang and Lang, p. 305.
they note that
television, like radio and Drint, forces attention tnsome issues and ignores others, helps build pubUc
to'f??
,-olitical figures uniil thev become familiar
^Mnc;.'.-
92"stantly suggests, by what is shown, the
ohonf individuals everywhere should know about, thinkabout, have opinions about.,. ^ '
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Another type of effects they discuss involves dimensions of
trust and confidence in the government. In examining this,
they argue that the distrust of governm.ent
has its roots in the complexities of political life,
complexities that lie beyond the understanding of ailbut the m.ost politically sophisticated. The media,
we contend, can stir up in individuals defense reactionsby their emphasis on crisis and conflict in lieu of
clarifying normal decision-m.aking Drocesses.
. .Some-times disgust may be fully justified, but often it is
nothing but a defensive reaction against confusion,
against reality that is overpowering, against the un-familiar and the frightening, where "remote" events
and invisible powers seem to determine the destiny of
the individual who can do nothing about it..,.
Still another interesting theme developed by the Langs
is the role television plays in"personalizing'» some aspects
of the political process. The result of the "personalizing'*
process is that "trust" may become a more important requisite
than "truth.'* The Langs contend that one of the effects of
of television is that
viewers focus less on what the truth is than on who can
be trusted. Trusting in their own ability to know who
can be trusted, they will accept oolicies they otherwise
might oppose, so long as their advocates- seem 'sincere'
and 'honest.' Even the most sophisticated viewer will
^^ang and Lang, p. 306.
^''Lang and Lang, p. 307.
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lean on television for this kind of infornationduring those neriods when
-whom to trus?^ seemsmore important than what any man stands fo^t^J^S
A final point worth examining is the notion, discussed
by the Langs, that television has the effect of being most
believable since with television, people can "see for them-
selves,^*
We do not implv that viewers believe thev actually spe andknow everything that is going on. But they do cone tosubscribe to the notion, constantly conveyed to them by
VLt'^'^Tr ^l!? "^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^y
^'^'^^ themselves,-
f^tl. r ^i^^^^l^^ involved in history, that televisiontakes them to the scene of the crime, that they have aclearer picture of what is going on than people rightthere.'
.
.The gist of the evidence is that people donot actually 'see for themselves," but many still believethat they do. The effect of this belief may be as im-portant as any effect of television that can be obiec-tively documented. A belief in television as authentic
experience makes it possible for viewers to validate theirprejudices while increasing their self-confidence abouttheir^ political expertise. They can assure this by notperceiving what they do not want to see, or by limitingtheir "participation- to what they understand. Viewers
often lack the background to comorehend a good many of
the events that "happen before their eyes.- But no
matter. They can decline to follow the camera and limit
the number of personalities and the breadth of action they
permit to reach their threshold of attention. In this way,
they can overlook much of what goes on and fit the restinto available sterotypes
. 1/^3
Others approach the problem of media effects from dif-
ferent perspectives. As mentioned, V'amsley and Pride note that
the conventional thinking towards media effects has held that
media '*are more likely to reinforce than change. -^^^ They
argue, however, that because of its unique nature, television
''^^Lang and Lang, p. 30^.
''^^Lang and Lang, p. 301.
^^^Klapper, p. ^.
-may have profound non-reinforcing effects. Specifically,
they assert that the characteristics of television "result
in a sum total of effects that is denigrative of political
system authority symbols rather than supportive. '^^^^
On Vietnam, Russo believes that
^oH.-:^^^
ambivalent.
.
.coverage of the .var by the TV
th I £?• 2?^^ ^ 1^^^^ ^^sctor contributinF to
war Tctiv?;;.;;;^^^^^ ^nTlUl^y
However, John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion
,
disagrees with this view. Mueller, based on an extensive
analysis of poll data, argues that the television coverage
of Vietnam did not 'V.ake a profound impression on public
attitudes. ^^""^^
Another obvious area of interest involving the political
effects of television concerns voting and elections. For
example, Edward V/. Chester contends that television "has
probably led to a greater independency in voting and decline
in partisan politics David Broder is even more emphatic
about television's effect on politics: "Television has pro-
-^V/amsley and Pride, p. 443.
''^Vamsley and Pride, p. 449o
''^'^Russo, p. 543.
''^^John E. TTueller, V^, Presidents and Public Opinion
(Few York: John V/iley and Sons, Inc., 197377"^
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Mueller, p. 167.
''^^Chester, p. 310.
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bably changed American politics more than any other single
factor in the nast two decades . 51 McCombs and Shaw discuss
the possibility that the media may "set the agenda for each
political campaign.-'' 52 Mendelson and Crespi believe that
p?pp^n^Jr created new political experiences for theelectorate which are not fully understood. Because theseexperiences are emotional rather than cognitive they hivea powerful ir.pact upon the election nroctss, particularlyin the selection of candidates for national offic-. As
J^i embroiled in the daily unfolding of ihe po-litical process^on the TV screen, he develops over timehis own subjective, private percepts of the process andof its participants. The development of these percepts
occurs quite imperceptibly and unconsciously.
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Robert MacNeii, "Electric Schizophrenia: Does Tele-
vision Alienate Voters?", states that there are four general
areas in which television effects the electoral process.'' 54
These areas are (l) identifying candidates, (2) choosing
issues, (3) increasing voter turnout and (4) affecting elec-
tion results. MacNeil contends that television has presented
a "disconnected and schizophrenic view of America" with one
of the results being that it "would be very surprising if
television has not contributed substantially to the disorien-
''5lDavid S. Broder, The Party^s Over (Few York; Harper &
Roe, Publishers, 1971), p. 239.'
1 5?Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda -
Setting Function of Mass Media", Public Oninion Ouart^rlv,
Summer 1972, pn. 176-1^7, p. 177.
^
1 53^
'Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls
.
Television
^nd the New Politics (Scranton, Pennsvlvania : Chandler
Publishing Comnany, 1970), p. 276.
1 5iL
^^Robert MacFeil, "Electronic Schizonhrenia : Does Tele-
vision Alienate Voters?", Politeia, Vol.'l, A, Summer 1972,
pp. 5-10.
tation and volatility of the 1972 election scene. -"'55
A similar argument is made by Shafer and Larson in
^^Did TV Create the 'Social Issue-^^156 ^^^^.^^ ^^^^
vision did, in fact, play a vital role in creating Lhe '^Social
Issue-, they assert that often the picture broadcast by tele-
vision is perceived as being a
-tnreat to ordinary secure
living. The threat results from v^hat the physical/electronic
fact of seeing demonstrations, atrocities, and confrontations
does to the viewer.-'' 57 ^he authors mention other effects
related to this. For example, television
-forces- different
lifestyles upon the viexvers—which could increase hostilityo
Also,
-those with deviant life styles see themselves on the
evening news, but fear is not the em.otion they feel. Rather
they tend to vastly overestimate their own strength—which
could increase feelings of hostility and insecurityl^^An
important political effect of television is the teaching
function it serves. According to Shafer and Larson, what
television teaches
-is not the 'old' politics of hard work
and compromise, but the 'new politics' of theatricality.-''^^
Whether or not television created the -Social Issue-
155MacMeil, p. 10.
1 '-\f)
Byron Shafer, Richard Larson, -Did TV Create the 'Social
Issue'?'*, Columbia Journalism Review, September/October 1972,
pp. 10-17.
1 S7
'^^Shafer, p. 11.
15^
Shafer, p. 13.
1 59
Shafer, p. 13.
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IS somethine; we lust Hog j d not know since there is not a good
understanding of the political effects of television. The
following two extended thoughts seem to epitomize both the
complexity and lack of understanding of television's politi-
cal effects. On one hand, Minor argues that
ln%hfLjrs^:f\Vnkra'rd\^?7^^%^^^^^ ^''^
bitterness of Hue and ?ho^ carriers, the bloodv
nr. thL by television, had a profound^ effect
that r]^t\hi ' military people will arrupfor this very reason television should be cur^Iuld
On the other hand, considering the folloiving:
provrthittr?evii?on?°
the events in Chicago seemed to
onrd\rectio'n';r'ano;her'l;lLs°th:n^r^ ^T''
credit for Thl 111 i- ^'^^^ ^een given
those that 'mnlht
^^°^^°^\that were aroused were not
hr^^^fi T^^^ ^! expected from pictures of Dolice
starred tlT^lt °' ^'""^ for change
earliPr ^^^^^^^^ coverage of Selma and Birmingham
and revuSion%^nn%^^ produced mindless denial
-
victimized. V/as the public fin-ally fed up with too much violence, the real life not
sanitvlicTmat'''^' of'^at^onalty su h m.aterial must be avoided in the future?
^ 5^
Two main conclusions emerge from this extended review.
First, there exists only a limited understanding of the con-
tent of television news. Second, the existing empirical
research has not produced a real understanding of the polit-
ical effects of television news. Instead, analysis of tele-
vision's political effects is usually based on perceptions.
"^^•^Unor, p. 116.
1 fil
Barrett, 1965-1969, p. 24.
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These perceptions, as has been shown, often produce contra-
dictory interpretations. Therefore, the obvious need is for
a real understanding of the content of television news, an
understanding which can function as a foundation for attempts
to understand the political effects of television news.
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CHAPTER III
OTIANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The content of CRS Evening News can be analyzed two
v/ays—quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative
analysis classifies records and measures the frequency of
the relevant codin^^ units of the communication. It
attempts to identify numerical patterns and tendencies.
Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, classifies,
measures, and documents the direction of the communication.
The essence of this research involves a Qualitative com-
prehension of CBS Evening News. However, to accom.nlish
this, it is helpful to have an understanding of the fre-
quency of both the different categories of news and the
different types of news stories. In addition to providing
this information, the quantitative analysis will also,
in providing a composite of CBS Evening Mews, identify
certain patterns of coverage. By doing this, it is possi-
ble to have an understanding of che subject areas and
types of news stories CBS ^•'Ivening News chooses to em-
phasize. This chapter and the next will analyze CRS
Evening News from a quantitative perspective. This
chapter will be general in nature while the next will be
more specific.
y (
This chapter directs itself to the first major question
of the research: 'n./hat amounts and forms of information
are being presented?'^ therefore, it is not interested in
direction, favorable-unfavorable assertions, or bias in
its usual sense. The concern of this chapter is the fre-
quency of different sub.iect areas and types of nev.s stories.
However, even the measurement of frequency is not necessarily
dealing with neutral entities. Exposure on the nightly news
is a valued commodity. One aspect of many of the contro-
versies of today is the contest for "political visibility.-
Exposure and coverage themselves become a value—whether
it is positive or negative coverage of one's position or
positive or negative coverage of the opposition's position.
In many cases, the more extensive the coverage, the better,
even if it is negative, since it affords a greater oppor-
tunity to explain one's own side of the problem. Faturally,
there are instances when political actors would just as
soon reduce the scope and extent of coverage. However,
while they might want a reduction of coverage, others would
be hoping for an extension of the coverage. Exposure,
therefore, may convey certain benefits and advantages to
some while withholding similar benefits and advantages from
others. A Quantitative analysis may give some indication
of who receives the most benefits and advantages.
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Methodology
In order to most accurately measure and reflect the
types and forms of inform.ation being presented, each indi-
vidual news story was classified according to three basic
criteria. Each news story was classified on the basis of
its being (1) an Event or a Report, (2) U.S .
-Domestic
, and
(3) Political or Non-Political. The first criterion in-
volved the .journalistic nature of the news story. The
second involved the location of the news story. And, the
third concerned the political or non-political nature of
the news story.
One point should be made concerning the strategy used
in this analysis. This research is ultimately concerned
with the political effects of television news on public
opinion and political behavior. Because of this, the ana-
lysis should be sensitive to the nature of the mass audience
of television news. Because this research is oriented toward
the effects of television news, the categories and coding
schemes used should be similar in nature to those an
"average" man would choose if he were doing the analysis.
Thus, a conscious attempt has been made to construct cate-
gories and code the news in a manner which would be self-
evident and obvious to the "average" viewer if he were
familiar with the rules and coding procedures. For example,
it makes no sense to define "political" in a way which would
have no meaning to the "average" viewer.
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The first of the three basic categories involved the
Journalistic nature of the unit of analysis-the ne.s story.
The reporting of the nev^s on CBS Evening News either occurs
in the CBS studio or outside of it. Those news stories
which are reported from the CBS studio have been categorized
as Events. Events have the characteristics of (1) being
read by the commentator (usually Cronkite), (2) being brief
in nature and (3) providing the basis for understanding a more
elaborate report of the story which follows. The following
are examples of number 1 and number 2,
CROFKITE: There was more sporadic gunfire in Amman tonightbetween Palestinian commandos and Jordanian troops. Theoutburst followed an emergency meeting of the JordanianCabinet to consider Iraa's threat to use its 12,0C0 troops
stationed m Jordan to aid the guerrillas. King Hussein'sgovernment, m effect, warned Iraq to keep its nose out ofJordan's internal affairs.
In that other war, Forth Vietnam's chief negotiator inPans has rejected the idea of a stand-still cease-firein Vietnam. Referring to that proposal bv 14 U.S. Senators,
Auan Thuy said that there can be no cease-fire until the
allies withdraw all American troops from the war.
The major fighting in Cambodia still centers around the
town of Srang, 26 miles south of Phnom Penh, and for the
third straight day Cambodian troops were unable to dislodge
the Communists there despite air and artillery strikes.
Ever since Communist forces began fighting in Cam.bodia,
they have had no hesitance about breaking into holv places
and using then as battle stations. V.'ell, today, the coun-
try's Buddhist, Moslem and Catholic leaders denounced the
enemy troops, saying they not only have ignored the sanc-
tity of churches and pagodas but killed or wounded scores
of monks or priests. They appealed to all Cam.bodians to
resist the Comm^unists in any way possible.
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ti^sln:r';m'l^^^,^'^^ ^^-t for the third
force to the Caribbean It ?n^?, a ^r^^^"*^ ^ ^"^^^ task
surface ships and. fo?'the ftrSj^?^ Ifissile-firing
This raised the oossibiul/ihit ' ^^^P-
P.rt in a
.ock assault^JiV^iS^fca'^t^^Vrj^SLlfL^^r?
ently was unaware they wer^ thrown ?h ^^^^ ^P^^^^"quiCly subdued, told^^l^^L^'eT
^
-tL^^fd^^^'spirits
.
While Events are brief, other news stories receive more
emphasis and thus are longer, more complete and involve a
correspondent. This tyoe of news story has been labelled a
Report. A Report, therefore, occurs outside of the CBS
studio, involves a correspondent such as Dan Rather, Daniel
Schorr or Bruce Norton, and elaborates upon the Event.
Usuallv the Report is dependent upon or related to a previous
-Event- read by Cronkite. Along with visual presentation,
a Report often involves interpretive and analytical reporting-
rather than just reading the 'Tacts'^ of the nev/s. There are
two basic exceptions to the above rules. First, sometimes
Reports do occur within the CBS studio and are handled by
Cronkite. Second, because of their nature, Eric Sevareid's
'"comjnentaries" are classified as Reports.
Events and Reports, therefore, are each coded as one
news story—even though a Report deals with the same subject
matter as its preceding Event. Although the decision to
distinguish between Events and Reports was a subjective one,
it does seem justified on t-.;o counts. First, these are two
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different lournalistic for.s and should be treated as such
in order to give a more accurate reflection of CBS Evening
-e.s. Second, bv doing this, it is possible to locate and
document those sub.iect areas which CBS perceives as im-
portant and thus chooses to emphasize. It has to be assumed
that a Report does reflect news which CBS has considered im-
portant enough to merit elaboration or interpretation. Thus,
the Report category is used to provide a more precise measurl.
itient of the forns of information which are oerceived to be
most important by CBS-and therefore receive more extensive
emphasis
.
To count every news story as just one unit equal to the
others would give a distorted and inaccurate reflection of
the actual content of CBS ^^vening Fews. For example, a
thirty-word Event is not eoual to a two-page Report and
should not be counted as being equal. Thus, what others
might classify as one news story or unit is classified here
as two news stories or units when the news story contains an
^vent plus an accompanying Report—even though both deal with
the same subject matter. This should be kept in mind when
the total number of news stories is being analyzed since this
classification scheme does oroduce an artificial total num-
ber of news stories. It is felt, however, that the advan-
tages and precision attained by distinguishing between
Events and Reports do outweigh the problem of an inflated
total. The following are examples of Events followed by
Reports
:
(Event)
CROrKITE: Good evening. The American-sponsored effort tobring peace to the Middle East has reached its most criti-
cal stage yet. ^'Jhat Israel has been charging all along,that Egypt has used the cease-fire to build up its Suez
A !JVr ^i^^^' "o^'^ openly confirmed by the United States.And Washington, m hopes of getting the angrv Israelisback to the peace table, has taken its findings to Russia
and
_
Egypt,
^'.^e have a roundup reDort on the situation,beginning with CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin
Kalb in V/ashington,
(Report)
KALB: Several times in the past week, the U.S. has pre-
sented evidence of cease-fire violations to Moscow and
Cairo, and appealed to both to observe the termis of the
standstill along the Suez Canal. The Egyptians ignored
the evidence and denied there had been violations. They
accused the Israelis of trying to sabotage the peace
talks. The Russians leveled the same charge against
Israel and refused to discuss the substance of V.'ashington ' s
independent and indisputable evidence of Egyptian vio-
lations.
This curt, negative response from both Moscow and Cairo
has nersuaded the Administration that the Egyptians have
no intention of reversing the missile buildup, and that
the Russians won't help either. In the official view
here, that leaves only one course of action, designed to
keep the possibility of the peace talks alive. That is
to take advantage of the 19 billion dollar weapons bill,
passed yesterday, and step up the flow of American planes
and air-to-ground missiles to Israel. The hope is that
this American step-up will ease Israeli anxieties, which
are recognized here as profound, and thus reduce the
chances of Israel busting up the cease-fire by attacking
the new Egyptian missile sites.
--Marvin Kalb, CBS TIE^.'/S, V.^ashington.
(Event)
CRONKITE: Vice-President Agnew, in an unscheduled speech
to the Am.erican Legion convention today, discussed the
problem of division at home. Those v;ho look at the faults
and cry that the system has failed, Agnew said, just don't
understand the system.
—Terry Drinkwater reports from. Portland, Oregon.
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(Report)
wds Lough, prefaced by some v/ry humor.
treated thIflSnTLVan A^^'^ ^^^'^ - -phis-
I've just %turnfd ?roran l^if • Yo^^ know,
visited many countries inMn^ '' v-^'' ^^^^^^ which I
brought back ^any messages frn^^ '"k^""^ ^
some of our morrdovish^ILators Thr^'iH^°°P' "'"^^to deliver those messages Serson;n3 h ^^^^d me
supposed to send that'ftuffthrough^hr
d'inn'er'that" President' M^x^n^ifh''^ "'"^^ ^^^-^
President of Mexico but ? h^v
^''^''^
attend a
.ild;^:;rSinner at'sena?or?:;iSr?g??T:^~.^°
lolle^oltt,: '^"^ ^^^^ Senator'p^^ifr^g^i ha^I^'Is
One of the tragedies of life in America today is thatwhen we speak of maintaining peace we do have to soeaknot only of peace abroad but of peace at home ^^P^f?Lbombs exploding not
.lust in
-ietnlm bufin ou^ o;n cUies
?t\ies\n'\''pati:rn"o'f''%" '^"^^ the'trunc'h'eon:
bearancp ?h^t^?c '"''^''^^ respect and m.utual for-D e t a is the essence of a civilized society.
DRINKVrATrR: The applause for Agnew inside the convention
anil ^'"'.^''^ ^^^^ J'^^^^ from the 3oS
?hp
anti-Agnew demonstrators outside. It was
once ?h^.=?
rather feeble showing of the protestors whot reatened to disrupt this whole convention
—Terry Drinkwater, CBS NS^/S, Portland.
The second basic criterion for classifying the news in-
volves the location of the news story and its relevance to
the United States. On the basis of location and relevance,
the three classifications are: (1) U.S.
-Domestic
, (2) U.S.-
International, and (3) International. "U.S.
-Domestic'^ merely
categorizes all news stories which physically occurred within
the United States.
'»U.S.-Internationar' involves news
stories which occurred outside of the United States but
which personally involved Americans in some capacity. News
about the Indochina VJar or about a Russian statement on U.S.
participation in Indochina would be examples. The '»Inter-
national'* classification refers to news stories which
physically occur outside of the United States and which do
not involve the United States in any direct way. A news
story about the Oerman government would be an example.
The third basic criterion for classifying the news
concerns whether or not a news story is "Political'* or 'Non-
Political". Previously, it was discussed that because this
research is oriented towards the political effects of tele-
vision upon its audience, the construction of categories
and coding procedures should try to relate to the per-
ceptions of the audience. Because of this, the distinction
between "Political" and "Non-Political" is an elementary and
traditional one. Basically, "Political" news is news which
involves the government. Specifically, the Political cate-
gory contains news whi^u involves the individuals, institu-
tions and agencies of the various governments and those
individuals and groups who either seek to influence or discuss
government policy. Thus, Political involves "government"
and those who discuss governmental policy or try to influence
the actions of government. Non-Political news stories are
mental policy nnin^-i«
e.^v-rn-
-
—
-
- ---nee
..e ,ove.n-
—
.n SUCH a .a.
.Ha.Per...s a two-di.ensional analysis.
.-Uhin tHe Political
category, each news story is clas,-!f.- hy IS C assified according to two
perspectives: (1) tho Pr^nn t .e Political Actor or Actors who are the
-in subjects of the Political news and i2) the Policies
Actions. Issues or Controversies which are being discussid
or acted upon bv the Polit-;,.£.T « •
- «
^^-1^----
-coor or Actors. Thus
, each
^'olitical news story is cl^^^^-r^^^ ,IS C assified on the basis of the Pcli
Classification such as this is „ore accurate in that it per-
-ts analysis of political news fro. four perspectives:
(1) the number of news stories involving specific Political
Actors, (2) the number of stories involving Political Actors
and Specific Policy or Issue Areas, (3) the number of stories
concerned with a specific Policy or Issue Area, and M using
a specific Policv or Issue Area as the unit of analysis-
the nun^ber of stories involving the Specific Policy or Issue
Area and selected Political Actors, r'umbers 2 and 4 are
similar but one uses the Political Actors as the unit of ana-
lysis while the other uses a specific Policy or Issue Area.
The following is, a list of the Political Actors, Issue
and Policy Areas, and r'on-Political categories which were
used
:
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Political Actors
U.S. - Domestic:
IFSTITIITIONS
Executive
Mixon
Agner
Advisers/Staff
Cabinet
Departments
Kxec, Agencies
Reg, Agencies
Legislative
Senate
House
Judicial
Supreme
Lower Courts
GROUPS: UNORGANIZED
Political
Social
Racial
Environmental
INDIVIDUALS
.
Inst. Officials
Politicians
Others
Eric Sevareid
STATE/CITY/LOCAL
ROUPS: ORGANIZED Executive
Political Legislative
Parties Judicial
Ideological
Vietnam Groups
Other
Individuals
Social
Poverty/Welfare
Environmental
Consumer
Other
Economic
Business
Labor
Other
Racial
Policy or Issue Areas
Political Racial
Social rUlitary
Economic Indochina
Ecology
Eoreigh Policy/
Inter. Rel.
1 nn
Political Actors
n.S.
- International and International
IMSTTTUTTONS/nROnPS/lNDIVIDUALS
United States';^
^-reat Britain/Commonwealth
"^ermany/France
Other V/. Europe
riddle Kast
Africa
Russia
China
Indochinasi^
Other S.E. Asia
South Asia
Japan and Pacific Islands
So. and Central America
Intern. Organizations
*not included in International
category-
Policy or Issue Areas
U.S.
- International and International
Political
Social
Economic
War Ecology
x'^i^^?^^ Foreign Policy/Int. RelationsIndochina-
-not included in International
category
Mon-Political Subject Areas
U.S.
- Domestic, U.S.
- International, and International
Tragic Events
Accidents
Crime
Space
Labor
Business
rYSE'!= Racial/Ethnic
Personalit. T'ilitary
Intertain. Environment
On The Road-
Other
Sports
Social
Economic
-only included in U.S.-
Domestic category
More information c-ncerning the meanings of these cate-
gories will be given in the discussion of the results. One
point, however, should be made concerning one specific coding
procedure since it does affect the results. V.'hile the normal
coding procedure was to count each news story as one unit and
to place it in one category, it was often necessary to divide
news stories into two halves and place each half in a separate
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stories contained more than one PoliUcal Actor or involved
..ore than one Issue-Area. Examples of this might be n^.s
involving the President and Congress, the State Deoartrent
and a foreign government, or a situation such as the Galley
Trial which involved both the
-miitary'. and "Indochina-
Issue Areas. The following examples illustrate how news
stories would have to be divided between two Political
Actors
:
imV-h ^-i.^ T
J^xno p±eage to make every eiforl
saSsfacMSn'.^???; ^^^^ expressed^doisiaction ^ith the progress made in this thirdround, and said that they looked fonvard to the Lxtsession, scheduled to begin in Vienna next March?
In Paris, today's Vietnam Deace talks ended ud inarguments oyer whether the United States has the rightto carry out reconnaissance flights oyer Mo?th Vietnam
^^id those flights w^r^
pinsion'of'l] r
the ';underit^ing'^ that led to the sus-
^^!n?oS^^ '.^"'"^^''^ attacks. The North Vietnamesedenied that, and said they'll use all ^TThe ir resourc esto shoot down any U.S. plane flying oyer their territory
President ^^ixon assured industrialists today that his
PoSutLn'^'^n T on the held to fiJhtp llu ion. To correct what is wrong, Mr. Fixon saidwe m.ust not destroy what is right, what ^as p?oy?dedAmerica's wealth. me officials, members of his in-dustrial pollution control council, had assembledTopresent a rencrt which, ar.ong other thinr^s
,
charg^^^ thatsome goyernment antipollution standards are harsh^'and
'
impractical. In the council's words: ^»Standards hayebeen established which are unachieyable with presently
ayailable technology or are unattainable at economicallytolerable costs. Often, the council added, standardshaye been based not on facts but on emotional appeals.
Obviously, this type of coding will affect the total
results. For example, during the period of a week, there
1 no
might be four Reports involving debate between the Secretary
of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By
dividing each Report in half and coding it appropriately, the
week's total would be
Indochina
Cabinet \, ^, f) = 2
Senate (4, \, \, \) = 2
^J^mile this procedure does give distorted totals in one sense,
it does seem .justified since it is the most accurate way of
measuring and reflecting the content and the emphasis of CBS
Evening ^^ews.
Analysis
The analysis covered the period of September 1, 1970,
to October 15, 1971,—exclusive of weekend broadcasts. This
period contained a total of 294 broadcasts which produced a
grand total of ^^,042 news stories. This yielded an average of
27.3 5 news stories Der broadcast. Tt should be noted that
this does not mean that apnrcximately 27.3 5 different subjects
were presented on an a . ^rage broadcast. Since this total does
include both Events and Reports, it is im.portant to remeriber
that generally a Report involves the same subject matter as
the Event which immediately preceded it. Thus, the number of
Events in an average broadcast would give a better apDroxi-
mation of the number of different subject areas which were
covered. And, since Reports are usually dependent upon Events,
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it is expected that Events will outnumber Reports
.
The fact that Events do outnumber Reports by a great
-rgin is the first significant pattern which emerges fron
the analysis. This is understandable since television news
emphasizes width rather than depth of coverage. Thus, Events
outnumber Reports by a 3 : 1 ratio.
Table 1. Total Number of Events and Reports
Total
Invents 60gl.
. 75.61 20. 6g
Reports 1961. 24.39 6.67
Total 6042. 100. 27.35
From these totals, it is evident that on an average
nightly broadcast slightly over 75^. of the news stories were
Events. Mth an average of over twenty Events per broadcast,
there obviously is not very much time to go into much detail
in any news story. Since there were 20.68 Events per broad-
cast, this would mean that there were aDproximately twenty
different subject areas covered on each broadcast. Thus, the
first pattern to be documented, and one quite familar to
viewers of CBS Evening News, is that CBS Evening News empha-
'
sizes quantity and width rather than depth of coverage.
The second pattern to emerge concerns the dominance of
Political news. ''Tiile about 75^^. of the news stcrioc were
Events, about the same percentage (74^) of news stories were
Political,
Ill
Table 2. Political
- Mon-Political Totals
.
/o
Political
Non-Political
5925.5 73. 6g
2116.5 26.32
Total 5042. 100.
As Table 3 illustrates,
both Events and Reports:
this general pattern holds with
Table 3. Political
Events
- Non-Political Totals for
and Reports
Event s €
— '
Political 4435.5 74.92
Non-Political 1645.5 27.06
Total 6051. 100.
Thus, on an average broadcast, CBS devoted 75'fo of its
news stories to matters o^ a political nature. One important
point should be noted. The actual battlefield coverage of
the Indochina ^-^ar was classified as being Political. Because
of the heavy coverage of the war, this would tend to inflate
the nuiTiber of Political news stories. The inclusion of Indo-
china battlefield coverage as being Political is justified
since the success, failure and brutality of the war could be
very strong factors in terms of public opinion support or
Reports
U90. 75. 9g
A-71. 24.02
1961. 100.
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attentive publics. V/hether or not television coverage of
the v,ar increased or decreased support is i^naterial at
this point. The ooint is that coverage of the war could
have had important effects on public opinion. This justi-
fies its inclusion as Political news.
Thus, as will be seen, the U.S.-International category,
Which includes coverage of the Indochina War has an extremely
high percentage (93.76?5) of Political news stories. However,
as Table U illustrates, the other two categories which do not
include coverage of the Indochina War, both devote about 70f,
of their news stories to Political news.
The distortion imposed by the high percentage of Poli-
tical news stories in the U.S.
-International category does
not affect the total average very much. Thus, the pattern of
CBS- devoting 70f, of its news stories to Political matter is
a pattern prevalent in all of the three main categories.
A third basic pattern which is evident from the results
is that slightly over 70f. of the news stories falls within
the U.S.
-Domestic category. Therefore, about 70^> of the news
stories on CBS Evening Mews involved news which occurred with-
in the United States.
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.Table 5. Totals for The Three Basic Categories
Total
^^.S,
- Domestic 570^^.5 70.93
U.S.
- International 1345.5 16.73
International
12.29
Total
100^
This table graphically illustrates the dominance of
U.S.
-Domestic news—as the combined total of the other
two categories does not even equal one-third of the total
num.ber of news stories. This emphasis on news involving
the United
.States can be further illustrated by combining
the two categories involving the United States. The
com.bined total of the U.S.
-Domestic and U.S.
-International
categories is 7054. news stories or 87.71^^ of the total
number. Therefore, during this period, almost 88^. of the
news stories of CBS Evening News consisted of news stories
occurring within the Ur-'-^ed States or news stories involving
the United States in some direct capacity.
Table 6, giving a different perspective, illustrates
the comparative emphasis of Events to Reports for each of
the three basic categories.
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Table.. 6. The Totals of The Three Pasic Categories
V.^ithm Events and Reports
^^I^Llil ^ Renorts ^,
n.S.
-
Domestic 4171.5 (6^,60) 1537. (7^.3^)
TJ.S.
- International 1101. 5 (ig.i.i) 244. (12.44)
International
^0^. (^3^29)
. ISO. ( 9.1^)
1961. 100^/S
Here, within the Reports category, U .S.
-Domestic news
stories dominate to an even greater degree with over 7S%
of the news stories involving news within the United
States. By combining the U.S.
-Domestic and U.S.
-Inter-
national categories, it is evident that slightly over 90%
consist of news stories involving the United States in
some direct capacity. The similar percentage for Events
is 56.71'^..
Table 7 shows dominance of Events to Reports within
each of the three basic categorieso
This again illustrates the dominance of Events to
Reports within each main category. This is especially
apparent with the U.S.
-International and International
categories where over ^0^ of the news stories are Events.
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There is a fourth basic pattern which is evident from
the results. This pattern is the dominance of Events which
are Political in nature, "ithin each of the three basic
categories, there are four general news ty.es as illustrated
by the natrix:
Political
^^on-
Political
'vents Reports
In a situation of equality, each news type would, of course,
equal about 25fo. T,-ith CBS Evening News, however, it is
significant that slightly over 55fo of the total news stories
were Political-Events. Of the g042. total news stories,
4435.5 (55.1 5fO were Political-Events.
Table Totals of the T^our General Types of ^^ews Stories
of ^ of
^v^nt Total Report Total
Political 4435.5 (55.15) 1490. (13.53)
^^on-Political 1645.5 (20.46) 471. ( 5.g6)
Total 60?^1
.
1Q6lo ?^042.
The actual rratrix, therefore, looks like:
118
Political
Non-Political
55.15f.
20.46^ 5.86f,
As would be expected, the dominance of Political-Events is
'
constant throughout the three basic categories. Specifically,
within all three of the major categories, at least 50^ of all
the news stories within each category was a Political-Event.
Tables 9-11 illustrate this.
^"'ithin the n.S.
-Domestic category, two types of news
stories dominate: Political and Events. Of the total 5708.5
U.S.
-Domestic news stories, almost 70°^o (69.62^,) were Political
and over 73^^. (73.08^:^) were Events. The dominant single news
type was the Political-Event as alm.ost one-half (49.66) of
the U.S.
-Domestic news stories were Political Events. The
matrix illustrates the proportions of the other news types
within the U.S.
-Domestic category.
Events Renorts
Political
^^on-Political
49.66f. 19,96%
23.41^'o
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.csults rro. Table 9 an. the
.at.ix
.ean'that ap..oxi-
.atel. one-half of all the ne«s sto.les on CBS Kvenln. Ke.3
Which occurred within the United States were Political-
yet only received superficial coverage since they were
events.
,..uch of this type of news is basically an announce-
ment or press release briefly indicating that a Political
Actor or a Governmental Agency either said or did something.
Or, as stated by O.orge Reedy in The Presidency in Flux:
'•One of the real problems with television is that it has
not worked out techniques for conveying ideas. It is not
capable of carrying any more than very brief bulletins; it
does not have the caoacity to really probe into, behind, and
under the various words that are being said."' This would
certainly seem to apply to news stories occurring within the
United States since 71. 3^.^ of the total U.S.-Do,.estic Poll-
tical news stories are Events.
Table 10 indicates how this pattern was prevalent in
the U.S.
-International category-the category which included
coverage of the Indochina War. Again, the dominant news
types are Political and
-vents. V/ithin this category, over
93^ (93.76'^) of the news stories are Political. This is
extremely high though one obvious cause is the extensive
coverage of the Indochina V^^ar-almost all of which was classi-
fied as Political. A second cause is simply that the most
/;eorge E. Reedy, The Presidency In Flux, New ^crk:Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 62"
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important news involving the United States and other on-to
of the world is news of a political nature involving
governments. Also evident within the U.S.-International
category is the high incidence of Events (SKye-^,) compared
to Reports (1g.13«^0
As would be exoected, the single dominant news type in
the 'J. S.
-International category was the Political-Event.
Political-Events comprised over 76^ of the U.S.-International
news stories. Again, much of this was due to coverage of the
Indochina Var. The matrix shows the percentages for the other
news types within the U.S.-International category.
Political
^'on-Political
76.J^1^ l6.95fo
1 .195^
Obviously, the ^^on-Political Nev/s is not emphasized by CBS
Evening Nev/s
»
As indicated by Table 11, similar patterns were found
in the category which did not. contain news involving the
United States—the International category. Here, over ^%
(f^7.7?^^) o^ the news stories were Events and almost 70^7
(69.?^4'^0 were Political. The Political-Event was the single
most dominant news tyne as over 57f9 of the International news
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stories were Political-v.ents
. The matrix illustrates the
other percentages of news types:
Political
^^on-Political 24.39f. 5. 77fo .
The nattern established in Tables 9-11 has been both
constant and clear, ^ithin each of the three basic cate-
gories, at least 6qf, of the news stories within that cate-
gory were Political. And, within each category at least
73^^ of the news stories within that category were Events.
As cited in Table 5, 55.15^ of all news stories are Poli-
tical-Events. Table 12 compares the number of Political-
Events for each of the three basic categories:
Table 12. Number of Political-Events
Per ITaior Category
of.
U.S.
-Domestic 2/^T5T
^^S.
-International 1033.5
International 567.
T o f each category
76.^1^
57.39'^.
Total 443 5.5
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Another way of emphasizing the dominance of specific
types of news stories is to compare each to the total number
of Events or the total number of Reports. In doing this,
Table 13 again illustrates the dominance of both the U.S.-
Domestic category and Political news stories within both
the Events and Reports. Especially evident is the dispro-
portionate number of Political news stories to Mon-Political
news stories within both the Events and Reports.
Table 13. Number and Percentage of News Types WithinEvents and Reports
Events Renorts (if
N.S.
-Domestic
Political 2^35. f46.6?fO 1139. (5S.0gf^0
N.S.- Domestic
Non-Political 1336.5 (21
.9gf.) 39S. (20.29f.)
U.S.
-International
Political 1033.5 (17.00^0 22g. (11.63f.)
N
. S.
-International
Non-Political (1.12f.) 16. (.525^0
International
Political 567. {9.32fO 123. (6.27:^0
International
^^on-Political ?41
.
(3.96^,) 57. (2.91<)
Total 60^1 . (100!^;) 1961.
Table 13, again demonstrates the emphasis given to N.S.-
Dorestic Political-Events. This one type of news story com-
prises almost Zf7^ of the total Events and slightly over 5o-^
of the total Reports.
1?6
Another way of examining these r.atterns 'is to compare
each news type to the total number (S042) of news stories
rather than to the nunber of Events or Reports as illustrated
in Table 13.
Table K. dumber and ^% of the V.'h.ole of Each f'ews Type
—
.
Event '^0 Report S <f,
n.S. Domestic
Political 2835. (35.25'^.) 1139. (I4.l6f,)
.3. -Dorrestic
Non-Political 1336.5 (16.62^',) 398. a.95?0
^J. S.
-International
Political 1033.5 02.^5'^,) 228. (2.83f.)
N
.55.
-International
Non-Political 68. (.85^-) 16. (.20fO
International
Political 567. (7.05^0 123. (1.53^0
International
Non-Political 241
. (3.00^0 57. {.71'^0
8042. (100^)
This table gives the most accurate reflection of the content
of CBS Evening News presented so far. It should be noted,
however, that the numbers included here indicate only the
number and proportion of news stories during this period.
Table 14 says nothing about the amount or oro portions of
time alloted to each, category or news type. Thus, according
to Table 14, CBS Evening ^^ews devoted 3 5.2 5^^^ of its tctal
news stories to N^S.
-Domes tic Political Events. However,
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this does not
.ean that CBS Evening
.e.s allocated 3 5^. of
its broadcast time to U.S.-Do.estic Political Events. The
reason this inference cannot be .ade is obvious since Events
and Reports are not eoual in time length.
It is possible, however, to obtain a more precise re-
flection of CBS Evening ^e^s than that offered by Table U.
The actual nunber of specific news stories on an
-average'^
broadcast can be computed. As cited in Table 'l
, there were
an average of 20.68 Events per broadcast and an average of
6.67 Reports per broadcast. By using the respective per-
centage from Table 13, it is possible to compute the actual
number of news stories per broadcast. For example, from
Table 13, n.S. -Domestic Political Events comprise 46.62f.
of the total Events. Since there were an average of 20.68
Events per broadcast, then 46.62f, of 20.68 would be 9.64.
Thus, there were 9.64 TI.S.
-Domestic Political Events in an
-average- broadcast. Table 15 provides a composite of the
number and t^^pe of specific news stories on an "average'*
broadcast of CBS Evening Tews during the period of analysiso
This table illustrates
. ^e number and type of news stories
which would apoear on CBS Evening Mews during the period uf
September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The. average number
of news stories can be sumnarized in various ways which
reflect the dominant patterns discussed in this chapter.
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Table 15, Averae^e ^urrber of News Stories Per Broadcast
n .S.
-Dorrestic
Political
n.S,
-Domestic
Non-Political
^US.
-International
Political
^^S,
-International
Non-Political
International
Political
International
Non-Political
Events
9.64
4.54
3.52
.23
1.93
.S2
Reports
3.^7
1.35
.06
.42
.19
Total 20.68 6.67
Table 16. Average Number of News Stories per Broadcast
U.S.
-Domestic
U.S.
-International
International
19.40
4.59
3.36
Total 27.35
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Table 17. Average Fu^ber of Nev.3 Stories per Broadcast
n.S.
-Domestic Political
^^S.
-Domestic
''^on-Political
U.S.-Internaticnal Political
n.S.
-International
^^on-Political
International Political
International
^^on-Political
13.51
5.S9
4.30
.29
2.35
Total
27.35
Table 1^, Average Number of riews Stories per Broadcast
Events Reports Total
U.S.
-Domestic 14. IS 5.22 19.40
U ,S.
-International 3.75
.34 4.59
International 2.75 .61 3.36
Total 20. 6S 6.67 27.35
Table 19. Averapie Numbe. of News Stories ner Broadcast
Events Peports Tot.nl
Political 15.09 5.07 20.16
Non-Political 5.59 I.60 7.19
27.35
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine sorr.e or
the more general results of the quantitative analysis of
CRS Evening Mews during the period of September 1, 1970,
to October 1 5
,
1 971
.
The results of this analysis have'
indicated som.e very obvious patterns.
These patterns have been quite evident in the preceding
analysis and thus can be easily sumjrarized. First, a high
number (75f.) of news stories were Events. Second, an almost'
equally high nu.n-ber (74^>) of the news stories were Political.
Third, a dominant number of news stories (70^) were IJ.S.-
Domestic and thus involved news which occurred within the.
United States. Fourth, over half (55^.) of the total news
stories were Political-Events. Fifth, slightly over 3 5^, of
all the news stories involved Political-Events within the
U.S.
-Domestic category. Thus, the dominant news type were
news stories which were: (l) Events, (2) Political,
(3) U.S. -Domestic, {U) Political-Events and (5) U.S.-
Domestic-Political Events.
The actual significance of these results in relation
to the effects of television news on public opinion is
difficult to determine given the generality of the results.
V.^hile further discussion of this should wait until it can
be put into a m.cre complete context, a few generalizations
can be made concerning the patterns outlined in this chapter.
-evision
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It would appear that „ost Americans, through t=l.
news, learn more from their government than about it
Because of the heavy emphasis on announcement-type Events
people cannot learn much about their government or the
political process. V.'hat they do learn, as transmitted by
television news, is a superficial account of what the govern-
ment or key Political Actors say or do. However, learning
this is one thing-understanding it is another. How can the
people, especially those whose main source of political in-
formation is television,
"understand" the government and the
political process when over 70", of the U.S.
-Domestic Political
news stories are Events?
Even the extent of this
-learning- has to be suspect-
given that there are over twenty-seven news stories in an
average broadcast. Obviously, vital and salient inforrration
conveyed by television is absorbed. However, when television
^'passes on- inforrration at the rate that it does rather than
explain it, the visual element, because it is easier to retain
than marginally important political information, may becom.e
the most imnortant fact.,- in the political effects of tele-
vision. Tore inform.ation is required to have a better unner-
standing of the forms of inform.ation presented by CBS Evening
^^ews. This chapter, though, has given a general understanding
of some of the forms and types of information conveyed by CBS
Evening ^^ews. Perhaps most important, it has documented and
reinforced Reedy' s contention that television "is not capable
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of carrying any rrore than very brief bulletins."^ How-
ever, in doing this, a point Reedy overlooks, the visual
element of television may emerge as the most important
and most personal link between government and the average
m.an. The next chapter will give a more precise account
of who CBS Evening News permits the average m.an to see.
^Reedy, p. 62.
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CHAPTER IV
COi'FRAGE OF POLITICAL ACTORS
This chapter continues the quantitative analysis of th
previous chapter.
.*ile Chapter III „as general in nature
and involved both Political and Mon-Political
.news
, this
Chapter is .ore limited in that it only analyzes Political
news. Specifically, this chaoter documents and analvzes
coverage of Political Actors-within the context of (1) the
three nain categories and {?.) the respective subcategories.
Thus, this chapter is only concerned with the analysis of
Political Actors. The next chapter will complete the
ouantitative analysis by analyzing both the Policy-Issue
Areas and the "on-Political news.
U.S.
-Domestic
T^^ithin the II.S.-Dorrestic category, the main groups of
Political Actors were categorized as: [^) Institution,
(2) Organized Groups, (3) Unorganized Groups, (4) Individual
and (5) .State/City/Local. All the Political Actors except
for State/City/Local pertain to, and involve, the national
government. The Institutions category included the Execu-
tive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the national
government. Both Organized and Unorganized Groups are
Political Actors who either discuss or try to influence
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national governmental policy. The types of groups involved
here are (,) Political, l2) Social, (3) Economic, and
(U) Racial. Kach of these is divided into
.ore specific
groups. A distinction is .ade between Organized Groups and
Unorganized r.roups. "he latter refers to groups which have
a temporary association rather than a permanent basis of
existence. Demonstrations and protest groups .would be
included here. The individuals classification involves two
types of people who discuss or try to influence government
policy. One tvpe is a person who is not a part of the
government. The other is a governmental official, usually
of the Executive branch, who is speaking for himself-rather
than for his Adninistration or his executive agency. This
way, it is possible to discriminate between Political Actors
who speak for themselves. The State/City/Local category
includes political news stories which involve state, city
or local governments or those Political Actors discussing
or trying to influence state, city or local governmental
policy.
Within the U.S.
-Domestic Political category, there were
a total of 3974. news stories. Of these, 2335. (71 .34:^)
were Events and 1139. (2S.66<) were Reports. Table 1 presents
the totals for the subcategories.
or)
Table 1. Totals of the Five TTaxn Subcategories
Institutions 2637.5
Organized Groups 276.5
Unorganized Crroups 71.
Individuals 532 5
State/City/Local 356.5
Total 3974.
(66.37!^.)
{6.96%)
iU79fo)
(15.9lf.)
•(S.97^0)
From Table 1
,
the first main and important pattern
emerges,
-ithin the U.S.
-Domestic Political category, the
dominant Political Actor is The Institutions-which involves
the three br^^nches of government. Almost 67^^ of all Poli-
tical news stories occuring within the United States were
ones in which Institutions were the rain Political Actors.
Even more imDressive is the fact that Institutions com-
prised almost one-third (32.
.^Of,) of the total number of news
stories diiring the neriod of analysis. Thus, Political news
within the United State is for the r.ost part dominated by
the Political Actors of the three branches of the national
government. Table 2 examines totals of the five main sub-
categories in terms of Events and Reports. This again re-
flects the dom.inance of the Institutions category. The
Institutions comprise" over 70'-^ (72.13?') of the U.S.
-Domestic
Events and over 50t (52.02-^ of the Reports. Except for the
"i36
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Individuals category, the pattern of Events outnumbering
Reports is constant. The deviation was caused by Eric
Sevareid^s 'commentaries'^ which comprised 47.50f, of the
Individuals-Reports
.
Institutions. Vlth the Institutions, as with the other
main sub-categories of the U.S.
-Domestic category, it is
possible to obtain a very accurate reflection
-of the degree
of emphasis given to each Political Actor. This analysis will
examine the relation of the three branches to each other and
will then examine the relation of the Political Actors with-
in each branch.
From Table 3 a second pattern emerges. It is evident
that the dominant Political Actor of the Institutions
category is the Executive branch.
Table 3. Totals of The Institutions Category
Executive 1656.5 62.51
Legislative 625. 23,81
Judicial 353. 13.35
Total 2637. lOOf.
Obviously, the Executive branch is the center of attention
as it completely dominates the other two branches. The
dominance of the executive branch is illustrated by the
138
fact that it comprises slightly over one-fifth (20.60^) of
all the news stories of CBS Evening Ne.s during this period.
Thus, while theoretically the three branches of the federal
government are equal, on CBS Evening ^'ews
, as in reality
they are not. Access to the television screen is much
easier for .embers of the Executive branch than for members
of the Legislative or Judicial branches. The obvious
question is-Can the other two branches, especially the
Legislative branch which plays a m.ore antagonistic role
vis-S-vis the Executive branch, really compete with the
Executive branch for "political visibility"? The answer
appears to be "M0.'»
Table 4 presents a different perspective of the em-
phasis given each branch.
Vmile these tables indicate certain patterns such as
the dominance of the Executive, it is important to penetrate
further and examine the patterns within each branch.
Closer examination of the Executive branch, for example,
illustrates that in one sense, President Vlxon is not
the dominating Political Actor within the Executive branch.
Table 5 illustrates the coverage Fiven to Nixon in
relation to the other Political Actors of the Executive
branch of the government.
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Table 5. Totals of The Executive Bran ch
^^7
.
l^^ixon
*? Q1 c 23.63^
Agnew
2.56^
Advisers/sta ff 217.5 13.13^
Cabinet 243. 14.67f.
Departments 530.5 32.03%
Executive Agencies 127.5 l.lOfo
Regulatory Agencies 104. 6.2gf,
Totals 1656.5 100^
According to Table 5, it is not Nixon but the Departments
who are the dominant Political Actors within the Executive
branch. However, this can be explained. First, the Nixon
category pertains only to President Nixon himself. Other
references used by CBS Evening News which would relate to
Nixon such as the ^^^ixon Administration'^ or the '^liite
House^' were classified ^.i the Advisers/staff category.
Second, while the Departments outnumbered Nixon in Events,
Nixon did suroass the Departments in total number of
Reports. Thus, as Table 6 illustrates, a high number
(^2.56^) of the news stories of the Departments were
Events. By comparison, 72.54;> of the news stories involving
Nixon were Events,
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An interesting perspective of the Executive branch can
be obtained by collapsing the three bureaucratic categories-
Departments, Executive Agencies, and Regulatory Agencies.
doing this, it is possible to document the emphasis CBS
Evening News places on '^announcement-type" news passed on to
them by the federal bureaucracy, within these three bureau-
cratic categories there are 762 news stories-or 46^, of the
total news stories of the Executive branch. Of these,
637.5 (^3.66^0 are Events while 124.5 (l6.34^0 are Reports.
Thus, almost ^4^ of the news stories involving the federal
bureaucracy are Events. Also, within the Executive branch,
these three bureaucratic categories comprise 4^.91<^ of the
Events but only 3 5.27^. of the Reports. Therefore, almost
one-half of the Events of the Executive branch involve the
Departments, Executive Agencies or Regulatory Agencies.
This is a third important pattern to emerge.
A fourth pattern involves the Legislative branch. The
pattern here concerns the dominance of the Senate. As Table
indicates, on CBS Evening News the two houses of the Legis-
lative branch are not e^,aal. Slightly over two-thirds
(67.59^0 of the news stories of the Legislative branch in-
volved the Senate. Thus, by better than a 2:1 ratio, the
Senate is emphasized over the Fouseo
Table 7. Totals of The Legislative Branch
Senate
House
424.5 67.59?^
199. 31.69fo
"Legislative Branch'* 4.5 ^2^^
With the Reports the Senate is even rrore dorrinant since
73.01'^. of the Reports of the Legislative branch involve
the Senate. Thus, within the Legislative branch, the
"action'* and glamour are in the Senate—not the House.
Access to the television screen is easier for Senators
than for Representatives. First, CBS T-vening Tews em-
phasizes the Senate over the House by better than a 2:1
margin. Second, there are fewer Senators than Represen-
tatives which thus increases the potential for ''political
visibility" for each Senator,
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Within the Judicial branch there were two categories-
Supreme and Lower Courts. The latter refers to any federal
courts other than the Supreme Court. Included here are the
military courts. As evident in Table 9, the Lower Courts
greatly outnum.ber the Supreme Court in total news stories.
One reason for this is that usually only the Suprem.e Court
decisions receive coverage, mth the lower courts, however,
the trial in progress is covered as well as the final de-
cision. A second reason is that there are more Lower Courts
to cover. A third reason is the I-'y Lai trials which were
extensively covered by CBS Evening Tlews.
Table 9. Totals of the Judicial Branch
Supreme Court 75.5 (21. 39^^)
Lower Courts 277.5 {7^.6lf,)
Totals 3 53. i00f.
As evidenced from this table, relative to the Lower Courts,
the Supreme Court does not receive much coverage. Also,
since slightly over ^5'^'> (^5.43"^) of the news stories in-
volving the Supreme Court are Events, the coverage the
Court receives is very brief. Table 10 illustrates this.
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Iirou£s. In addition to Institutions, the U.S.-Dorestic
category includes categories involving Groups, Individuals,
and State/City/Local Government. Even though ^ey share only
a combined 33< of the total U.S.
-Domestic Political news
stories, they do deserve to be examined.
Within the Organized Groups there were four categories-
(1) Political, (2) Social, (3) Economic, and (4) Racial.
The two most dominant were the Political and Social Groups
which involve 80.92^. of the news stories of the Organized
'
Groups
,
Table 11. Totals of Organized Groups
f
Political 120. 1,3.Wo
Social 40.5 14.65:^9
Economic 103. 37.52f. .
Racial 13. 4.70f.
Totals 276.5 lOOf.
As Table 12 illustrates, the Political groups, in
addition to being the most numerous, also have the highest
percentage (31.67?^) of Reports
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As,, with the Institutions, a better understanding of
the general category can be attained by examining each
individual category. The Political category of Organized
Oroups consists of four groups: (1) Parties, (2) Ideologi-
cal, (3) Vietnam, and (4I Others. The most dominant of
these four groups were Vietnam groups-groups which existed
either to support or oppose the war. Table 13 demonstrates
the dominance of the Vietnam groups.
Table 13. Totals of Organized Political Groups
In addition to being the dominant group, the Vietnam cate-
gory also has a high nu-her (34. ^5'^^ of Reports.
o
o
o
o oo oo
rH cv
03
4-3 • •
O
E-i cv cv
•
cv
CO
4-) o
^
O ir\ •
D.
• •
C tC
c
o
OC
c
-1-
to
0^
CV
-J-
-cc
• •
• O • O • T
—
T
—
CV >—
VI
o c<-\o
• • •
o CV
• OO O
CV T-
C
•C
to T-
to
COp CV
c •
t— • vO •
> cv ur^
CV
'6^
<^
• • • •
• o
CV CV
-c^ Ov' c
tC r-
CO
<D
•H
CO
03
U
•H
tL
O
r-i
o
(U
E
03
C
Q)
•H
x:
o
CO
rH
CT3
O
151
Organized Social groups involved only W.5 news stories
No one group dominated since the
.ost numerous group, Others
would include diverse types of groups. Table 15 shows hov,
these groups were distributed.
Table 15. Totals of Organized Social 0roups
Poverty/Welfare 3. 7.41^
Environmental 7.5 lg.52f.
Consumer 6. 14.^1^
Other
Totals
24. 59.26^
40.5 100^
Within this category, Invents greatly outnuinber Reports.
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Organized Econoirdc r.roups consist of three types:
Business, Labor and Other. This category does not involve
strikes or disputes between business and labor unless they
specifically involve the federal governirent in some way.
Within this catefory, Business was the dominant Political
Actor,
Table 17. Totals of Organized Economic GrouDs
I.
Business
Labor
Other
Totals
66.5
34.5
2.
64.56^
33.50^
103. 100^
In comparing Events to Reports, there is no important
deviation from the norm.al patterns.
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Within tho Orrnnized Racla] Hroupa there la only on^ cator.ory,
Racial, which only involvoa n totnl of thlrtoon ii...vm ntori^^a.
Tablo 1Q. Totaln of Orrnnizorl Rncinl Croups
^vontg Ronortn "I, Totnl "I
Racial 11 ? (15.3^"^) 13 (loof,)
Vfhlle the total number of Orrani'/od Croupa is nf)t. fJi.it
BlRnlficant compared to tho TnatituMonn, the numbor op
Unor/^nn 1 '.',.•(1 flroiif).'! in ovnn moro 1 nn 1 mi n cant . Th.> t.ot.-il
number rx^ws atorion donllnr with Hnorranizod T/roups ia
71. Thu:], t,he total of nuwn jjLoi : involving; Orrani '/,i->fl
and Ilnor/VMi! '/.od Cronpn in T/,7o5 or f^74'/. tho totnl ii.;;.-
Domoatic I'o] i t, i ci I hcwm ntori..,!. Obviounly, rol/itivo to
Ins t i tutlonn
,
r,r-()Uf):; rlo rujt havi? a v.M'y ^'.ood ncconiJ to tho
telovinif.n ncroon. T.iblo 20 nhowa the distribution of tho
four r.'ite^orion oC "n()r^!;ani'/od Croupa:
Tab It; ?n, Totaln oC Unor/'ani'/od flroups
Political 16.5 2'^.2K%
Social 45, 63. 3?^^'
Racl'il :>.5 3 .52/^
Knv i ronmontal 7.0 Q.rt6'^
Totals 71. 1007^
Among the Unorganized Groups the dominant Political Actors
are the Social Croups. And, as Table 21 demonstrates, with
Social Groups, kOfo of the news stories are Reports.
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Individuals, The Individuals category includes four
elements: (1) Institutional Officials, (2) Politicians,
(3) Others, and (4) Eric Sevaried. As mentioned, Institutional
Officials are governnental officials «ho in the ne^^s story are
speaking for the^selves-rather than reflecting their ad,rini-
stration, departn-ental
,
or agency position. For example, a
member of the State Department v,ho criticizes official policy
would be listed here rather than under Departments since he
is speaking for himself and not for the State Department.
Politicians are those who are engaged in a political campaign.
Others are those who were not part of the government but were
discussing Political matters. As Table 22 illustrates, the
Others category was the most dominant with 47.12^, of the news
stories of the Individual category.
Table 22. Totals of Individuals Category
Institutional Officials 13.91%
Politicians 13.99%
Others 298. k.7.12%
Eric Sevareid 158. 2K,9^%
Totals 632.5
. 1 Q0%
The influence of Eric Sevareid is seen in Table 23. Here,
because of Sevareid, Reports actually outnumber Events,
1 cd
Sevareid constitutes Kl ,50^> of
the normal patter
would be present.
the Reports. Without him,
n of Events greatly outnumbering Reports
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^^^teZCit^ZLocal. The State/City/Local
" category
involves Political news stories on the State, City or Local
level. Within this category, the t.o .ost dominant Political
Actors are Groups and the Executive. These two account for
over 70^, of the news stories within this category.
Table 24. Totals of The State/City/Local Category
Executive iog.5 30.43f,
Legislative
Judicial 41.5 11.64f.
143. 40.12^
Individuals 49. 13. 74^^.
State/City/Local 3, ^g^^^
'^o'^^ls 356.5 loof.
Table 25 shows the proportion of Events to Reports within
the State/City/Local category.
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U.S.
- International
The U.S.
-International category includes news stories
which occur outside of the United States, but .hich directly
involve either An^ericans or the United States. Here, as wiih
the International category, there are only tv.o basic cate-
goric distinctions-fD Institutions and (2) Groups and
Individuals. Each of these is subdivided into fourteen
geographical areas or countries. Because of the distribution
of the news in the U.S.
-International category, the sub-
sequent analysis will be more general than the previous one.
And, in most cases, whole numbers rather than percentages
will be used.
V/ithin the U.S.
-International Political Category there
were a total of 1261.5 news stories. Of these, 1033.5
(^1.93^0 were Events and 22g (lg.07<o) were Reports. Ob-
viously, this indicates a great emphasis on Events.
Table 26 shows the distribution of news stories among the
two Political Actors of the U.S.
-International category.
Table 26. Totals of The U.S.
-International Category
Institutions
Groups - Individuals
1091.5
170.
g6.52fo
Totals 1261
162
From this, the first obvious pattern is evident. Almost
m of the Political news stories of the U.S.
-International
category involve Institutions. The distribution of Events
and Reports within this category is illustrated in Table 2?,
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This again reinforces the dominance of Institutions. In fact,
Institutions constitute Si .12% of the total U.S.
-International
news stories.
Institutions. V.^ithin Institutions, a second pattern
emerges—that of the dominance of two countries—the United
States and Indochina. Together, they represent slightly over
79fo (79.21^) of the total news stories of the Institutions
category. The United States has k5.63% of the news stories
and Indochina has 33.5^/'. Obviously, both of these reflect '
the extensive coverage of the Indochina V'ar. Table 28
illustrates the totals and the distribution between Events
and Reports for the Institutions category.
Table Totals for Institutions Category
Events Reports Total
United States 399. 99. 498.
Great Britain/Commonwealth 12.5 1 13.5
Germ.any/France 12. 2.5 14.5
Other, ^.'^estern Europe 8.5 2. 10.5
Eastern Europe 8.5 0. 8.5
Middle East 49.5 8.5 58.
Africa 6.5 1. 7.5
Russia 44.5 .5 45.
China 15. 2.5 17.5=
Indochina 313. 53.5 366.5
South Asia 5. 1. 6.
Japan/Pacific Islands 3. 1. 4.
South and Central Anerica 15. 2.5 17.5
International Organizations 17.5 7. 24.5
Totals 909.5 1S2. 1091.5
{^^ 4 of which are Natl. China)
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OrouDs-Individuals. Within the Groups-Individuals
category, the United States and Indochina still dominate.
They account for 59.4^ of the category's total. As Table 29
indicates, this is constant with both Events and Reports.
With the Reports the United States constitutes 51.09^/ of the
total Reports,
Table 29. Totals of Oroups-Individuals Category
United States
Herman/France
Other Western Europe
East Europe
Middle East
Russia
China
Indochina
South Asia
Japan/Pacific Islands
South and Central America
International Organizations
Totals
Events Reports Total
43.
. ^
2.5 1.
4.5 1. 5.5
2. 1. 3.
IS.
5
1.5 20.
2.5 2.5
1
.
1.
25.5 9. 34.5
2. 2.
1. 3. 4.
2. 2.
19.5 6. 25.5
124. 46. 170.
International
The International category includes news stories which
occurred outside of the United States and did not involve
Americans or the United States in any direct way. The sub-
categories here are the same as the U.S. -International
category—except for the absence of the United States and
Indochina, Table 30 shows the general distribution of the
International category.
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Table 30. Totals of The International Category
f ofp ..
Institutions 523.5 75.^7%
Groups - Individuals 166.5 2k. 13%
Totals 690. 100%
As would be expected, the Institutions dominate. Table 31
shows the distribution of Events to Reports,
Table 31. Totals of The International Category
Events % Reports % Total %
Institutions, 426. {Si .3^%) 97.5 (I8.62f0 523.5 (100''/^)
(75.13^0) (79.27fO (75.g7f.)
Groups -
Individuals I4I. {Sk.6S%) 25. 5 (1 5.32f.) 166.5 (100^)
{2k.S7%) (20.73f-) (24.13fO
Totals $67. {^O.g7f.) 123. (19.13^^0 690, (100^^)
(ioo<^) (ioo?n (lOOf,)
Institutions , T! most dominant "Political Actor"
within International Institutions v;as the Twiddle East with
3 5. 53^^ of the news stories. Second in emphasis was Great
Britain/Commonwealth with 14. 90^^ of the news stories.
Table 32 shows how the other news stories were distributedo
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Table 32. Totals of Institutions Category
Totals
iLvents^ Reports Total
Great Britain/Commonwealth 60,5 17 5 7rtGermany/Frnnce 23.5 10 5 ^l'Other ''.'estern Europe 22.5 l' i on'
East Europe 19. ^ 5Middle East H6. " UO. ul]^
^^^^9^ 13.5 2. 15 5
rh?nf -5 52.5
Other S.E. Asia '5 ' 'c
South Asia 32, 10. Zl2
Japan/Pacific Islands
.5 -* *5
South and Central Arrerica 33. 7, 40!
International Orf;anizations 12,5 l| I3I5
Institutions 1,5 .
523.5
2 are Natl. China)
Groups -Individuals
. Vfithin this category the two areas
receiving most emphasis were the same as with the Institutions,
Middle East and Great Britain/Commonwealth. These two com-
bine for 47.59^^ of the total Groups-Individuals news stories.
Table 33 illustrates how the others are distributed.
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Table 33. Totals of Individuals-a.oups Category
Great Britain/Commomvealth
Germany/France
Other l^estern Europe
Kast Europe
Middle East
Russia
China
Other S.E. Asia
South Asia
Japan/Pacific Islands
South and Central America
International Organizations
Totals
Events
35.
3.5
11.
12.
27.5
7.5
1.5
1.
4.5
3.5
13.5
20.5
141.
Reports
3.5
3.
2.
13.
1.
1.
2.
25.5
Total
35.5
3.5
14.
14.
40.5
1.5
1.5
1.
4.5
4.5
13.5
22.5
166.5
168
Conclusion
Within the dimensions of this analysis some interesting
and sip:nificant patterns emerged concerning the coverage of
Political Actors. ^Tiile it is difficult to obtain an under-
standing of the political effects of television based on this
analysis, the analysis does give a good perspective of what
CBS Evening News chooses to emphasize. By knowing what CBS
emphasizes, one is in a better position to at least m.ake
generalizations about the effects of television on public '
opinion. These generalizations, in turn, can be the basis
for a more detailed investigation of the political effects of
television.
Within the m.ost important category, the U.S. -Domestic
category, four significant patterns were evident. The
first involved the dominance of Institutions. The Insti-
tutions constituted almost 67^^^ of the total U.S. -Domestic
news stories. Actually, almost 33^^^ of the total news
stories during this period involved these Institutions.
However, on CBS Evenir^ News, the three branches of the
Institutions are not of equal importance. Thus, the
second pattern is the inequality of the three branches.
By a large degree, the Executive branch dominates the
other two branches. It constitutes almost 63'^5 of the
total Institutions', news stories and over 2CK of the
total number of news stories during this period. A third
169
pattern occurs within the Executive br.nch. ' Here the thr.e
bureaucratic categories (Departments, Executive Agencies,
Regulatory Agencies) account for 49", of the Events of thi
Executive branch-but only
^yf. of the Reports. A fourth
pattern involves the Legislative branch. Here, the Senate
dominates the House by better than a margin. Over 67f.
of the news stories of the Legislative branch involve the
Senate. Thus, relative to the Senate, viewers do not
learn much about the House of Representatives.
The two other main categories have interesting patterns,
but they are not as important as those of the tr.S.
-Domestic
category. In the International category. Institutions were
emnhasized. They comprised over 86<, of all the U.S.-
International news stories. And, obvious within Institutions
was the dominance of both the United States (45.63"?) and
Indochina (33. 5f!?^). These two areas accounted for over 7%
of all the U.S.
-International Political news stories. In
the International category. Institutions (75.fl7f,) were
dominant. And, two areas. Middle East and Oreat Britain,
accounted for over 50?5 „r the Institutions' news stories.
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CHAPTER V
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES
This chapter is a continuation of the quantitative
analysis of the previous two chapters. V/hile the previous
two chapters concentrated on the Political Actors, this
chapter will examine the frequency and the relationship
between the Political Actors and the Policy Issues. And,
it will also examine the frequency of the Policy Issues.
In addition, it will briefly examine the nature and fre-
quency of the Uon-Political News Stories.
Before discussing each category, an overview of the
totals will give an indication of some of the patterns
which will emerge. Table 1 presents the total number and
percentage of Policies.
The most numerous subject area would actually be
coverage of all matters relating to Indochina. The general
area of **Indochina'* actually involves many news stories
classified under different Policies, such as V.*ar or Ilili-
tary. The War category involved noncom.bat military matters,
Needless to say, not all the '^/Jar" and ''Military'* totals
pertain to Indochina. Thus, by combining the total Inco-
china news stories (750.) with the V7ar (/f62.5) and Military
(^^.5) news stories specifically involving the United
States or Indo-Chinese, the total news stories about the
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Indochina war
.vould be at least 1397. news stories. The
most numerous analytical category was the political one.
There were rrore news stories involving strictly political
matters than any other single category. V.^.ile all the
stories involving these Policy-Issues are political in
nature, over one-fifth of the news stories deal with strict-
ly political activities or problems. As evident, the second
most numerous single category is the social policy area.
Table 2 illustrates the frequency of Events and Reports
for the total Policy-Issues, frost of the Policy-Issues were
very close to the overall 3:1 ratio of Events to Reports.
The two biggest exceptions were '^/ifar'^ with alm.ost 85f, Events
and ^^Indochina'^ with over 3 5^^ Reports. This might be sig-
nificant. Much of the discussion relevant to the Indochina
V/ar has been the effect of television coverage of it on
United States public opinion. From a quantitative perspec-
tive, the potential impact would appear to be small, since
only 15^5 of the "V7ar'» news stories are Reports. In total,
the ^n/7ar'» news stories constitute 11. 21^^ of the total
5925.5 political news stories. And, of the total number of
political reports, '-^.^ar" Reports constitute only 6.75f^.,
These figures involve more than the Indochina I'.'ar, although
the resDective figures from the U.S.
-International category
demonstrate that the same proportion of Events [/^3 6 , (^5.66'^.)]
to Reports [73, (U.3'Vf')] exists. V.Tiile taking into account
that visual reports do have obvious effects, these figures
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would tend to de-e.phasize the i.pact visual coverage of the
Vietna. ^-J.r might have on public opinion since the incidence
of Reports to Events was so small-only 1 5f„ and since "War'^
Reports onlv constituted 6.75% of the total Political Reports.
Table 3 rives a more complete perspective of the total
Policy-Issues for the basic Political Actors. The number one
Policy-Issue concern for the ri.s.
-Domestic category (news
stories occurring within the United States) is ''Sociar^ news
stories which comprised almost 25^ of the total U.S.. Domestic
Political news stories. This is followed by "Political- Ac-
tivities (21.24^) and Indochina (15.^0^0. Together, these
three Policy-Issues comprise almost 62% of news stories within
this basic category, within the U.S.
-International category
(news outside the United States which directly involves the
United States), the obvious m.ain Policy-Issue is the "^,'.^ar'^
category—the coverage of actual hostilities and com.bat.
Over 40^ of the n.s.
-International news stories involved
'Var^» coverage. As will be shown, the emphasis of the U.S.-
International category involved coverage of the activities
and problem of Indochina. V^thin the U.S.
-International
category, three Policy-Issue areas,
-Political'% "^."ar", and
'^Foreign Policy/International Relations^% dom.inate. Together,
they constitute 75.54^. of the Political U.S.
-International news
stories, ^hree Policy-Issues also dominate the International
category, (news occurring outside of the United States, not
directly involving the United States). These three, "Polit-
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ical", ••'-ar", and Foreim Policy/International Relations",
account for 85"^ of the Political-International ne«s storils.
Table 4 shows the nurber and frequency of the basic
Political Actors for each of the Policy-Issues. By relating
each Policy-Issue area to the totals, it is possible to see'
how far each Policy-Issue deviated fron, the average of each
basic category. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the same per-
spective for total Events and Reports.
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An exanination of each basic category
.ill illustrate
further patterns.
The U.S.-Dorrestic Category
Table 7 illustrates the distribution of the Polic3.-
Tssues for the min Political Actors within the U.S.-
Domestic category, ^nth each Political Actor either the
^^Political" or ^Sociar^ Policy Issue is the most numerous,
and it is evident that with some Political Actors, the
coverage is often monopolized by only two Policy-Issues.
Policy-Issues dominate. These two Policy-Issues constitute
51.10^ of the news stories of the Organized Groups, 60.56-::^
of the news stories of Unorganized Groups, and 55, of
the news stories of Individuals. With State/City/Local,
the
-Political- and
-Social- Policy-Issues comprise almost
72% of the news stories.
Table ^ reveals the percentage of Political Actors for
each Policy-Issue. This gives a good perspective of how
the coverage of each Polic3/-Issue is distributed am.ong the
Political Actors. As would be expected, there is much vari-
ation. For example, 51. 60^5 of the
-Political'' Policy-Issue
news stories involve Institutions while ^2.47^ of the
-Military- Policy-Issue news stories involve Institutions.
Since the Institutions constitute almost 67^ of the total
Political news stories, it is obvious that this category
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would dominate each Policy-Issue, ^ith only Urn Policy-
Issues,
-Political" and -Racial-
, does the percentage of
Institution news stories fall below 60f, of each respective
Policy-Issue.
Table 9 presents a similar perspective of the Events
of the U.S.
-Domestic Policy-Issue totals. Tables 9 and 10
will combine the percentages of both the Political Actors
and the Policy-Issues.
Host of the patterns prevalent in Table 7 are still
prevalent in the coverage of Events (news stories read at
CBS studio by Cronkite). For each Policy-Issue, Institu-
tions is the dominant Political Actor. Within Events,
Institutions constitute 72. U^, of the total Political Events,
and with only one Policy-Issue,
-Political", does the per-
centage of Institutions fall below 60^9. A different situ-
ation, however, prevails with the Reports {news stories
which are renorted by a correspondent away from CBS studio).
Here, the Institutions are not so dominant, as Institutions
comprise 52.029^ of the total U.S . -Domestic Political Reports.
Vfithin the -Political- Policy-Issue area, the dominant Po-
litical Actor (43. 37"^^ is Individuals. One of the reasons
for this is the commentaries of Eric Sevaried vjhich comprise
200 59^^ of all the -Political" Policy-Issues which are Reports,
Within the -Political- Policy-Issue area, Institutions is the
second most frequent Political Actor at 36.43^. Also, devi-
ating from the pattern in Table 8 is the "Racial- Policy-
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Issue. Here, 60.29=? of the "Racial" reports involve cover-
age at the level of State, City or Local. Only 23.53-; of
the "Racial" news stories involve the federal institutions.
Thus, what little coverage there is of "Racial" matters
(thirty-four Reports) Is primarily coverage of Strte, City
or Local matters.
Since the Institutions category of Political Actors is
the most dominant, it is necessary to examine it in
greater detail. Table 11 illustrates the distribution of
Policy-Issues for the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
branches
,
Except for some exceptions, the distribution of the
Policy-Issues among the three Political-Actors is rather
consistent. The coverage of the executive branch for both
•^Economic^ and ^Foreign Policy/International Relations"
are tv/o such exceptions.
Another exception is the coverage the Judiciary received
with the ''Military'^ and ^^Indochina" Policy-Issue areas. The
reason for this was the extensive coverage of the My Lai
trials. Other than these exceptions, the proportion of
Policy-Issue coverage for each of the three branches is
remarkably similar.
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Table 12 illustrates how the coverage for the three branch
is distributed within each Policy-Issue.
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Since 62.8lf, of the news stories here are news stories
involving the Executive, it is obvious that the Executive
will dominate each Policy-Issue area. Even so, as is evi-
dent, there is variation. Almost 85^. of the news stories
concerned with "Foreign Policy/International Relations'' in-
volve the Executive branch whereas less than k^^o of the
news stories about the
-Military" and "Indochina- involve
the Executive. But even with ^*^'ilitary" or "Indochina"
news stories, it is still obvious that the Executive
dominates since with each of these Policy-Issue areas, the
Executive outnumbers each of the other branches by an
alm.ost 2:1 ratio. Thus, at the minimum, there will be
almost twice as many news stories for a Policy-Issue in
volving the Executive than for one which involves Congress
or the Courts.
Table 13 presents the totals for Events of the Insti-
tutions category. The distribution of Events in Table 13
is extremely similar to the total figures presented in
Table 11 and 12.
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Table 14 presents the totals for Institutional Re-
ports. Here, there is a little more variation than in
Table 13. Within each Policy-Issue, the Executive branch
is generally not quite as dominant as it was with the
Events. Even so, in every Policy-Issue except for "T'lili-
tary" and "Indochina" the Executive branch is more pro-
nounced with the Events. V^ith the Events, the highest
frequency of Executive coverage was ''Foreign Policy/
International Relations*' with S4.42fj and the lowest was
"Indochina" with 47.77f^~or a difference of 36.65^,. Vfith
the Reports, the highest frequency of Executive coverage
was again "Foreign Policy/International Relations" with
^5.90'^ and the lowest was "Military" with 34.64^,—or a
difference of 51.26f^, As explained earlier, the coverage
of the My Lai trials accounts for the high percentage of
"Tlilitary" (39.^7%) and "Indochina" (27.2lf,) Reports which
involve the Judiciary. And, within the Judiciary, the
"Military" and "Indochina" combined account for 67.08^ of
its total. Thus, with the Judiciary, one-fourth of the
Policy-Issue areas account for two-thirds of its total
coverage.
With Congress, three Policy-Issue Areas, "Social"
(22.54'^'), "Indochina- (21.59^0 and "Political" (21.27%)
account for 65.40^? of its total coverage of Reports.
Within the Executive branch, the top three Policy-Issue
areas, "Social" (19.97^^0, "Foreign Polic--/International
192
il&.m). and
-Indochina- (1^.4lf.) account for 57.36f, of
the total. However, it should be obvious from Table 1Z.
that with the exception of
-Racial- (since it is so small)
and
-Military-, Congress cannot compete with the Executive
for political visibility. Since Reports offer more of a
chance at political visibility than do Events, the results
presented in Table 15 are significant in trying to under-
stand the difficult time Congress has in trying to compete
with the Executive branch—even though, of course, the
Legislative branch consists of two Houses, each speaking
not with one voice, but with many diverse voices.
Table 15 presents an even closer look at the distri-
bution of Policy-Issues among the Executive branch. It
presents the distribution of Policy-Issues for each Poli-
tical Actor of the Executive branch. As evident in Table
15, 60.03*^ of the news stories about President Nixon in-
volve either the -Political- or -Social" Policy-Issues.
By contrast, over 62% of the news stories of Agnew involved
-Political- Policy-Issues. The coverage of the Advisers/
Staff was more oriented towards "Economic- and "Foreign
Policy/International Relations- Policy-Issues since these
two account for almost 50% of the coverage.
Other patterns are evident. Over 1^.6% of the coverage
of the Cabinet involves the "Social" and "Indochina- Policy-
Issues. The coverage of the Departments is more evenly
distributed with the Executive Agencies
—56.67^ of the news
stories involve "Social- and -Ecology- Policy Issues.
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With the Regulatory Agencies, 66.35^ of the news stories
alone involve the "Social" Policy-Issues.
Table 16 illustrates the distribution of Executive
branch Political Actors for each Policy-Issue. Of interest
here is the high (55.6?) percentage of "Political" coverage
which involved President Nixon. With each of the other
Policy-Issues, the Departments account for the most coverage.
With the "Military" Policy-Issue, almost 60.f. of the Execu-
tive branch news stories involve the Department* With
^Indochina", almost kO'fo of the news stories involve the
Department,
Table 17 presents the distribution of Reports for the
Executive branch. While the Reports are less numerous than
the Events, Reports are more significant since this is where
the political visibility is.
As evident in Table 17, for both Nixon and Agnew,
"Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues dominate their
coverage. Combined, they account for 54.42^ of the news
stories of Nixon and 79.30^ of the news stories about Agnew,
And, 70.19^ of the "Political" Policy-Issue Reports dealt
with President Nixon.
Other patterns are evident. For example, the "Economic"
and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy-Issues
account for almost 65% of the Adviser/Staff coverage. With
the Departments, "Indochina" and "Foreign Policy/International
Relations" account for almost 53% of the news stories.
President Nixon, Advisers/Staff, and Departments account for
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75*^' of the 'Economic'" Policy-Issue news stories. Almost
one-half (47.17^0 of the "Military'^ news stories involve the
Departments with the 'Indochina" Policy-Issue; 80^> of the
news stories involve the Cabinet or the Departments.
Slightly over 59^^^ of the "Foreign Policy/International
Relations" news stories involve President Nixon and the
Departments.
Table 18 illustrates the distribution of coverage be-
tween the House and the Senate.
The difference between the coverage of the two Houses
is evident. The "Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues
accounted for 58.55^ of the news stories of the House but
only 44. 29^^ of the Senate. I'Jith each Policy-Issue the Sen-
ate receives the most coverage. This ranges from almost
57^5 with "Social" to slightly over ^2% with "Indochina".
Thus, on Indochina, the obvious focal point of CBS' cover-
age is the Senate. The sam.e applies to the "Military" and
Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy-Issues,
since the Senate accounts for over 70^ of their coverage.
Only in "Social" and "Economic" Policy-Issues does the
House proportion of coverage go above 40^,
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Table 19 presents the totals for Organized Groups.
As would be expected, the most coverage for each
Organized T-roup involves its respective Policy-Issue. Thus,
for Political Groups, ''Political" Policy-Issues receive the
^
most coverage. However, within Political Groups,
-Indochina
accounted for 42.50^ of the coverage. And, over of the
coverage of
-Indochina" as it involved Organized Groups
involved "Political- Groups.
Table 20 presents the totals for Organized Groups-
Reports. From this, the dominance of the "Indochina" cover-
age is evident. "Indochina" received more coverage {27,^9%)
than any other Policy-Issue. It constituted 50fo of the news
stories of Political groups. Almost 93fo of the "Indochina"
news stories involved Political groups—which would be
expected.
Table 21 presents the totals for Unorganized Groups
who received coverage—such as some demonstrations and
protests. In all, seventy-one news stories dealt with
Unorganized Groups, Of this total, forty-five (63.3g^)
news stories involved Social Groups, Two Policy-Issues,
-Political" and "Indochina", constitute slightly over 60%
of the news stories.
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Table 22 illustrates how the coverage was distributed
among Individuals. This category consists of four types.
Institutional officials are people who work for the federal
government but were speaking on their own—not in the
capacity of a member of a deDartm.ent or agency. An example
might be the secretary of labor commenting on Vietnam.
A politician is a Political Actor campaigning for office
or dealing in nonlegislative party politics—such as the
Republican National T-overnors^ Conference. Eric Sevareid
is self-exDlanatory. '^Others" involves those not in
government (George Meany) who speak for themselves and
receive coverage within the context of the Policy-Issues.
Actually, the ^^Others" category is the most dominant.
•^Others" account for 47.12^7 of the news stories within this
category. Two Policy-Issues, "Political" and "Indochina"
constitute 55. Sl!^? of the news stories.
Table 23 gives the totals for the Reports of the
Individual category. As m.ight be expected, Eric Sevareid
has the most coverage. He accounts for 47.50^ of these
Reports. He spent 33.12^9 of his tim.e discussing "Political"
Policy-Issues. The rest of his tim.e is pretty much balanced
between the "Social", "Economic", "Indochina" and "Foreign
Policy/International Relations" Policy issues. \''±th the
"Others" category, "Indochina" constitutes 41. of the
news stories.
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Of the total U.S.
-Domestic Political category, g.97f,
of the news stories involved news at the state, city or
local level. Table 24 presents the total distribution of
Policy-Issues,
Table 24. State, City, Local: Policy-Issue Distribution
l2ii Soc^ Econ. Racl. Mil. Indch. EcdL FP/IR Tntjj_
% ?i6.09) u1:l6, ?3!66, fl:i3) ILI3) \Uv klt)\:W<^U^
Two Policy-Issues, "Political** and "Social" account for
almost 72^ of the state, city, local coverage. Table 25
demonstrates the distribution of the coverage of the Political
Actors
.
Table 25. State, City, Local: Political Actor Distribution
Executive 10875 30.43
Legislative 11. 5 3,23
Judicial 41.5 11. 64
Groups 143. 40.12
Individuals 49. 13 .74
Totals 356.5 lOOf.
Two Political Actors , "Executive" and "Groups" account for
over 70^ of the news stories at the state, city, or local
level. With the Reports, as illustrated by Table 26, these
two Political Actors account for an even higher percentage of
the news stories.
208
Table 26. State, City, Local: Political Actor Distribution -
Reports
Executive 26.5 22.46Legislative 2. 1.69Judicial 6.5 5.52
,
61. 51.69
Individuals 20. 16.95
"totals 118. loofo
With the Reports, the proportion of Executive news stories
is reduced. However, with Groups accounting for almost
52^ of the news stories, the combined
-total of Executive
and Groups is almost 75^^. Table 2? presents the distribution
of Policy-Issues for each Political Actor. Fithin the biggest
category, ^Social", 66.36fo of the news stories involve the
Executive and Groups.
Before discussing the U.S.
-International category, it
is necessary to briefly discuss the U.S. -Domestic Mon-
Political News. Table 23 presents the tot^^l number and dis-
tribution of U.S. Non-Political News. Four types of Non-
Political News dominate these totals: Crim.e, New '''ork Stock
Exchange, Business, and Social. Together, four account for
54. 97^^' of the total U.S. Non-Political news stories.
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Table 2^. Totals for U. S.
-Domestic : Nonpolitical
Tragic Events
Accidents
Crime
Space
Labor
Business
N.Y. Stock Exchange
Personalities
Entertainment
Sports
Social
Economic
Racial/Ethnic
Military
Environment
"On The Road"
Other
Total
57,5
73.
324.
SB.
30.5
I6a.5
2Sg,5
115.
15.
77.
172.5
10.
17.5
45.
69.5
43.
90.
1734.5
3.32
4.21
IS. 68
5.07
4.64
9.71
16.63
6.63
.86
4.44
9.95
.58
1 .01
2.59
4.01
2.48
5.19
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Because the nightly N.Y. Stock Exchange listing is
not a Report, there is a much wider distribution of Non-
political Reports. As evident in Table 29, there is a
relatively equal distribution of category. The two excep-
tions are ''Crime*' and ''Social'' which together account for
35.56^ of the Reports.
Table 29. Totals for U.S.
-Domestic Monpolitical:
Events and Reports
Events RpT^orts
Tragic Events 33. 2.47 24.5 6.16
Accidents 51.5 3.^5 * 21.5 5.40
Crime 234.5 17.55 59.5 22.49
Space 64.5 4.^3 23.5 5.90
I^abor 61 .5 4.60 19. 4.77
Business 136.5 10.21 32. g.04
N.Y. Stock Exchange 2^7.5 21.51 1. ,25
Personalities 99. 7.41 I6. 4.02
Entertainment 11. .^2 4. 1.01
Sports 57. 4.27 20. 5.03
Social 120.5 9.02 52. 13.07
Economic 5. .37 5. 1.26
Racial/Ethnic 12. .90 5.5 l.3g
Military 37. 2.77 2.01
Environment 45.5 3.40 24. 6. 03
"On The Road" 13. .97 30. 7.54
Other 67.5 5.05 22.5 5.65
Total 1336.5 dOOf^T iwr TWm
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U.S.
-International
As discussed earlier, the "U.S.
-International" cate-
gory refers to news which occurs outside the United States .
but either involves Americans or the United States directly.
The coverage of the Indochina V7ar will, of course, dominate
this whole category. On the Institutions level, slightly
over 50f^o of the news stories of the United States and
57.57'^ of the news stories of Indochina involve actual
coverage of the war.
For both the U.S.
-International and International
categories there are two basic classifications—Institutions
and Groups/Individuals. "Institutions" involve entities
or extensions of a government, whereas Groups/Individuals
do not. Thus, our military forces in Vietnam would be an
"Institution". Tables 30, 31, and 32 present the totals
for the Groups and Institutions,
In each table, "!'7ar" is the dominant Policy-Issue
for the Institutions, For the Groups/Individuals, "Poli-
tics" is the dom.inant Policy-Issue,
Table 33 presents a closer examination of the two
main Political Actors—The United States and Indochina,
Together, the United States and Indochina account
for 51,92^5 of the total U.S. -International Institutions
news stories. The United States alone constitutes 47. 20^^
of this coverage. Within the United States category, the
"^•.^ar", "llilitary" and "Indochina" Policy-Issues comibine
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for a total of slightly over P.l^.. ,r^tle not all t^^
^'Military'^ Policy-Issue would pertain to the Indochina
War, certainly
.ost of it would. For Indochina, as a
Political Actor, almost 5B^. of its news stories involved
the hostilities of the
-/ar-.
-Polities'* and ^^ar-
together accounted for almost 95% of Indochina's total
news stories. Table 34 gives similar totals for Reports.
The difference here is that with the United States,
the ^^r^r- Policy-Issue is not so dominant as it is in
Table 33. As evident from Table 34, almost all (96.26f,)
of the Indochina Reports involve the "Political'' or
'^^ar'' Policy-Issues.
Table 35 illustrates the totals for some of the m.ajor
countries in the U.S.
-International category. This table
tends to reaffirm the dominancy of the United States and
Indochina
•
m
rH
ITCMJ • o
o
—
CtJM
• •
(X to to
fx.
•
1
—
1
O
O
(J
w
•
O
o • •
C 1— 1M
o
• to
• • • •
•H ON On
I
• ay
CO • to •
IS cv cv
«^
•
c O to
o • • • •
o <i— 1 ^
— ^
•
o
o • •
CO 1
CM
-4-
• O
rH • • • ry
o
CO
I CO
o c
C XM O
2'
COfCO CV
toO
> <
Oh U^rr^^
c
o
o
cv
• •
to
u\cv
• • • •
o
ITS CV
• •
cv
to
ir\—
.
• • • • • •
-4-CV
cv^
«r\0
u-\oO r-
to
• • • • • •
Oto
• •
cv r-
• •
-cftO
• •
-4-cv
6.5 (4.00)
to
. •
»
CV o
vO O
•
iH vO
O « • • •
o 1
w
•
s: Co Uf\t-
•to
o •
ocv 1
C oH
CV
o
On
• O O
•H T— T—
(V
CV
%^ • • • •
CO r~ • i CV cv
U^CV
cv ir\
O IfMfN
• • • • • •
to to ^— 1
—
CV
• •
cv
T-tO
cv
• .
r^to
cv
• •
mo
• •
mO
to to
• vO lC\tO vO
o • • • • • •
O r^vo T-tO «-tc rv 1 mcv too
CO CV T-O
to o o vO
to u-\to mto to O ir\^—
•
rH f^CV • C m mcv cv T- tc O
O X— • OO
^
— ^
•
P
•H CO
0) CO O
• O iH •H 1 a H iH
• E C T3 P to c o c ^H « • CO
CO • t3 10 to •H • Q) P tL P
• p •H 03 c ^ O E O
o o CO < M O 1 ^
220
Table 36 presents the nonpolitical totals for th(
U.S.
-International category.
Table 36. U.S.
-International Nonpolitical Totals
JL
Tragic Event 4,
Accident 3,5
Crime 7,
Social 19!5
Economic 19^
Racial/Ethnic "5
Military 2,5
Ecology 1,5
Space 5,5
Business ' 4,5
Labor
,5
Personalities
. 2.
Entertainment 1,
Sports 10.
Other 3.
Total —
221
International
)es
The International Category involves news which do(
not directly involve the United States. As with the
U.S.
-International Category, the International Category
has two subdivisions—Institutions and Groups/Individuals.
Table 37 presents the totals for Institutions and Groups/
Individuals.
Since Institutions account for 75.^7% of the news
stories, it is to be expected that for each Policy-Issue
the Institutions will dominate. And for both Institutioxxs
and Groups/Individuals, "Political" is the most numerous
Policy-Issue. The total Reports for these two basic
Political Actors are illustrated in Table 38. The same
pattern exists here as with the totals.
Table 39 illustrates the distribution of news stories
among some of the more numerous Political Actors, Three
Policy-Issues, "Political", "T^/ar", and "Foreign Policy/
International Relations" pretty much dominate. They
account for 86.18^ of the news stories in Table 39. The
biggest Political Actor was the Middle East which was
involved in hostilities during the period of analysis.
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Before concluding, it is necessary to examine the
International Nonpolitical News,
Table 40. International Nonpolitical Totals
Tragic Events 3475
Accident 29.5 9 90Crime 38.5 ^2^92
Social^ 11.35 3S.09
Economic 1,
.33Military 2,5 '.6^
Ecology 6.5 2.18
Space 26.5 ^.S9
Business 9, 3,02
Labor 6,5 2.*18
Personalities 22, 7,38
Sports 3, 1.01
Total ^9Fr • TTWT
As evident from this table, '^Social" news dominates,
as it constitutes JS,09% of the International Nonpolitical
News, And, '^Social'^, "Crime" and "Tragic Events" account
for 62,59^ of the International Nonpolitical News stories.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined aspects of CBS' news coverage.
Because of the scope of the information presented, there
are too many obvious patterns to summarize as was done in
the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER VI
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PART 1
The preceding three chapters have been relatively
general and have analyzed CBS Evening News with Walter
Cronkite from a quantitative perspective. The remaining
chapters will analyze CBS» coverage of different subject
areas from a qualitative perspective. The subject areas
that will be analyzed are: 1) Vietnam Battle Deaths,
2) Reactions to the Conviction of Lt. Calley, 3) The
Senate Constitutional Rights Subcomjnittee Hearings on
Freedom of the Press, 5) The Son Tay Prison Raid,
6) Campaign ^70, and 7) Domestic Support and Opposition
Towards the Vietnam War. It should be remembered that the
period of analysis of this study was September 1, 1970, to
October 15, 1971. Because of this length, it was felt
that it would be more advantageous to do "mini" analyses
involving different subject areas over short periods of
time, rather than just having a few analyses covering the
entire thirteen and one-half month period.
Before examining the actual studies, it is helpful to
review the analytical methods em.ployed. The qualitative
analysis used in this study involved the basic steps of
any content analysis: 1) selection of categories and
criteria, 2) defining direction, 3) coding, and U) measure-
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-ent. Within the analysis, with the exception of the Vi.,.
nam Battle Deaths, the unit of analysis was the individual
word. Although word-count was extremely time consuming, thi:
seem.ed to be the best method of accurately determining the
nature and direction of the coverage. It might have been
possible to use either nmnber of lines or number of inches
as the unit of measurement. However, this would have pro-
duced inaccuracies since the transcripts often contain dia-
logue or other irregularities which would not lend them-
selves to precise measurement.
The actual selection of subject areas was dictated by
various factors. One factor, with the exception of Dom.estic
Support and Opposition of the Vietnam War, was that coverage
of the subject should have occurred over a relatively short
period of time to facilitate measurement. Another factor
was simply that the subject should be important. A third
factor was that the subject provide ample potential for
support and opposition. It should be noted that one of the
basic considerations of this study is to examine the degree
to which CBS ^'balanced'* supporting and opposing opinion on
different subjects. Thus, the subjects had to possess
measurable degrees of both support and opposition. A fourth
factor was that this analysis only involved subjects of a
political nature.
yjhlle the individual subjects differed in nature, the
criteria applied to each were the same. These criteria
basically involved two dimensions: 1) direction and 2) rele-
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vant material. Direction was expressed as 1) Support or
Favorable Coverage (Positive), 2) Neutral Coverage, and
3) Opposition or Unfavorable Coverage (Negative). All
relevant content v;as classified into one of these three
categories. The definitive definitions as to what constitu-
ted Positive or Negative coverage were basically consistent
throughout the entire qualitative analysis. There was some
flexibility as the sub jects
. differed in nature. Relevant
material was simply coverage which by 1) statement, 2) ex-
pression, or 3) action involved support, neutral coverage,
or opposition towards the specific subject being analyzed.
Irrelevant material within a news story was not measured.
Thus, all relevant content would be classified within the
following matrix:
Positive
Statement
Expression
Action
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Both the actual determination of direction and coding
were, for the most part, not that difficult. It should be
noted that the qualitative analysis was not based on
sampling. All the relevant content for each subject was
measured and included. And, this analysis did not measure
intensity of direction. It was felt that the inclusion of
intensity in the analysis would involve am.biguous criteria
and the costs would outweigh the benefits. It should be
remembered that one of the long-range concerns of this
research are the effects of television news on public
opinion and political behavior. Thus, any research of this
nature, in addition to meeting the criteria of scholarly
research, be sensitive to how the "Average"* man would re-
ceive, perceive and internalize the information being
presented. It was felt that intensity of direction, as
defined by the researcher, would simply be beyond the
recognition of the average viewer. Therefore, it was felt
that it would be better to omit intensity of direction as
an analytical variable.
As mentioned, coding was relatively simple. The word
was the unit of analysis, but this, of course, was in-
terpreted within the context of the paragraph, sentence, or
phrase. In order to be precise, a sentence would sometimes
contain opinion of two directions. This, however, was
unusual, as most sentences contained a consistent direction.
If the direction of some content was ambiguous or too
difficult to classify, that content was classified as
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"neutral" coverage.
The third step, measuring, involved simply classifying
a sentence or phrase and then counting the words within it.
Next, the subtotals were transferred to a calculating sheet
where the totals for each news story were computed. The
totals for each news story were then entered on the master
coding sheets. The totals for each master coding sheet were
computed, which produced the grand totals found in the tables
In addition, most analyses contain sections which,
using material from the transcripts, function to give a
more accurate perspective of the nature of the coverage.
This specific type of analysis is selective and this
should be kept in mind, since it examines a limited,
though meaningful, portion of the coverage. Often, this
type of analysis is m^eant to der.onstrate different types
of coverage or reporting techniques prevalent in CBS News.
Mention should also be made of the problems inherent
in this type of research—content analysis of television
news. One problem is the actual acquisition of the tele-
vision transcripts. Experience has shown that this is not
easy. Individual taping and transcribing can be done, but
this involves additional work and may reduce accuracy. A
second problem is the necessity of an index if the period of
analysis is an extended one. The index, which classifies
each news story on each program, is essential but in itself,
involves substantial work. A third major problem involves
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the actual measuring. Counting words is dull, laborious,
and tim- consuming. The point is that these three basic
problems would tend to motivate researchers away from this
type of research—at a time when more not less analysis
of television news is needed.
Vietnam Battle Deaths
The Vietnam War offers many opportunities to examine
the "reality" of CBS' coverage. One way to examine this
reality is to use battle deaths (KSA) as the unit of analy-
sis. This is amenable for comparison because two versions
of "reality" are presented and thus can be compared.
Even though CBS received most of the reports of battle
deaths from the Saigon command, CBS presented these in two
different forms. One form was the occasional nightly
reports of battle deaths which had occurred the previous
day. It should be noted that these battle death reports
were not reported every night. Their reporting was at the
discretion of CBS. The m.otivation for reporting these
battle deaths on an occasional basis cannot be determined
from the transcripts. A second form of "reality" was
reported every Thursday night. This was the weekly report
of battle deaths for the previous week. This version of
"reality", as mentioned, appeared occasionally according to
the selective criteria of CBS.
These two versions of "reality" can easily be compared
since they both deal in basically quantitative terms.
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Since these two versions are both reporting and describing
the same war, it can be argued that there should be a close
similarity between the two versions. However, there are
some methodological problem.s which should be discussed.
First, there are obvious problems in using casualty-
figures submitted by the South Vietnamese. It seemed to
be a known fact that figures submitted by the South Viet-
namese were grossly distorted—both in underestimating their
own casualties and overestimating the casualties of the
Forth Vietnamese/Vietcong. But, this does not present a
real methodological liability, since CBS was using South
Vietnamese casualty figures for both its nightly reports
and the Thursday night weekly reports. Thus, the distortion
which was present was a consistent one since the two ver-
sions of "reality" were based on the same sources. A
second problem involved the actual casualty figures. Not
all the nightly casualty figures could be used since some,
but not many, were expressed in relative terms such as
"light", or "several", or were expressed as "between 100
to 150,^ The latter, however, by interpolation based on the
total proportion of dead to wounded, could be reduced to
an absolute figure. This same interpolation was em.ployed
when just the term "casualties" was used.
Even with these liabilities, battle deaths, as the
unit of analysis, can be used to compare these two versions
of "reality." Needless to say, battle deaths are only one
criteria of the progress and success of the war. In a
limited sense, though, battle death reports do give one
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perspective on who is "winning'* and who is "losing." And,
one would argue that the two versions of "reality" would
agree
.
Table 1 comDares the total number of "nightly" battle
deaths with the total number of "weekly" battle deaths.
Table 1
.
Comparison of Total Number of Nightly
and T'/eekly Battle Deaths
Nightly V/eekly
United States 393 2,094
South Vietnam 4,112 24,0^1
North Vietnam./
Vietcong 23,237 106,216
27,742 132,391
From this, it is evident that the nightly reports include
only a small portion of the weekly battle deaths. The
total "nightly" battle deaths account for only 20. 95'^^ of
the total "weekly" battle deaths. Table 2 illustrates
this proportion for each combatant.
Table 2. Percentage of Total Nightly Battle Deaths
to Total V/eekly Battle Deaths
United States 1^.77/^
South Vietnam 17.06^^
North Vietnam/
Vietcong 21.8Sf.
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Each combatant has about the same percentage of battle
deaths on the ''nightly'» reports. From this perspective,
the "nightly" view of "reality" is a uniform one for each
combatant. And, as Table 3 illustrates, the "nightly"
perspective closely approximates the "weekly" one.
Table 3. Comparison of Total Battle Deaths
of Each Combatant
Might ly Weekly
United States 1 .42^
South Vietnam 14.82^ 18.19%
North Vietnam/
Vietcong 83.76f. 80.23fb
100% 100%
As can be seen, there is no great variance, for any
of the combatants , between the "nightly" and "weekly"
reports. Thus, from this perspective, it appears that
the two forms of "reality", the "nightly" and the "v;eekly"
reports are very sirdlar with only minor discrepancies.
However, in analyzing this data, some oddities ap-
peared. It seem.ed that a large portion of the "nightly"
battle deaths might be concentrated in only a few broad-
casts—especially during the Laotian Campaign of Winter 1971.
It is possible that a few broadcasts during this period
distorted the total number of "nightly" battle deaths for
the September 1, 1970, to October 8, 1971, period of
analvsis—which covered over three hundred broadcasts.
Closer analysis did reveal that heavy concentrations of
battle deaths in a few broadcasts did distort the results.
For example, of the total 23,237 North Vietnamese/Vietcong
"nightly'^ battle deaths, 13 ,600 or 5^.53'^. v;ere reported on
one nightly broadcast (March 24, 1971) which reported on the
recent losses of the Laotian campaign. Obviously, this would
distort the North Vietnamese/Vietcong results in Table 2.
To determine the effect of a few "nightly*' broadcasts
on the total number of "nightly" battle deaths, the five
most numerous "nightly" broadcasts for each combatant were
totaled and eliminated. Table 4 illustrates the number
and percentages of battle deaths reported on the five most
numerous broadcasts.
Table 4. The Number and Percentage of Nightly Battle Deaths
Reported on the Five Most Numerous Broadcasts
Number
United States 1^5
South Vietnam 2,5^^
North Vietnam/
Vietcong 1S,150
Percent of Total Nightly
Battle Deaths
47.07^
62.94^
7^.11^
As evident in Table 4, the top five broadcasts involve
substantial percentages of the total number of ''nightly"
battle deaths. This is especially true with the North
Vietnamese/"^^ietcong—where five broadcasts account for
almost SO^- of their total "nightly" battle deaths.
Table 5 demonstrates the effect of eliminating the five
most numerous nightly broadcasts on the relationships
presented in Table 2.
Table 5. Percentage of Total Tightly Battle Deaths(Minus the Top Five Broadcasts) to
Total I'Jeekly Battle Deaths
United States 9.93^
South Vietnam 6.33%
North Vietnam/
Vietcong 4.79^
Viev/ed from this perspective, the results are interest-
ing. Since this version of "reality" is at variance with
the "weekly'- version of "reality." As discussed, according
to the "weekly" reports, the United States suffered the
fewest battle deaths. Now, with the elimination of the
top five "nightly" broadcasts, the United States is experi-
encing the highest percentage of "nightly" battle deaths
while the North Vietnamese/Vietcong were experiencing the
lightest percentage of "nightly" battle deaths. The per-
centage of "nightly" battle deaths for the United States
is twice that of the North Vietnam.ese/Vietcong. However,
according to the "weekly" battle deaths, just the opposite
was true—the North Vietnamese/Vietcong suffered the heavi-
est number of battle deaths while the United States suffered
the fewest number of battle deaths. Thus after elim.inating
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the top five "ni^htly^ broadcasts for each combatant, tv;o
grossly different forms of reality were being presented.
In one, the '^nightly^ reports, the United States was
'•losing^* in that relative to its total "weekly^' num.ber of
battle deaths it was experiencing the highest percentage
of "nightly'* battle deaths while the North Vietnamese/
Vietcong were '^winning" since they were experiencing the
fewest battle deaths. In the other, the "weekly'* reports,
the opposite was true. Here, the United States, with the
fewest battle deaths was "winning" while the North Viet-
namese/Vietcong were "losing" since they had the most battle
deaths. Thus, two different versions of the same war were
presented.
Son Tay Prison Raid
This section will briefly analyze coverage of the un-
successful raid on the Son Tay Prison in North Vietnam in
late November, 1970. Initially, after a preliminary reading
of the transcripts, it was felt that possibly the "negative"
coverage might exceed "positive" coverage. Here, "positive"
coverage involved opinion which supported the raid; "nega-
tive" opinion opposed it. The analysis, however, demon-
strated that this was not true. Positive coverage exceeded
negative coverage on both Quantitative and qualitative
levels. Coverage of this subject is interesting in that it
distinguishes the difference between "description" which
supports opinion and opinion itself. It is significant,
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therefore, that 62. 55^^^ of the '^positive'* coverage of the
raid was basically description of the actual raid.
Table 6 shov;s the distribution of the coverage—usin
number of words as the unit of analysis.
Table 6. Totals for Raid at Son Tay Prison
and Subsequent Reactions
+ = 3,829 (67.17fo)
0 = 359 (6.30f.)
- = 1,512 {26.53%)
Total = 5,700 iWOfo)
Positive coverage is obviously Dominant. Table 7
shows the proportion of positive to negative coverage.
Table 7. Positive and Negative Coverage
+ = 3,829 (71.69^0
- = 1,512 (28.3lfo)
Total = 5,341 {100%)
Thus, as evident in both tables, there was a huge
imbalance of coverage in support of the raid. Hov;ever, a
closer analysis put this imbalance in a different perspec-
tive. It seemed that much of u'hat was classified as posi-
tive coverage was not opinion per se, but rather actual
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descriptions of the raid itself
—either by reporters,
President Mixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, or by some
of the actual participants. It was decided to eliminate
description of the actual raid from both positive and
negative coverage.
The results. are interesting. Of the total positive
coverage, 1,434 words or 37.45'^ were classified as opinion.
Thus, as mentioned earlier, 62.55/^ of the positive coverage
was not opinion—but description of the raid itself. Vfith
the negative opinion, as one might expect, a different situ-
ation existed. Here, 1,428 words, or 94.44/5 of the negative
coverage was opinion. Thus, as Table 8 illustrates, there
was a close balance of coverage of actual "opinion.^
Table 8. Number and Percentage of Actual Opinion
+ = 1 ,434 (50.10f,)
- = 1,428 (49.90fo)
Total = 2,862 (lOOfS)
As evident, the totals were almost exact. But, there
was still an important difference—and that was in the
proportion of ^direct" to ''indirect" coverage. The advan-
tage, here, as illustrated by Table 9 was with coverage
supporting the raid.
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Table 9. Number and Percentage of "Direct
Coverage of Opinion
+ = 1,007 (70.22f,)
(45.03f.)643
Thus, over yof^ of the positive coverage was "Direct Tt
while only 45^ of the negative coverage was "Direct." In
both cases this percentage was computed only on "opinion."
With this neasurerent
, it is evident that the "positive"
coverage was superior.
And, even though for part of this analysis, the des-
criptions of the raid were eliminated in that they were not
opinion per se, it should be noted that the descriptions of
the raid were not neutral. The descriptions did help to
confer legitimacy on the raid, especially when others were
criticizing it or questioning its intent—such as Senator
Fulbright. These descriptions by military leaders or by the
participants were not neutral in another way, for they
helped to ''romanticize" the war. These descriptions in-
volved traditional American values, qualities and symbols
—
bravery and heroism—even though the raid did not achieve
its announced objective. V.Tiile these descriptions of the
raid probably had little effect in terms of support, it is
im.portant to note that these values and sym.bols had largely
been missing from the war. Coverage of the war had not
produced any "heroes." Thus, it is possible (though maybe
o I 4
not probable) that this type of coverage could have had,
for sone, the effect of presenting the complex war in a very
simple and traditional way-war as consisting of bravery and
heroism. The presentation of a war within this context is
not neutral, since bravery and heroism help to romanticize
a war; and, romanticizing a war on the basis of traditional
values could ouite Dossibly help to legitimize it.
Therefore, while description was not included in part
of this analysis, it is important to note that description
of an event such as the Son Tay Raid could be a factor in
the formation of opinion. Thus, the coverage of the Son Tay
Raid contained a disproportionate amount of positive coverage
which supported the raid.
The coverage of the Son Tay Raid was interesting in
other ways. The coverage, to a certain extent, shows the
capacity and inclination of the media to define or frame
an event or reaction in a certain way. And, this is not
neutral. The cnpacity to frame the issue in a certain way
or to help determine what the '^questions"' v;ill be can
affect the subsequent debate and reactions. This was
exemplified by Cronkite's discussion of "the big question.'*
1) The big question, now what will Forth Vietnam*
s
reaction be, v/ill there be reprisals against the
more than 500 prisoners it's believed they hold?
(11/23/70, page 4)
2) The big Question no\i in V'ashington and Paris is
what effect the raids against North Vietnam will
have on the peace talks. (11/23/70, page 7)
3) The big unanswered question, of course, is,
what went wrong in the prison camp raid;
why were the prisoners gone? (11/24/70, page 6)
VJb.ile these may be ^valid" questions, it should be
noted that these are not the only "questions'* that could be
raised. And, more important, they are not neutral questions;
they are negative questions—meant to place the Son Tay Raid
in a negative context. Questions number 1 and num.ber 2 are
not necessarily questions that supporters of the raid would
ask after the raid had been conducted. Cronkite, in this
instance, was not being neutral. And, by he, himself,
raising the questions, he became, a participant in the debate
over the .justification of the raid. Thus, the capacity of
the media to raise the questions is vitally significant;
but also significant is the direction of the questions.
In this case, the direction is quite apparent—especially
number 2. It should be remembered that in the fall of 1970,
the Paris Peace Talks were unproductive.
Another interesting exam.ple from, the Son Tay coverage
was the tendency of newsm;en to preface an event with their
own subjective description:
1) There was an unusual reception at Pope Air Force
Base in Forth Carolina today. Those being wel-
comed were part of the military team that tried,
without success, to rescue American prisoners of
war in North Vietnam. (11/25/70, page 3)
2) There was a certain sense of unreality about the
cerem.ony for those v.-ho remembered that the highly
publicized mission was a failure, even though the
m.en who tried to carry it out might be heroes.
(11/25/70, page 4)
ii43
Thus, for Cronkite, the reception was
-unusual", and
for Pierpoint, the V.'hite House reception had a "certain
sense of unreality." Obviously, these descriptions are
not neutral, and they may function to place the subsequent
story within a negative context. Both descriptions were
at the beginning of each story. Therefore, they could
affect the audience's subsequent perception of the story.
Reactions to Lt. Galley's Conviction
This section analyzes the reactions to the conviction
of Lt. Galley on March 29, 1971. The reaction to Galley's
conviction was immediate and was overwhelmingly in support
of Galley. The size of the reaction was impressive.
CBS described the reaction in the following term.s:
^'A nationwide protest, taking m.any forms.
. .''(3/30/71,
page 2); "The furor touched off by Galley's conviction
continued unabated today."
. . ."More than 16,000 telegrams
addressed to the V-Tiite House have poured into VJashington'
s
main telegraph office since the verdict was announced Mon-
day. Eight to ten thousand were received today, and m.essage
tapes piled up faster than clerks could process them. The
^'Hnite House reported 1 500 phone calls. Another 20,000 tele-
grams addressed to congressmen flooded the Capitol Hill office,
A company spokesm.an called the messages 'the tip of the ice-
berg'." (3/31/71, page 5); "The announcements came amid a
deluge of telegrams to the Vv'hite House—25,000 today
—
called the greatest expresoion of public sentiment by far on
any issue of the Nixon nresidency. . . .Mr. Hixon did so
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as V/hite House and Western Union sources acknowledged that
the telephone and telegraph flood on Galley's behalf is
setting an all-time record, surpassing that set last year
at the time of the offensive in Cambodia." (4/1/71, page 2).
The reaction, while short-lived, was substantial and
one-sided. And, there was no significant counter-reaction
in support of Galley's conviction. However, there were
certain factors which mitigated against extensive coverage
of the pro-Galley reaction. As a result, it can be argued
that the pro-Galley sentiment did not receive much coverage
relative to its size. One of the reasons for this was that
the pro-Galley sentiment was not "televisable . " Basically,
it was neither action-oriented nor organized. The way to
receive television coverage is to do something which can be
televised; and better yet—be organized and do something as
a group. Basically, the pro-Galley reaction met neither of
these criteria since it consisted of individuals acting alone
or in small groups. Thus, except for some rallies, the
basic '*nongroup'' or dispersed nature of the reaction did not
conform to the unofficial rules of television coverage. The
pro-Galley reaction was not an 'Vvent.^ It consisted of
"mini" events—which do not receive coverage. In addition
to the dispersed nature of the protest, the manner of the
protest dictated against coverage. Except for the rallies,
there was nothing television could cover—unless it took
the initiative. Telegrams in a pile do not m.eet television's
need for action. Thus, because the Galley protest was not
organized or visual in the manner of the anti-war protests,
it did not receive coverage proportionate to its size and
intensity.
Another problem created by the nature of the situation
was the absence of counter-reactions. Thus, if CBS were to
try to achieve a relative balance of opinion, it would have
to go out and overtly solicit opinion which supported the
conviction. This, CBS did. It included interviews with
one of the jurors. Major Harvey Brown and Telford Taylor.
Both of these people supported the conviction and were
critical of the pro-Calley reaction. CBS also had an inter-
view with r.eorge Latimer, Calley's attorney. Since CBS
twice overtly sought and gave extended coverage to opinion
contrary to the m.ajority opinion expressed in the protest,
an interesting situation arises. Should television basic-
ally reflect the 'Veality" of the situation and give cover-
age prim.arily to that opinion which is being overtly express
Or, should television try to "balance" the opinion by seekin
and presenting counter-opinion? There is no correct answer-
as this, of course, involves values, but one quality that
should be insisted upon v;ould be that of consistency. V.Tiich
ever approach CBS takes should be consistently used—regard-
less of the controversy or issue. It might be that CBS
would "balance" the opinions only when it is in philosophi-
cal disagreement with the major opinion being expressed. If
one can argue that CBS does have a liberal bias, then it
would support the conviction of Calley. Thus, it would seek
246
and give coverage of opinion which also supported Galley's
conviction. To do this-it would have to go out and overtly
seek this opinion. Mow, the interesting question concerns
whether or not CBS would overtly attempt to achieve this
same type of balance in a situation where CBS» views coin-
cided with the major opinion being expressed. For example,
during the Vietnam Veterans Against The War Demonstration
in Washington, a few weeks after the Galley reaction, will
GBS also attempt to overtly solicit opinion contrary to
that being expressed by the anti-war veterans? If CBS does
not, it may say something about bias. After analyzing GBS»
coverage of the Galley reaction, the veterans' march will be
analyzed and compared to the Galley reaction.
The coverage of the pro-Calley reaction covered the
period of March 29, 1971, to April 7, 1971—a period of
eight broadcasts. (Saturday and Sunday are excluded.) During
this period, the unit of analysis used was ''reactions to
Galley's conviction.'* A total of 5454 words were used within
this context. Table 10 demonstrates the qualitative classi-
fication.
Table 10, Nature and Percent of Coverage of Galley's Conviction
+ = 3,199 (5S,65fO
0 = 1,257 (23,60fo)
- = 968 (17. 75^^^
Total = 5,454 (100^.)
Here, the positive (+) category refers to opinion
which supports Galley and thus opposes the verdict of
guilty. Negative oninion is negative tov/ard Galley and
thus supDorts the conviction. By eliminating the relevant
but neutral coverage, a better picture is gained of the
effective ratio.
Table 11. Percentage of Positive and Negative
Coverage of Reaction To Galley
+ =• 76.77%
23.23%
Total = (lOOfO
The coverage obviously was dominated by pro-Galley
coverage. As mentioned, CPS actively solicited, by going
out and interviewing two people—Fajor Brown, a juror, and
Telford Taylor. These two interviews were substantial in
that they involved 4^.14"^? of the anti-Galley coverage.
Thus, almost half of the anti-Galley opinion was solicited
opinion. This sm.all example would tend to negate the con-
tention of television th^^t all it does is reflect reality.
Obviously, with this example CBS created a significant part
of the '^reality"—rather than just reflecting it. V.T^en
television goes out and solicits interviews, rather than
doing them at the scene of the story, then it is creating
the "reality" which appear j on the screen. V/ithout the
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Brown and Taylor interviews, the coverage was distributed
as follov/s:
Table 12. Adjusted Percentage of Positive and NegativeCoverage of Reaction to Galley ^ Tii
+ = 66.22^
13.
Total = (lOOf,)
The coverage of the pro-Calley opinion deserves
analysis. The major source of pro-Calley opinion was
George Latimer, Galley's lawyer. He, personally,
accounted for 24.66f. of the pro-Calley opinion. Obviously,
Latimer would be a valid source of opinion, but it is in-
teresting why CBS concentrated so much on him—especially
when so much pro-Calley opinion was being expressed by
those unrelated to the case. Another pro-Calley source
of opinion was interesting. One story dealt with a pro-
Calley record which had just been released (4/6/71
,
pages
1^-19). This accounted for 6.90^', of the pro-Calley opinion.
As with Latimer, this coverage did not reflect, other than
the big success the record v/as having, the m.assive senti-
ment that Galley had in the country. Thus, these two opin-
ion sources accounted for alm.ost one-thiri (31.56-7^) of
the pro-Calley opinion—yet neither articulated the public's
views on the issue. This total reaches 40fo (40. Uf,). l-^en
a third source, Retired Ilarine General Lewis V/alt, (3/31/71,
page 6) is added. In fact, even though CB55 noted that
'*there have been demonstrations of support for Galley in
many places across the land'^ (4/2/71, page 4), and one
demonstration as being".
. .especially typical of hundreds
like it around the country— (like it)—this week" (4/2/71,
page 4). GBS, during this whole period, only gave actual
coverage to two of them. These were demonstrations in
Colurrbus, Georgia (3/31/71, page 7) and ^/^aterloo, Illinois,
4/2/71, page 4). This, in itself, is interesting. To-
gether, the two demonstrations included 35^ words—or just
11.19^ of the total pro-Calley opinion. This is significant-
given that there were so m.any rallies and demonstrations in
Galley's support. GBS obviously de-emphasized the im-
portance of these by not covering them. The question has
to be asked—V.Tny? Did they articulate a sentiment that
GBS found itself in disagreement v/ith? It would seem that
the GBS view of "reality'* was at variance with what was
really happening. It seems obvious that through its
coverage, CBS did not transmit or reflect the true size,
activity, and intensity of the pro-Galley sentiment through-
out the country. True, the coverage was "pro-Galley," but
the point is that the mass public, which was expressing its
outrage at the verdict, did not receive coverage pro-
portionate to its size or degree of activity. It „iU
be interesting to compare its coverage with that of th.
Vietnam Veterans Against The V'ar.
CHAPTER VII
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PART 2
This section analyzes coverage of the 1970 congress-
ional elections. This analysis covered the period of
September 10, 1970, to November 2, 1970. There were
basically two aspects to the coverage of these elections.
The first was the extensive coverage of President Nixon
and Vice President Agnew and their activities and role in
the elections. The second aspect involved the coverage of
the elections and selected campaigns. This analysis will
demonstrate that not only was the coverage of Nixon and
Agnew quite extensive but it was also extremely positive
coverage. Thus, "^^ixon and Agnew were able to have the
best of both worlds. They had extensive coverage which
was not countered by much negative coverage. Part of this,
of course, would be endemic to the situation—since T^ixon
and Agnew were not running against anybody. Thus, there
was no real organized entity to '^balance" them. This
''pro-Nixon"' coverage was '^balanced'^ in an overall sense by
CBS' coverage of the actual campaigns. CBS gave '*in-depth'*
coverage to nine different congressional or gubernatorial
races. This analysis will show that the Democrats (com.-
blned with anti-administration Republicans and Independents
in two races) received more positive coverage than did the
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Republicans. This was true in seven of the nine races.
For the mrpose of analysis, coverage favorable to the
Nixon Administration and Republicans supported by the Mixon
Administration was labeled ''positive." Coverage of Demo-
crats was classified as "negative" coverage. A couple of
problems were apparent, given the nature of the 1970 election
First was the Fixon-Agnew opposition to Goodell and their sub
sequent support of Buckley. Here, favorable coverage of
Buckley was classified as positive, while favorable coverage
of Goodell was classified as '^negative," since it was,
similar to favorable coverage of Dem.ocrats, negative from
the Administration perspective. Second, the campaign of
Thom.as Dodd as an Independent in Connecticut presented
minor problems. Since Dodd was not supported by the Nixon
Adm.inistration
,
"pro"-Dodd coverage was classified as nega-
tive. These two races. New York and Connecticut, m.ade
interpretations of ''balance" difficult, since there were
three people in each race—one basically supported by the
Administration and two candidates opposed by the Admini-
stration.
Table 1 presents the total distribution of coverage
for the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1970.
Table 1. Total Distribution of Coverage of "Campaign '70"
+ = 9,129 (46.56^.)
0 = 3,B15 (19. 46^^)
- = 6,661 (33.9gfO
Total = 19,605 (100^)
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Table 2 compares the positive and negative coverage.
Table 2. Distribution of Positive and
"^Campaign ^70'''
^legative Coverage of
+ = 9,129 (57.82f,)
6,661
Total = 15,790 (loofO
From these two tables, it is quite obvious that the
"positive" coverage dom.inates. "Positive" coverage in-
cludes coverage favorable to 1 ) the ^^ixon Administration
in its cam.paign activities of this period, and 2) Republi-
cans, and 3) other candidates supported by the Administra-
tion. As evident, alm.ost 5^^^ of the coverage was favorable
to the above point of view—which is a distinct imbalance.
However, a more precise perspective of this can be
obtained by separating the coverage of the role of the
Nixon Administration from the rest of "Campaign '70" cover-
age. Without the coverage of the '^^ixon Administration
(primarily ^'ixon, Agnew and Mrs. Fixon), the balance of
coverage swings the other way, v/ith favorable coverage of
the Democrats and anti-Administration campaign coverage
dominating. Table 3 presents these results.
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Table 3. Totals for Coverage of '^Campaign '70 Minus Coverage
of ^ixon Administration
4,116 (42.19f.)
5,641 (57.gif.)
Total = 9,757 (100f.)
Here, coverage favorable to Democrats or anti-
Administration dominates by 57f' to 42f,. This imbalance is
the second example of imbalance—though its direction is
opposite that of the first exar:ple , as illustrated in Table 2
A third imbalance, one of a greater magnitude, is found
in the coverage of the role of Fixon, Agnev/ and Mrs. Nixon
in Campaign '70. Of importance here is the significant degre
of imbalance favorable toward Nixon, Agnew and Mrs. Nixon.
Of the coverage involving just Nixon and Agnew, g1.75f. was
''positive.^* I'Jhen the coverage of Mrs. Nixon is added, the
total percentage of '^positive'' coverage was S3,09fo,
Table 4 presents these totals.
Table 4. Positive and Negative Coverage of The Role of
Nixon, Agnew, and Mrs. Nixon in Campaign '70
_g Total ^
Nixon = 3,493 (Sl.9lf^) S09 (13.^1^) 4,302 (100^)
Agnew = 1,050 (g3.76f.) 205 (l6.33f^) 1 ,255 (lOOfo)
Mrs. Nixon = 470 (9^.74^0 6_ (1 .26"^0 476 (WO^)
Totals 5,013 {S3 .09fo) 1 ,020 (l6.9lf^) 6,033 (lOGfo)
As is quite evident, there is a significant imbalance
in favor of Fixon and Agnew—who vjere playing a very-
active role in Campaign '70. It should be noted, however,
that '^able U only includes coverage of the actual activities
and rhetoric of Nixon and Agnew. This rhetoric and these
activities are the unit of analysis. This is important
in interpreting Table 4 since Table k would exclude such
things as negative rem.arks by Lawrence O'Brien (10/22/ '70,
pages 4-5) since they were not delivered within the context
of the T'ixon/Agnew campaign activity. Because of this,
there is a bias to Table 4 since, while it is important,
it only presents one aspect of the total picture. There-
fore, discussing the significance of Table 4, it is necessary
to examine further data to get a better perspective of the
meaning of Table 4.
The coverage of Cam.paign '70 can be divided into
three parts: 1) the role of T'ixon/Agnew , 2) the nine con-
gressional and gubernatorial races, and 3) the rem.aining
coverage. This "remaining coverage'' category is of rele-
vance here since this category would include coverage of
anti-Administration remarks, such as those by O'Brien
(10/22/' 70, pages 5-5) which might balance the tremendously
favorable im.balance given to Nixon/Agnew presented in
Table 4. Table 5 presents the totals for this third cate-
gory—which is the foarth example of imbalance.
CJKJ
Table 5. Coverage of Third Category
+ = 911 (32.49^.)
1,S93 (67.5lfo)
Total = doof.)
Here, as evident, pro-Democratic and anti-Administration
opinion dominate by a big percentage. The imbalance is
significant, though not quite as big as the pro-Nixon/Agnew
imbalance exhibited in Table 4. To give a better perspective
of the extensive coverage given to Nixon/Agnew, it would be
helpful to combine Tables k and 5. It should be obvious,
however, that the results of Table 5, imbalanced as they are,
cannot effectively counterbalance the favorable coverage
given to Nixon and Agnew. Table 6 documents this.
Table 6. Combined Total of Tables k and 5
+ = 5,924 (67.04fO
2,913 (32.96f.)
Total = J^,S37 doof.)
As was expected, the pro-Mixon/Agnew, Republican
im.balance is only slightly diluted by the addition of the
third category coverage of Table 5. Kven with this addi-
tional category, the imbalance (67.04fo) in favor of the
Mixon/Agnew and Republican point of view is still quite
significant.
Together, Tixon and Agnew accounted for /v9.76^3 of the
total '^positive'* ( + ) coverage whereas they accounted for
only 15.22'^, of the '^negative" (-) coverage. The reality of
this imbalance resulted from both the tendency of CBS News
to give the President excessive coverage and the fact that
Nixon and Agnew were not candidates; thus, there were not
any "equal" entities playing the sam.e role who could in
quantity and quality effectively counter the coverage given
to Nixon and Agnew. This situation does pose problems and
further docum.ents the dom.inant role the president plays as
a newsmaker—even in an election in which he is not a
candidate •
So far, this analysis has demonstrated four examples
of imbalance. The imbalance of coverage presented by
Table 2 and k favored the T'ixon/Agnew Republican point of
view. The imbalance presented in Table 3 and '^able 5, which
is equally significant, favors the Democratic and anti-
Administration point of view. This is not quite a standoff
since the total coverage (Table 6) to this point favors
Nixon/Agnew, Republican opinion. V/hat remains to be ex-
amined are the nine congressional or gubernatorial races
which were a part of CBS' coverage of Campaign '70. This
analysis will demonstrate that there was a fifth example of
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imbalance—one in favor of Democrat and anti-Administration
opinion, but that the total degree of this imbalance was not
very significant since the imbalance was not that great.
The following is a list of the campaigns featured on
CBS News:
1) New York Senate: Ooodell, Ottinger, Buckley
2) Ohio Senate: Taft, Metzenbaum
3) California Governor: Reagan, Ilnruh
k) Tennessee Senate: Gore, Brock
5) New York Governor: Rockefeller, Goldberg
6) California Senate: Tunnev, Murphy
7) Florida Senate: Chiles, Cram.er
8) Illinois Senate: Stevenson, Smith
9) Connecticut Senate: ^Veicker, Dodd, Duffey
The total distribution of coverage is presented in
Table 7.
Table 7. Total Coverage of Nine Major Races
+ 3,205 {40.87fO
0 (11.34fO
3,748 (47.79f.)
Total = 7,842 (lOO-?^.)
Table 8 shows the relationship between the "positive'* and
"negative^* coverage.
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Table S. Positive and Negative Coverage of Mine TTajor Races
+ = 3,025 (46.10f,)
3,7/fg (53.90f.)
Total = 6,953 (100<^.)
The total imbalance here is really not one of signifi-
cance. However, this slight imbalance in favor of the
Democratic or anti-Administration point of view is a com-
posite total. An examination of the coverage of the in-
dividual races will produce more significant examples of im-
balanced coverage. This is presented in Table 9. In this
table, neutral coverage is omitted for better comparison.
As evident, there are major imbalances in both direc-
tions—though most of the major imbalances are in favor of
the Democratic-anti-Administration point of view. Of parti-
cular significance were the New York Senate, the New York
Crovernor, the California Senate, and the Florida Senate
Races because of the extent of the im.balance. The New York
Senate race was significant since there were two anti-
Adm.inistration candidates (Goodell and Ottinger); yet, the
pro-Administration candidate (Buckley) received the favorable
imbalance. The Few York Governor and Florida Senate Races
were very interesting because of the real im.balance in favor
of Democratic candidates. /.Iso, it is important to note that
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the reporter covering the story can be a source of opinion.
This will be discussed in the next section.
In order to summarize the information presented to
this point, a composite chart would be helpful. Table 10
presents a brief com.posite of the three categories of the
coverage of Camoaign '70,
Table 10, Total Coverage of Three Basic Categories of
Campaign *70
+ ~ Total
1 ) Role of Nixon & ^
Agnew, etc, 5,013 {^3.09%) 1,020 (l6.9lfo) 6,033 (lOOf.)
2) 9 Major Races 3,205 (46.10f.) 3,74S (53. 90^^) 6,953 (lOOf.)
911 (32.49/.) 1,S93 (67.5lfo) 2,g04 (lOOf.)
3 ) 'Remaining"
Coverage
Totals 9,129 (57.g2fo) 6,661 (42.18/015,790 (lOOfo)
This table once again graphically illustrates both the
quantitative and qualitative imbalance in favor of Fixon
and Agnew,
Another perspective of the CBS News coverage of Campaign
»70 can be obtained by examining some of the different pat-
terns of coverage, ^or example, coverage of the nine major
races featured by CBS tended to emphasize such things as
personalities, prediction, and politics at the expense of
issues. A review of the coverage of the nine campaigns
will
demonstrate this.
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In the coverage of the New York Senate Campaign,
(10/2/70, pages 12-15), there was no discussion of the
issues by the CBS reporter, Morton Dean. He did ask
Buckley if he agreed with Nixon on certain issues (page U).
Dan Rather, covering the Ohio Senate race (10/14/70, pages U-
16), indicated that '^integrity of state Republican leaders"
was the issue (page 14). However, he later stated that
both Taft and Metzenbaum felt that "the economy may decide
the election." (page 15) In the California race (10/19/70,
pages 13-14), there was no discussion of the issues by the
reporter. The coverage included Reagan's discussion of
law and order (page 13) and Unruh's discussion of pollution
and Reagan's association with big business. Roger Mudd's
coverage of the Tennessee Senatorial race did not speci-
fically include discussion of issues. He did indicate that
Brock said that Core was out of touch with the people of
Tennessee (page S). Brock later reiterated this charge.
The coverage of the New York gubernatorial rqce involved
no definition of the issues by the reporter Mike Wallace.
The coverage did include survey results (page 10) and
charges by Goldberg (page 11) concerning the economy. Bill
Stout, in his coverage of the California Senate Race, re-
ported that, ''There seem to be few issues capturing the
voter's im.agination." (page 12) Basically, he said, it
would be a "choice between men not issues.'' (page 12)
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The coverage of the Florida Senate and Gubernatorial
Races (10/27/70, pages 12-14) contained no discussion of
the issues. There ..as, though, coverage of Cramer stressing
the need for "strong law enforcement." (page 13) In the
Illinois Senate Race (10/29/70, pages 6-8), there was a
definition of the prime issue. Reporter Fromson reported
that "like so m.any races across the country, the campaign
here is keyed to the issue of law and order." (page 6)
There was no discussion of the major issues in the Connec-
ticut Senatorial Race. (10/30/74, pages 9-12.
Thus, the "in-depth" coverage of Senatorial and
Gubernatorial Races does not really develop the issues in-
volved in each ^.ace. It is interesting, though, that
Walter Cronkite had little trouble identifying the issues.
For example: ''One of the big question marks in this year's
election is whether economic problems or law and order will
have greater impact on blue collar workers.
.
." (10/27/73,
page 3) Also, ''With congressional elections getting closer,
and the state of the economy becoming increasingly important
as an issue, the Nixon Administration was confronted with
more bad economic news today." (10/28/70, page 2) Cronkite
also stated that "would-be forecasters are hesitating
calling many of next Tuesday^s election contests because of
general uncertainty over the nation's economy." (10/28/70,
page 16)
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Other interesting points are v/orth discussing. On
October 29, (pages 4-5) CBS discussed the results of its
own poll on aspects of Campaign ^yo. Specifically, the
poll meant to discover if Tixon and Agnew were effective
in their campaigning. One of the questions employed was:
-If you knew that Mr. Nixon (or Agnew) supported a candidate
for election in your state, would you be more likely or less
likely to vote for that candidate?" (10/29/70, page 4)
There seems to be a problem with this question since it
can be argued that very few people would answer in the
affirmative-no m.atter who the reference is included in the
question. Thus, the result of the poll was not surprising.
""If you add the second and third columns ("less likely",
''not affected"), you find that three-quarters of the voters
say the President could not influence them in favor of his
rran.« (10/29/70, page 4) An indication of the feeling of
CBS seemed to emerge in the third question of the poll:
''In a non-nresidential election year, is it proper or
improper for the President to personally campaign for can-
didates in state elections?" (10/29/70, page 4) Perhaps
this question said something about how CBS felt about the
campaign activities of President Nixon,
Another interesting aspect is the role the reporter
plays in the reporting of a story. For example, after a
report in which George Meany and Speaker McCormack criti-
cized the economy, Daniel Schorr sumimariz ,d by saying:
'^mat Meany and McCorrr.ack are arguing is that ' conditions are
bad and, and that this is the
_gut issue for labor." (IQ/27/70,
page 4) This last point is interesting since neither Meany
nor McCormack mentioned anything about the 1970 elections.
Thus, Schorr added something on his own. Sometimes reporters
can be mouthpieces for one candidate. For example, Roger
Kudd, in an interviei^ v/ith Senator Gore, said: 'ni-^ell, your
opponent says that you^re tied too closely v/ith Vfashington;-
that you really don't represent Tennessee.'^ (10/20/70, page S)
Mudd did not make a similar statement against Brock.
Also, reporters have the ability to ask what can be
considered unfair questions. For example, Roger I'.udd asked
Reubin Askew, who was running against Claude Kirk, "V-'hat do
you think of Governor Kirk, Senator?'^ (10/27/70, page U)
Askew then indicated what he felt about his opponent. This
same question was not asked of Kirk. Needless to say, this
was a rather slanted question. Another tactic is the capa-
city of the reporter to put a candidate on the defensive on
a point that may not be important. For example, Mike V/allace,
in discussing Goldberg ±n. the New York gubernatorial race,
stated that '*Ke has been called aloof. Some say he still
comes over like a Supreme Court Justice." (10/21/70, page 12)
Goldberg, being on the defensive, was then forced to respond •
to the allegation provoked by the reporter, that he was aloof.
Goldberg snent the rest of the interview explaining that he
was not aloof. (10/21/70, pages 12-13.
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Another tactic is for a reporter to defend a candidate.
For example, as cited by Murray Fromson, the main issue in
the Illinois Senatorial Campaign was law and order. (10/29/70,
page 6) Some of the charges made in the campaign wer-e that
Stevenson was a "radical liberal. '» However, Fromson told
the viewers that '^Stevenson is not a radic-lib.*' (10/29/70,
page 7) He then went on to explain why Stevenson was not a
"radic-lib.** Feedless to say, this explanation was bene-
ficial to Stevenson. Still another tactic is reporter's
giving coverage to one side but not the other. On November 2,
1970, CBS gave direct and extensive coverage to the address
Kuskie was going to make later that night. He had not given
the speech, yet a significant videotape excerpt of his
speech was broadcast. Nixon, on the night before the election,
was not given the same opportunity. According to Cronkite:
"President Nixon's broadcast was to have been taken from a
speech in Phoenix on Saturday. Most of that has been widely
reported. It is a television reporting of portions of that
speech." (11/2/70, page 2) A subsequent story discussed some
of the activities and strategies of President Fixon. How-
ever, this was in no way synonomous with the exposure given
to the Muskie speech. On the night before the elections on
C3S, there was a favorable, extensive imbalance in favor of '
the Der.ocrats.
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Ervin Constitutional Rights Subcommittee onFreedom of The Press
This section analyzes CBS' coverage of Senator Ervin»s
Constitutional Rights Subcomm.ittee
' s hearings on "Freedom of
The Press'*. This analysis covers five different news stories
v/hich were broadcast between P^eptember 2g, 1971, and October13,
1971. It should be noted that the period of analysis for
this study ended on October 15, 1971. Thus, it is possible
that CBS had other coverage of The Ervin Subcommittee which
'
would not be included in this analysis. This should be
kept in mind,
CBS, obviously, has a strong interest in freedom of the
press. This interest and lack of neutrality seemed to emerge
in CBS» coverage of the hearing dealing with government regu-
lation of the press. In this analysis "positive" coverage is
coverage "positive" or supporting the point of view taken by
the press. This point of view argues that governmental
regulation of the oress is a real danger. An example of
this would be:
Norman Issacs,.
. ., decried what he called persistent
Administration pressure on the press and its effect
in eroding press forthrightness
. (9/2^/71, page S)
"Negative coverage would- be coverage which argued that
the government does not represent a real threat to freedom
of the press. For example:
. . .Ronald Ziegler said that the ^'"ice-President has
every right to express himself, that the Adm.inistration
is not trying to intim.idate the prer>s, and that the
press is too sensitive to receiving the kind of criti-
cism it likes to hand out. (9/2^/71, page 8)
Table 11 shows the distribution of opinion for the
coverage of the subcommittee hearings.
Table 11. Total Distribution of Opinion: Ervin Sub-
Committee Hearings
+ = 1,060 (68.65fo)
0 = 146 (9.59%)
336 {2k.07fo)
Total = 1,544 (ioo<^.)
Note: + - pro-press; - = support of Administration position
On CBS, over 6^fo (66.65fO of the coverage of the Ervin
Subcommittee Hearings contained opinion which argued that
government regulation was a real threat to freedom of the
press. The percentage is even higher when just the positive
and negative coverage is compared.
Table 12. Distribution of Positive and Negative Coverage
+ = 1 ,060 (75.93f^O
.336 {2k.07%)
Total = 1,544 (lOO^',)
Thus, of the positive and negative opinion, positive
(pro-press) opinion constitutes better than 75!^ (75.93'^)
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of the total. This, obviously, is not an even balance of
opinion. In addition to the 3:1 ratio of opinion supporting
CBS' opinion, other factors are worth examining.
All the opinion vvas opinion which occurred before the
Ervin SubcoiTunittee. Thus, it is possible that testimony
before the Ervin Subcommittee contained a 3:1 ratio in favor
of condemning government regulation and intimidation of the
press. If so, then CBS did reflect the "reality" of the
hearings. But, CBS made no attempt, as it did with the
Galley reaction, to solicit opinion to balance its coverage.
¥ith the reaction to Galley, CBS went out and gave inter-
views to two people who supported the conviction of Galley.
Yet, with the Veterans' Demonstration and the Ervin
Subcommittee Hearings, CBS made no such effort—and as a
result, in both cases—the opinion was very much one-sided,
one-sided in the direction that one might anticipate if one
were to argue that CBS has a "liberal" bias. Based on these
three limited examples, CBS will "Balance" opinion only when
to do so would increase the opinion CBS identifies with.
And, as with the Veterans' Demonstration, opinion
before the Ervin Subcommittee which warned of dangers of
governmental regulation received extensive and direct cover-
age. Table 13 docum.ents the percentage of Direct to Indirect
Coverage for both Positive and Negative Coverage. Obviously,
Direct Coverage is superior to Indirect—where the reporter
quotes or summarizes what the opinion source said.
2/0
Table 13. Percentage of Direct to Indirect Coverage
Pi^eg^ Indirect Total
701 (66.13^) 359 (33.87^0 1,060 (lOOf.)
90 (26.79f.) 246 (73.2lfo) 336 (I00f,)
This further substantiates the great advantage to opin-
ion which would support the CBS point of view. (In this case
it is possible to speak of "CBS point of view", since both
CBS President Frank Stanton and V/alter Cronkite testified
before the Ervin Subcormrittee
. ) Almost two-thirds (66.13^b)
of "pro-press" opinion was Direct. V/hereas only slightly
above one-fourth (26.79fO of negative coverage was Direct.
Direct Coverage was given to: Senator Ervin, Norman Is-
aacs, Representative Odgen Reid, CBS President Frank Stanton,
Walter Cronkite, NBC President Julian Goodman, and Fred
Friendly. All, except Friendly, represented the "pro-press"
position. Five other people who testified were given In-
direct Coverage. Two oJ these were "pro-press" and three
took the opposite point of view.
Thus, CBS gave superior quantitative and qualitative
coverage to opinion it agreed with. It did not actively
attempt to solicit opinion to balance the proportion of
positive to negative "opinion. "Pro-press" opinion got the
most coverage and it got the best coverage. As mentioned,
subsequent covera/re of the Ervin Subcorrjnittee rr.ay have
occurred past October 15, 1971 -which was the end of the
period of analysis for the whole study. But, the concept
of "balance" is one which should be applied over a short
period—not over a month's period. Thus, it would seem
that the results presented here are valid and that they do
say something about CES» coverage of a controversy where
there were two basic sides. It is interesting that CBS
did not include any opinion, with the exception of Ziegler's,.
from the Nixon Administration. The conclusion is obvious-
there was no quantitative or qualitative equality of opinion
here. And, that is what bias is all about.
CHAPTER VIII
QUALITATIVE Ar^ALYSIS: PART 3
This section is an analysis of CBS' coverage of domestic
supDort and opposition toward the ^^ietnam War during the
period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The m.ost
significant finding was that CBS gave almost exactly equal
coverage to both the ^'pro'»-war and the ''anti'»-war positions.
A second significant finding was that the "pro'»-war opinion
almost totally consisted of Nixon Administration sources.
The **anti"-war opinion was much more diverse. It contained
both governmental and non-governmental sources.
Before discussing the results, it is important to
examine the rules and criteria employed in this analysis.'
First, opinion, behavior, and policy statements were in-
cluded. Behavior involved such things as demionstrations
and Senate votes. Policy statements, such as a new peace
proposal by President Mixon, were also included. V.liile
these were not exactly opinions, they were value preferences
stated in the form of policy. If the analysis relied
strictly on the '^opinions'* of the Fixon Administration,
then there would not have been too much to analyze. In-
cluded in this was justification of a specific policy or
decision. Second, this analysis only measured domestic
opinion—opinion which occurred within the United States,
Thus, this analysis does not include coverap:e of 1) foreign
opinion, 7) Paris ^eace Talks, or 3) battle action in Indo-
china. It does, hov/ever, include ODinion and commentary on
these—if the OTDinion did occur within the United States.
For example, the analysis would include a Defense Deuartment
comment on the success of a military operation or Secretary
Rogers' speaking about the Paris Peace Talks.
Third, the analysis excluded coverage of the various
trials—such as My Lai or the Berrigans' trials. It was felt
that this would lead to difficult coding problem.s and that
material presented in an indictment or trial was not synono-
mous with the type of opinion this analysis was attempting
to measure. Fourth, coverage of the Pentagon Papers was
qualified. The government's attempts to prevent the disclo-
sure of the Pentagon Papers was excluded, since this involved
Vietnam only in a secondary way. And, coverage of the content
of the Pentagon Papers was not neutral. However, the Penta-
gon Papers did not deal with President Nixon's policy during
the period of analysis. Thus, it was felt that it would be
best to include it, but not to measure it by direction.
In this analysis, as with the previous, opinion was
classified as "oositive'*
,
"neutral", or "negative.'* Here,
'^positive" opinion was opinion which supported or coincided
with the position of the Fixon Administration during this
period. The "negative" classification involved opinion and
behavior v/hich opposed the war and Tixon'o conduct of it.
In addition, it is important to place the analysis in the
context of the period of analysis-September 1, 1970, to
October 15, 1971. The basic military activities during
this period involved 1) Nixon's winding down of the war,
2) the Son Tay raid, and 3) the Laos invasion. Domestically,
the period was one of relative calm. During this period,
the campuses were quiet. The major anti-war activities
included the Vietnam Veterans Against the War demonstration
and the subsequent demonstrations in May, 1Q71, by anti-war
groups. Also, this period contained attempts by Congress
to limit or end the war.
The total distribution of opinion (including behavior
and policy position) proved to be both significant and
interesting. In its coverage of domestic opinion concerning
Vietnam, CBS gave almost exactly the same proportion of
coverage to '*anti'*-war opinion as it did to opinion which
supported the war—which included the policy statem.ents
and positions of the Nixon Administration. Basically, the
Nixon Administration was the major source of opinion which
supported the war. Thus, it seems that for almost every
Nixon Administration opinion or policy position on ^''ietnam,
CBS would counter this—though not necessarily at the same
time—with an equal amount of ''anti'*-war opinion. Table 1
documents this and presents the totals for the September 1
,
1970, to October 15, 1971, period.
Table 1 . Total Distribution of Domestic Opinion on Vietn-.rnSeptember 1, 1970, to October ^5^1971
+ 31 ,905 (39.1lf,)
0 19,492 (23. 89'^.)
30,184 (37. oof,)
Total = 81 ,581 (lOOfo)
Table 2 eliminates the "neutral" coverage and demon-
strates how close the coverage was between "anti"- and
"pro"-v/ar opinion.
Table 2. Total Distribution of Positive and Negative Domestic
Opinion on Vietnam Vlar
31 ,905 (51 .39fO
30,184 (48.6lf,)
Total = 62,089 (lOOf.)
Not only is this almost incredibly similar, given the
total amount of opinion, but it illustrates an extremely
high degree of coverage given to the '*anti"--war position.
This is especially interesting in that this was not a
period of m.any anti-war demonstrations. As dem.onstrated by
Table 2, the coverage of "pro*'-war opinion exceeded that of
'*anti''-war opinion by only 2,78'^.
Also, the proportion of '»direct'» opinion for both the
opinion which supported the Mixon Adirr.instration' s Vietnam
policy and
-anti"-war opinion was almost equal in coverage
given. Table 3 presents this.
Table 3. Proportion of "Direct" Coverage for '^Pro"- and
"Anti"- War Opinion
10,435 (32.71fO
^,^^3 (29.43f.)
The difference here, as with the total distribution of
positive and negative opinion, is not that significant.
What is significant is the almost equal coverage CBS gave
to both the "pro''- and "anti"-war opinion. This equality
involved both total distribution and proportion of "direct"
coverage.
Although this was not precisely measured, there was
one difference in the coverage of the "pro"- and "anti"-war
opinion. This was, as previously mentioned, the fact that
opinion in support of the Nixon Administration's handling
of the V/ar emanated almost totally within either the Nixon
Administration or within the federal government. Anti-war
opinion, however, was more diverse in that it involved, in
significant defrrees, both governmental and non-governmental
opinion. This seems natural and perhaps is to be expectedo
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Hov^ever, this raises an important question. V/hat about non-
governmental opinion which supported Nixon»s handling of
the War? It surely existed—but not on CBS. If CBS ^vas
overtly attempting to "balance" "pro'•-war and "anti"-v/ar
opinion, it did accomplish that—as evidenced by the totals
of Table 2. But, whatever its motivation, the result seemed
to be that a significant aspect of society, that portion
which did support Nixon^s handling of the War during this
period, was denied access and simply did not receive coverage.
In fact, it sometim.es seemed as if CBS over-extended
itself to give coverage to anti-war opinion. Because of the
length of this period of analysis, it is not possible to
analyze it with the sam.e degree of depth as contained in
other analyses'. However, it is possible to briefly examine
some of the peculiarities in CBS' coverage of domestic
opinion of the Vietnam War,
One C^S tendency was to give coverage to what can be
classified as a "nonentity"—someone who was not important,
but, because of unusual circumstances and anti-war opinion,
received coverage. One example of this was the coverage
given to Debra Sweet, the girl who told President Fixon at
an award ceremony that, "I find it very hard to believe in
you until you get us out of Vietnam." (12/3/70, pages 10-11) *
The story was first told by Cronkite; then a report was given
by Robert Pierpoint. The report by Pierpoint included an
interview with Debra Sv;eet. This was a lot of coverage
given to one person. One important question concerns whe-
ther or not the routine ceremony would have received any
coverage if Miss Sweet had not made her anti-war remark.
Would it have received the same coverage if a recipient had
made a ^*pro"- war comment?
Another example of the same tendency was a story and
report on Lt. Louis Font. (4/1^/71, page 3-4) Lt. Font had
Just been discharged from the Army because he became a con-
scientious objector. As with Debra Sweet, Font was inter-
viewed. This situation was unusual but would have the same
degree of coverage been given in a similar situation if the
direction had not been anti-war? And, sometimes the unusual
but eoual coverage achieves the status of the usual. On
Memorial Day (5/31/71), CBS had two stories of equal length
about Memorial Day ceremonies. One involved the ceremony at
Arlington T^ational Cemetery, ""he other story, of equal
length, involved an anti-v;ar parade in ITadison, Wisconsin,
Thus, the one anti-war parade, probably the only one in the
United States that Memorial Day, received about one-half of
the total Memorial Day coverage. This raises questions about
how well the news actually reflects reality.
Another interesting tendency involves the reporter's
personal involvement or commentary. Often, this involves
just one or two sentences at the beginning or end of a story
which tend to dilute the credibility of what is being said.
Some exam.ples will illustrate this.
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In a story on the Senate's rejection of the IlcGovern-
Hatfield amendment, Ilarvin Kalb said:
Today's votes and proposals climax many months of
anti-"war activity in the U.S. Senate. The doves have
gained strength steadily, but those who do not wish
to challenge the President of his policy in South-
east Asia still retain the conclusive power of a
voting majority. (9/1/70, page 3)
Rather than presenting this in a positive sense—that the
majority in the Senate did support the President, Falb chose
to present the results in a negative sense—the majority not
wishing to '^challenge the President or his policy. .
Sometimes CBS would discuss the motivation behind an
event or story. For example, right before President Nixon
was to make a new proposal on ending the Vietnam War, Dan
Rather said:
Political observers note that the President's speech
comes just three weeks before the November congress-
ional elections. (10/6/70, page 2)
Rather then went on to tell how CBS had been told that some
senators had been told by the VThite House that they could
expect '^help from the President on the Vietnam issue some
tim.e in late October." Another example involved a media
event on Thanksgiving— prisoners ' families eating Vietnam
prison food. Jim Kilpatrick closed by saying:
The gathering was clearly organized to focus media •
attention on the POW cause. (11/26/70, page9)
Both Rather' s and Kilpatrick' s statements auite possibly
could be very valid. But, did CBS attribute the sam.e "poli-
tical" motivations to members of the anti-war
m.ovem.entv
2gO
Did CBS discuss coverage of anti-war demonstrations within
the context that they were trying to "focus media attention"
on themselves?
Sometimes the reporter's feelings just simply creep
into the story—as illustrated by Dan Rather' s reporting of
President I'^ixon's welcome of the First Marine Division:
These ceremonies are designed as a symbol of America's
gratitude for sacrifices by their sons whether they
believe in the Vrar or not, of the President's word that
he is ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and as a
sym.bol of Mr. Nixon's determination not to let anti-war
disruptions in Washington get all of the weekend head-
lines. (4/30/71, page 5)
Once again Mr. Rather gave us President Nixon's moti-
vation. In addition. Rather described the soldiers in
terms of '^whether they believe in the War or not." As part
of his closing, Rather states:
There was a flyover and Marine Veterans marching in
review. Marines wounded in Vietnam: 51 ,000;
Marines killed in Vietnam: S,000.
. . (4/30/71, page 5)
Obviously, Mr. Rather was trying to make a point.
Sometimes a reporter will reach conclusions that are not
really evident in the story. Remarks by Robert f^chakne il-
lustrate this. After reporting on a campaign to produce
comiTiercials to publicize the condition of POW's with
counter-reactions by other POW families, Schakne concluded
by saying:
But this strange controversy over the advertising
techniques to get these men home seems to point up
a growing disenchantment am.ong more and more PO'7
families, with the war itself, and with the political
uses of the prisoner issue. (8/12/71, page 9)
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The story did discuss POW families who opposed the use
of commercials and opposed President Nixon»s policy, but the
story in no way indicated that there was a '^growing disen-
chantment among more and more POVf families, with the war
Sometimes reporters simply like to "tell it like it is.'»
This involves a negative description of the statem.ent or
activity. For example, Bob Schieffer reported that:
The Pentagon has added a new touch to what has become
an obvious public relations campaign aim.ed at counter-
ing bad news from the battlefield. (3/1/71, page 8)
Marvin Kalb reported that:
The line here is that the bombing of the American Em-
bassy is ^not alarming" even though additional Marine
guards will now have to be posted there. And this line
gets a novel twist. (12/1/70, page 4)
Kalb then went on what he m.eant by the "novel twist.'*
Sometimes it is possible to detect the reporter's sym.pathies
by his use of labels and names. For example, in May, 1971,
anti-war demonstrators in Washington tried to shut down the
governm.ent by various methods. To Bruce Morton, these pro-
testors were "the peace army."
The peace army tried to do that today, but it failed.
Washington faltered, but was not shot down, perhaps
because the peace arm.y lacked the organization. . •
So the peace army changed tactics, turned guerrillas.
itself, and with the political uses of the prisone r issue.
hit and run raids.
And
,
And while the peace army was making its plans, the
other army was planning to m.ove out. ( 5/A-/71 , page 3)
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Needless to say, the reference to protestors-v;ho:
stated goal was to break the law, to physically prevent
the government from operating—as '»peace army" was perhaps
overly sympathetic and euphemistic.
Finally, the sympathies of reporters can be determined
by the questions that are asked and the respondents who are
selected.
For exam.pl e:
In Washington, Senator Hubert Humphrey was asked aboutthe xndochina situation, and whether he thought the
Nixon Administration is giving the public all the facts
on iJ.S. involvement there, (2/1/71, page 5)
And, Humphrey then gave a predictable response.
These examples of CBS» reporting "were specifically
chosen from the more than four-hundred news stories of
domestic support or opnosition of the Vietnam Vfar. It should
be stressed that they were specifically chosen to illustrate
a point—that CBS was very sympathetic to the philosophy,
objectives and means of the anti-war movement. And, that
this sympathy did filtrate into its reporting. As evidenced
by the reading, coding, and analysis of the transcripts, it
did seem to the author that CBS 1 ) often questioned the
m.otives of the Nixon Administration, 2) went out of its way
to give coverage to anti-war opinion, and 3) presented the
anti-war opinion uncritically.
Of course, other considerations have to be considered.
The events of the past year have certainly given a rather
negative oerspective of the motives and operation of the
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Nixon Administration. But does this justify questioning
and critically examining one side of a controversy v/hile not
doing the sarre for the other? And, as previously discussed,
what about the lack of coverage given to those who supported
the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policy? This element
simply was not given coverage. This raises some interesting
questions about balance—and bias, i-hat constitutes balance?
As docum.ented by Table 2, CBS gave almost equal coverage to
the^ro'*- and "anti"- war positions. But does this consti-
tute "ba]ance" when CBS omits an important segm.ent of public
opinion and uncritically gives sympathetic and extensive
coverage to the other?
One of the problems, it seems, is that while CBS was
presenting ''balanced" coverage in a quantitative sense, it
was not presenting a balance of equals. Thus, the basic
contest seem.ed to be: The Nixon Administration vs. other
governmental opnosition and anti-war sentiment in the
country. ''Pro'*-war sentiment of a non-governmental nature,
as indicated, was omitted. There were probably two reasons
for this—both involving bias. One was that CBS did oppose
the war and gave superior coverage to the point of view it
identified with. Two, '*pro"-war opinion was not organized,
nor was it active or visible. But, CBS could have specifi-
cally sought out this opinion. It seemed to have no trouble
finding anti-war opinion, such as an interview with Clark
Clifford (7/1/71, page 5), or the aforementioned example of
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Senator Humphrey (2/1/71, page 5), when it needed it.
Vietnam Veterans Against The V/ar
Demonstration
This section analyzes the ^'.'ashington demonstration by
the "Vietnam Veterans Against The V/ar" which occurred between
April 19 and April 22, 1971. CBS' coverage of this demon-
stration raises some interesting questions—especially when
compared against its coverage of the Galley reaction.
First, the total number involved in the demonstration was
small. According to CBS, "a thousand, maybe fifteen hundred
men.'* (4/19/71, page 2) However, the coverage of the
demonstration was relatively extensive. The amount of
coverage was almost half (46.71^0; yet, the reaction to
Calley involved "thousands" more than the fifteen hundred
Vietnam Vets. Thus, one question is—why did the fifteen
hundred anti-war veterans receive so much coverage? Second,
much of the coverage of the Vietnam Vets was "direct"—the
Vets expressed their views directly—rather than having
them communicated by a reporter. This, obviously, is the
best type of coverage for a group vjhich is expressing a
point of view. A group covld ask no better than to be able
to express its m.essage in its own words ; a message delivered
direct—unfiltered by a reporter's interpretation. A
question that has to be asked is—why did the Veterans'
demonstration receive so much direct coverage?
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Third, as recalled in its coverage of the Galley
reaction, QT^S v/ent out and solicited opinion which sup-
ported the verdict and which opposed the pro-Calley
reaction. In the coverage of the Vietnam Veterans, how-
ever, CBS did not solicit any opinion which opposed the
method or m.essage of the Veterans » demonstration. This is
not to say that CBS had no negative opinion in the coverage,
for it did. One was a statement of Senator Scott, reed by
Cronkite. The other was a direct statement (not an inter-
view) by the commander of the Veterans of Foreign V-ars—
who questioned the publicity the anti-war Veterans were
receiving. But, the point is that CBS did not seek inter-
views with those who opposed the Veterans
—
yet they did
with those who opoosed Galley. It can be argued that this
was not done accidentally.
A comparison of the two forms of expression—the pro-
Galley reaction and the "^^eterans' Dem.onstration may say
(even though these are only two limited exam.ples) something
about bias. This is bias which is endemic to television
itself. It involves the criteria for coverage imposed b^^
the unioueness of television. Thus, it seems that there is
an obvious bias in favor of organization. A group which is
organized is much more likely to receive direct coverageo
This appears to document one of the reasons for the differ-
ence in coverage between the Galley reaction and the Vet-
erans' Demonstration. The Galley reaction was not a product
286
of organization; it was not the expression of one organized
group-as was the Veterans^ Demonstration. A second differ
ence between the two forms of expression, and an important
one, is that the Veterans fulfilled the basic criteria of
television, action, whereas the Galley reaction did not.
Television is an action-oriented medium. The Veterans
provided this '^action^'-some of which were pseudo-events-
while the pro-Calley reaction did not. And, while this is
not an '-ideological'' bias, it is not neutral since because
of life styles, etc., som.e groups find it much easier to
organize and to provide
-action" than do others. It can be
argued that television's emphasis on organized opinion and
action discriminates against an important segm.ent of the
population—those who do not have the means, or are too
busy working or raising a family to participate in "demon-
stration'' politics.
Also involved here may be an "ideological" bias, but
since the "ideological" bias and the "institutional" bias
are interrelated, it is difficult to ascertain where one
ends and the other begins. The ideological bias is simply
a bias based on the ideology or philosophy of a reporter or
a network. Thus, it m.ay be that CBS 1) supported the con-
viction of Galley and thus opposed the pro-Calley reaction,
and ?.) opposed the Vietnam War and thus sunported the
manner and method of the Vietnam Veterans. If this were
true, then G^.S might 1) actively solicit anti-Calley opinion
28?
(which it did) while not soliciting anti-Veterans ^ opinion
(which it did also) and 2) present much of the Veterans
t
opinion directly (which it did) while presenting much of the
pro-Calley reaction indirectly (which it also did). But,
the situation seems mora complex than this, since, if it is
true that CBS is '^liberally- oriented, then often that
opinion which supports CBS' position is opinion which is
1) organized and 2) action-oriented. Thus, the excessive
coverage, relative to its size and importance, the Veterans
received may have been due to the fact that they were
1) an action-oriented group or 2) that they opposed the war.
Or, the extensive coverage could be due to both of these—
as they are interrelated. Thus, given the nature of '^pro-
test politics" during this period, it may be that the demands
of action-oriented television made it easier for CBS to ex-
press its ideological position. It may be that one kind of
bias '^feeds'* on the other.
As m.entioned, the Veterans' Demonstration received
extensive coverage. Table 1+ presents the totals.
Table 4. Total Coverage of Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration
+ = 1,982 (77.79f.)
0 = 83 (3.26f,)
483 (18.95^)
Total = 2,548 doofo)
2SS
Here, positive (+) coverage was coverage favorable to the
Vietnan. Veterans while negative (-) coverage was unfavorable
to the Veterans. Table 5 shows the totals for positive and
negative coverage.
Table 5. Positive and Negative Coverage of Vietnam Veterans^
Demonstration
+ =• 1,982 (80.4lfo)
Total = 2,465 (lOOfO
From both of these tables, it is obvious that, based on word
count, the coverage was overwhelmingly favorable to the
Vietnam Veterans. The ratio of positive to negative coverage
was better than 4:1.
It should be noted that not all of the negative coverage
was really negative. Actually, there were only three sources
who spoke against the anti-war Veterans. These three. Senator
Scott, Brig. Oeneral Daniel James, and the Commander of the
Veterans of foreign '".^ars
,
totaled 230 v;ords or 47.62f^ of the
negative coverage. The rest of the "negative" coverage
consisted of such things as the government's attem.pts to
prevent the "''eterans from sleeping on the Capitol Hall and
the actual arrest of the Veterans by police. Thus, over 52^5
of the '^negative'* coverage did not really ''counter'* the
opinions exnressed by the Veterans—even though it was negative.
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If this 52<^, of ^negative^ coverage is eliminated, the per-
centage of positive coverage to negative coverage is ?^8.6S^
positive to 11.32'^ negative, a tremendous imbalance in favor
of the Vietnam Veterans.
As mentioned, most of the positive coverage of the
Veterans was ^*direct.'» The "direct'^ coverage consisted
basically of the following:
April 19, 1971
1 ) Dem,onstration at Arlington National
Cem^etery
2) Direct statem.ent by John Kerry
April 20, 1971
1 ) Demonstration at Capitol
2) Demonstration at Arlington National
Cem^etery
April 21 , 1971
1 ) Demonstration at Pentagon
April 22, 1971
1) Direct testimony by John Kerry in front
of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2) Demonstration in front of Capitol;
Veterans turned in the m.edals they had
won
As evident, the Veterans were pretty much able to
express themselves on television the way they wanted. They
were able to obtain "political visibility" on their own
terms for a period of five days. V/hether or not they were
''newsworthy" for these five days is imjnaterial , since CBS'
extensive coverage of their events or pseudo-events made
them "newsworthy.'^ And, as might be expected, the Veterans
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actively'' contributed to their own '*nev;sworthiness" by '*per-
forming" within the action-oriented criteria of television.
They also, most likely, furnished the networks with sche-
dules of each day's events.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This chapter will review and discuss the findings and
patterns of coverage revealed in this study. It will also
discuss the nature of the concept of bias.
Quantitative Findings
1 ) CBS News covered many news stories superficially rather
than emphasizing depth of coverage.
The average broadcast had 27.35 news stories. A
high number of these (75.6lf.) were Events-bulletin or
announcem.ent-type news stories read by Cronkite. Often,
they were not more than five to ten sentences long. For
every one Report, which is a short-indepth analysis or
description, there were three Events.
2) CBS News basically presented political news.
Almost 7Wfy of the news stories on an average broad-
cast dealt with governmental action or other matters of
a political nature. Many of these, though, were primarily
bulletins or announcem.ents
,
since, as discussed above,
over 75'^! of all news stories were Events. Specifically,
over half (55"^^ of the total news stories were Political-
Events ,
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) CBS Nev/s, as would be expected, primarily dealt with
news within the United States.
Almost l^lo of the total news stories fell within
this category. The standard news story on CBS, therefore
was an Event which dealt with governmental or political
matters occurring within the United States. Over 35f. of
all news stories were of this type.
) Political news within the United States was dominated
by coverage of the three branches of the national govern-
ment.
These three branches, the "Institutions'* category
accounted for almost 6?^' of the political news stories
occurring within the United States. In ff^ct, coverage
of the three branches constituted almost 33^ of the total
news stories. Therefore, political news within the United
States was primarily "national'* political news.
) The Executive branch dominated coverage of the national
government
•
On CBS News, Congress and the Courts were left far
behind in the cojnpetition for "political visibility."
The Executive branch accounted for almost 63fi of the nevjs
stories involving the three branches of the national
government. This total, in f^ct, constituted slightly over
20^ of the totpl number of news stories during this period.
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6) Coverage of the Executive branch involved much more than
just coverage of President Tixon and his Administration.
The federal bureaucracy accounted for over 46^ of
the news stories of the Executive branch. This vvould
include coverage of the departments and executive agen-
cies. But, coverage of the bureaucracy consisted pri-
marily of bulletins and announcem.ents . Almost ^k'fo of
the news stories involving the bureaucracy were Events.
7) The Senate dominated coverage of Congress.
It has been documented that on CBS the three branches
of government were not equal. V/ithin Congress, on CBS,
the two houses were not equal. The Senate itself accounted
for slightly over 67% of the congressional news stories.
On CBS coverage of Congress was primarily coverage of the
Senate. The Senate and Senators were, by far, the r:Ost
visible. In addition, individual Senators were m.uch more
visible since there are fewer Senators than Representatives.
Thus, Senators had a much greater potential for visibility
than did Representatives.
V7ithin the "U.S. -International" category coverage of two
countries, the United States and Indochina, primarily
dominated.
This was to be expected, given the nature and extent
of the '''ar. The United States and Indochina personally ac-
counted for almost 80^ of the "U.S. -International news
stories
.
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9) The United States involvement in the Indochina V.'ar and
the War itself constituted the biggest Policy-Issue.
This also was to be expected—given the depth of
the involvement of the United States.
10) Within the
-U.S.
-Domestic- category, Political and
Social Policy-Issues dominated.
These two Policy-Issues accounted for over L6% of
the political news stories occurring within the United
States. The
-Indochina- Policy-Issue involved almost I6f^
of the -U.S.
-Domestic- news stories. Thus, three Policy-
Issues,
-Political,-
-Social,- and
-Indochina,- constituted
almost 62% of the political news stories occurring within
the United States.
11) Within the -U.S.
-Domestic" category, the dominant
"Political Actor- for each Policy-Issue was the -Insti-
tutions-—the three branches of the national government.
This was consistent with all the Policy-Issues. This
ranged from a high with -Military- policy—where almost
^3^^ of the news stories involved the three branches to
a low with -Political- Policy-Issues where alm.ost 52^. of
the news stories involved the three branches.
12) Within the three branches of the national government,
the **Political" and -Social" Policy-Issues dominated.
These two Policy-Issues accounted for slightly over
42*^ of the news stories of the three branches
o
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TVhile there were many other findings, these v/ere the
most important and most significant findings of the quanti-
tative analysis. The results of the qualitative analysis
discussed next, will present some of the various patterns
of coverage which could be explicated from C3S' coverage of
the subject areas analyzed. The following examples, therefore,
are meant to illustrate some of the patterns and journalistic
characteristics prevalent in C3S» coverage during this period.
Obviously, these patterns have been selected to illustrate
various points. They were not necessarily present in all
the subject areas analyzed in this study. They were frequent
enough, however, to be justified for inclusion in this sec-
tion. And, their inclusion does not necessarily mean that
they were only found in the coverage which was qualitatively
analyzed.
Qualitative Findings
1 ) Inaccurate Reflection of Reality
The analysis of the Vietnam Battle Deaths was one
illustration of this pattern. After accounting for
periods of heavy concentrations of battle deaths, it was
evident that the "nightly'- coverage of battle deaths
portrayed the United States as experiencing the highest
percentage of battle deaths while on the "weekly'* reports,
the United States suffered the fewest battle deaths.
Another exam.ple involved the Reaction to the Conviction
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of Lt. Galley. This involved a huge, nation-vvide mass
reaction in opposition to the conviction. The masses
involved in this reaction, however, received very little
coverage—especially in proportion to their size. V^as
this ninirr.al coverage an accurate reflection of the
existing reality at that tiir.e? A similar example is pro-
vided by the coverage of Support and Opposition towards
the Vietnam War. In coverage of non-governmental opin-
ion, CBS gave exposure to primarily only one entity—
the anti-war segment. Mass opinion supporting the
President's policy in Vietnam was not really given ex-
posure. In the competition for 'Apolitical visibility^' mass
support for the President's Vietnam policy never had a
chance. V.Tiere was the "pro"-war mass opinion? In neglecting
this segment, was CBS reflecting reality? Another ex-
ample of a specific nature involved CBS' coverage of 1971
Memorial Day activities. Fifty percent of that coverage
involved an anti-war parade in Madison, V'isconsin. Did
this proportion of coverag3 reflect the existing reality
that day?
) Ouantitatively Unbalanced Coverage
There were various examples of this pattern where
coverage of one side of opinion vastly outnumbered the
coverage given to the other side. The coverage of the
Son Tay Prison Raid contained unbalanced coverage in favor
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of the Press illustrated a vast Quantitative ir.balance
in favor of the
-pro-press- position. The coverage of
the reaction to the conviction of Lt. Galley and the
Vietnam Veterans Against the War Demonstration both
contained imbalances-in favor of the subject of the
analysis.
The coverage of Campaign '70 contained many im-
balances. Some of these favored the Republican point
of view-especially the coverage of Nixon and Agnew.
Other coverage favored the Democratic point of view.
Also, coverage of individual campaigns illustrated
imbalance. This was evident in the following campaigns:
New York Senate, Mew York Governor, Tennessee Senate,
California Senate, Connecticut Senate and Florida Senate/
Governor. Not all of these imbalances go in the sam.e
direction. Since these imbalances involve different
races, each one should be considered an example of
imbalance rather than computing the total distribution
of opinion and basing a judgment on that total amount.
Qualitatively Unbalanced Coverage
In addition to having a numerical superiority of
one point of view, it was also possible to have other
qualitative advantages—such as a favorable imbalance
in '"direct'* or on-canera coverage. The ''pro-press'*
opinion in the coverage of the Ervin subcommittee
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illustrated this. Almost 67^3 of the "pro-press"
opinion in the coverage of the Ervin subcomir.ittee ivas
"direct" while a little under 2n of the opposite opinion
was "direct." The coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid
was sirrilar. Here, opinion supporting the raid was
slightly over 70^. "direct" while opinion opposing the
raid was a little over 45?^"direct ." In both these ex-
amples, the opinion which experienced the quantitative
advantage also enjoyed an advantage in the qualitative
or "direct" coverage. It was often found that opinion
which did have a numerical superiority also had a quali-
tative advantage. The coverage of Campaign '70 presents
another example. President Nixon received 1) extensive
coverage in his campaigning role and 2) coverage that,
because he had no "opponent", was prim.arily (81.91^)
positive. A similar example is provided by the coverage
of the Vietnam Veterans Demonstration. The anti-war
Veterans received 1 ) excessive coverage
—
given their
size, 2) coverage that was not "balanced" by opposite
opinion and 3) coverage that was primarily "direct"
which allowed the Veterans m.any opportunities to
communicate their message to the television audience.
Dominance of the Executive Branch
This pattern was illustrated in three different
analyses. One example was found in the coverage of
support and opposition towards the Vietnam War. Here,
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opinion which supported the current policy in Vietnam
primarily came from the Executive branch. A second
example, which has already been discussed, was the
extensive coverage given to Nixon and Agnew during
the 1970 campaign. The coverage of the Son Tay Prison
Raid could be considered a third example since support
for the raid basically came from the President and the
Pentagon,
Balancing Unequals
It is imperative to realize that '^balancing'* in-
volves much more than relatively equal amounts of words.
To have a real "balance'* the balance itself should in-
volve equal entities. One example where this pattern of
balancing unequals was prevalent was the coverage of
Support and Opposition Towards The Vietnam V/ar. Here,
as previously discussed, the total distribution of
opinion was relatively equal. However, this coverage
was not *^equal'* since it did not really incorporate a
significant body of opinion—m.ass opinion which supported
the war.
The coverage of the reaction to the conviction of
Lt. Galley was similar since CBS attempted to '^balance'*
the mass opinion which opposed the conviction with
"elite" opinion, such as Telford Taylor and Major Brown,
which supported the conviction. A specific example of
this pattern was provided by CBS coverage of an "environ-
mental battle'* over the aerial spraying of mirex to kill
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fire ants (V12/'71, pa^es 12-14). The spraying was
supported by the Department of ^Sgriculture and opposed
by environmentalists. But, CBS did not include the
Department of Agriculture as a source of opinion. The
only real source presented in support of the spraying
was a farmer, P. vr, Thompson, who demonstrated what the
fire ants looked like. Farm.er Thompson was "balanced"
against 1) Lee Rogers, a conservationist with the
Environment.nl Defense Fund and 2) Dr. F. S. Arant who
had served on a National Academy of Sciences Committee-
relevant to this. Obviously, the anti-spraying opinion
surpassed that of Farmer Thompson in both legitimacy
and stature. Equal sophisticated opinion from the
Department of Agriculture would have helped, but CBS
chose not to present it.
Seeking Out Opinion
Both the coverage of the reaction to Galley's con-
viction and the supnort and opposition tovjards the
Vietnam War illustrated CBS' tendency to actively seek
out certain types of opinion. Specific examples would
be the inclusion of interviews with Ilajor Brown and
Telford Taylor (both in support of Calley's conviction)
and Clark Clifford (who opposed the War). CBS, however,
was not always consistent in this practice of seeking
out opinion. For exam.ple , in the coverage of both the
Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration and the Ervin Sub-
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cormnittee on Freedom of the Press, CBS did not "balance'^
the prevailing opinion with interviews representing the
opposite opinion. Based on these four examples, it does
seem that CBS v/ill not actively seek out all opinion,
but will seek out certain opinion. Here, CBS sought out
opinion which was critical of 1 ) the reaction against the
conviction of Galley and 2) the Vietnam V7ar. It did not
seek out opinion critical of 1 ) the Vietnam Veterans
Against the V/ar Demonstration or their views or 2) the
''pro-press'* opinion being articulated before the Ervin
Subcommittee
.
Creating or Determining Issues
The analyses in this study documented two good
.examples of the ability and capacity of a reporter to
help create an issue by giving it notice and attention.
The coverage of Campaign '70 contained references by
Cronkite to the economy as being the important issue.
The analysis of the Son Tay Prison Raid discussed hov;
Cronkite, on three different occasions, defined the
''big question.'* Though these examples are limited, it
is interesting that both of these issues or questions,
as defined by CBS, were negative towards the Nixon
Administration. Since the econom.y in 1970 was having
problems, it would not be good for the Administrntion-
supported candidates to have the econom.y as the ''major"
issue. And, as discussed in previous sections, the
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^'big Questions'* cited by Cronkite v;ere all negative
towards the raid or its possible effects.
Absence of Issues in Campaign Reporting
This was illustrated by the analysis of coverage
of Campaign '70. The coverage primarily dealt with the
campaign style of the candidates and predictions of who
was going to win. This coverage, by necessity, has to
be superficial. But, it was m.ade even more superficial
by not including coverage of the major issues or con-
cerns of the campaigns.
Institutional Bias
Institutional bias is a form of bias which is a
product of both the unique nature of television itself
and some of the norm.s of television news. Television
news seem.s to place great emphasis on visual and action-
oriented behavior which can be captured by television
camera. This means that certain types of behavior, such
as organized or group behavior, are more "televisable .'*
A comparison between two different expressions of opinion,
the reaction to Calley's conviction and the Vietnam
Veterans' Anti-war Demonstration, illustrates the nature
of this bias. The mass reaction to Calley's conviction
involving many thousands of people did not receive the
same degree or quality/ of coverage as the Vietnam Vet-
erans because either 1 ) CBS was. in supnort of the con-
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viction and/or 2) the mass reaction was neither orfianized
nor visual and thus v;as not "televisable'* or conducive
to coverage. In comparing the size of both groups it is
obvious that something is being distorted when the smaller
of the two groups receives superior quantitative and
qualitative coverage, while the larger group received
very little coverage relative to both its size and the
coverage received by the Veterans' Demonstration. This,
in part, would seem to indicate that to receive coverage,
one must be organized and be active.
Subjective Role of the Reporter
Reporters are not necessarily neutral. They, them-
selves, can be actual sources of opinion or can assum.e
roles which are not neutral, V.Hiile, by necessity, much
of journalism incorporates professional interpretation,
there is a significant difference between professional
interpretation and plain old subjectivity on the part of
the reporter. Dan Rather' s remarks, as previously dis-
cussed, during the Marine cerem.ony seem to illustrate
the latter. The same is true of Cronkite's ''big questions"
during the coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid. Another
example found in the same coverage would be the des-
criptions of the award ceremonies as "unusual. The
coverage of Campaign '70, "explaining" what Speaker
McCormack and George Meany "really" meant are other
examples. The following examples provide further ex-
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amples of the line between interpretation and subjec-
tivity being crossed.
These briefings have now become part of the normal
orchestration of diplom.atic policy, the impression
of big things happening.
—Kalb, (10/7/70, page U)
But the unwritten rule on membershiD annlications
of^almost every craft union seems to be^ if not for
wnites only, for whites mostly.
—From.son, (10/13/70, page 1/,)
Not everyone would agree that this President is
that^well informed. In fact, critics charge that
President Nixon is even m.ore isolated than some
of his predecessors. But, if that charge is true,it certainly would not appear to be the fault of
the President's own private news organization.
—Pierpoint, (12/7/70, page 17)
New ?Texico's Governor David Cargo is an exDert with
snowmobiles. He says you can get rid of frustrations
by riding them, the frustrations any governor has
when his party is the party in power in Vfashington,
and the economy is sagging so badly.
--Drinkwater, (12/14/70, page 10)
Mrs. MacDaniel, would you like to see anything
different being done to help get the prisoners
back?
—Joe Krebbs, (1/21/71, page IS)
. • .even in its original form, it is heavy on
philosophy and background, short on specifics.
Besides the hints without details of a new China
policy, the President speaks of a new Latin Ameri-
can policy, but he doesn't sav what it is.
--Rather, (2/25/71, pages 10-11)
Do police have the right to raid newspaper offices
in the dark of night and ranst^ck reporters' files
in search of evidence? 'Jith our Bill of Rights
guaranteeing freedom of the press, this sounds like
a question for sor.e remote totalitarian state. But,
it's a live issue now on the campus of Stanford
University. . . —Cronkite, (4/13/71, page 8)
. .
.It remains a popular theory around Washington,
however, that President Tixon may have privately
orchestrated the Vice-President's statements as a
way of Quieting the fears of conservative hard
liners on China within the Reoublican Party.
—Rather, (4/21/71, page 4)
305
In^ fl^'fS^'^^''^
responded with the kind of snee-h heand Alabama Governor
-allace ,P-ave often in'tb; 1Q68campaign I^t. Mixon charged that some peoDlel-
unidentified, but presumably including oth-r poli-
le'nlhlrtLT '^J'^ ^^^^^ promised lawmen that they could count on him.
—Rather, (6/30/71, page 10)
With the economy shaping up as a m.a.lor presidentialissue next year.
. . —Cronkite, (8/6/71, page 2)
Xp'r
'^^^candidates' platforms are truly tailored to
offer^what the voters want, then the m.essage to readm this campaign is that the Vietnam.ese people wantpeace, now or at least very soon. .
.
—Dunning, (8/24/71, page 11)
Mr. Agnew now says he is probably closer than ev^r tothe President, and that his relationship with him
more closely resem.bles the one between Eisenhower and
^ixon.^ Obviously, the Vice-President did not have in
mind Eisenhower's famous answer when asked \vhich ofNixon's ideas had become policy: '»If you give me a
week, I might think of one,'^ said Ike. I lust don't
remem.ber.
—Mudd, (8/25/71"; page 6)
I get a feeling that somebody's trying to cover up
something. How can I escape that conclusion?
. . .1 can't escape that there is a credibility gap.
—Schakne, (9/15/71, page 5)
V/hat do you think of Governor Kirk, Senator?
—r^udd, (10/27/70, page H)
The peace army tried to do that today, but it failed.
Vfashington faltered, but it was not shut down, perhaps
because the peace army lacked the organization.
. .
So the peace army changed tactics, burned guerrillas,
hit and run raids.
. . —Morton, (5/3/71, page 2)
These exam.ples,' purposely chosen to illustrate subjectivity,
are limited but they do seem to represent certain aspects
of CBS' coverage. It should be remembered that news-
casters and reporters can be im.portant sources of opinion.
) Coverage of a Nonentity
This pattern was exemplified in the coverage of
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Vietnam Support and Ooposition. There were occasions,
such as the Debra Sweet episode or the V/est Point gradu-
ate who applied for C. 0. status, when CBS seemed to
really extend itself to give coverage to anti-war opinion.
Another example, not included in the analysis, was the
coverage CBS gave to five soldiers in Vietnam who re-
fused an, order to go on patrol. At this time, there
were 205,000 troops in Vietnam. (10/15/71, page 9)
CBS had three different stories on the five soldiers
who refused the order. (10/11/71, page 5; 10/12/71, page
11; 10/13/71, page S) Was this an example of journalism's
preoccupation with the unusual? Or was it an example
of giving coverage to anti-war opinion?
From this analysis it is obvious that there is a
definite pattern to CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite,
An interesting concern is the degree to which CBS approxi-
mates the evening news of the other two major networks.
It is quite possible that com.parative analysis of the net-
work's evening news would demonstrate a very close simi-
larity between their content and patterns of coverage. It
can be argued, for reasons which will be discussed, that
the view of the world presented by each of the three net-
works is relatively the same.
\\Tiile this similarity has not been documented over
an extended neriod , two arguments can be made in support
of the argument that the patterns of coverage, no matter
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which netvvork, are basically the sar.e—though individual
biases may differ. First, a superficial viev;ing of the
three networks does indicate that they are relatively
similar. Second, all three of the networks have to react
to the same basic ^'realities'^ which can function as a
theoretical framework since they both limit and orient
the nature of television journalism. Because of these
''realities,'* it is argued, television news will be very
similar. These realities'* include both values and physical
and technological considerations.
One basic "reality" of television network news is that
the networks have limited resources. This, in turn, limits
what they can cover. With their flexibility of coverage
limited, it stands to reason that the networks would tend
to have a consensus as to what is and what is not important.
Limited resources obviously mean more concentration on ''hard'*
news and less concentration on peripheral news. Limited re-
sources would mean less discretion and more reaction to de-
veloping events.
A m:anifestation of the limited resources is that most
newsgathering facilities and, therefore
,
coverage is con-
centrated in two cities—^^ew York and VJashington. Of the tv/o,
Washington is the more important and does have the higher con-
centration of coverage, ^^-ith all three networks concentrating
their newsgathering resources in -.'Washington, it is aDparent
that there is going to be much overlapping and similar cover-
age.
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Also, in V'ashington, the networks have a tendency to
allocate their nevvsgathering resources in the sane strategic
places. While they primarily center on the '',^ite House and
other elements of the Executive branch, the Capitol, and the
Supreme Court, also receive oermanent coverage. Because of
this, much of the networks' V/ashington "news" is going to be
similar. It will also be similar since most coverage will
be directed to the President—who is the action-element of
the national government. And, there seems to be a certain
logic which will dictate similarity of coverage. This is
simply the logic that since areas in V/ashington are per-
manently covered these must be areas which produce "news."
Therefore, "news" in 'Washington may be a product of where
the correspondents are. The Washington news of all three
networks will be similar since they have their permanent
correspondents in the same places. Thus, coverage, especially
in Vfashington, can be a function of resources.
Another "reality'' which helps to explain the relative
similarity of all three networks involves the degree to which
the networks react to each other and to the major sources of
the attentive public—the ^^ew York Times and the Washington
Post
.
The networks do monitor each other's evening news
programs. Thus, each network can be influenced by what the
other networks are covering and emphasizing. The networks
can also be influenced by the Times and the Post--v/hich are
the two m.ost influential newspapers in the country. The point
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is th.^t all three networks, like most informed opinion in
V^ashinpton, are influenced by the same sources of information,
Another 'Reality'' concerns journalistic preoccupation.
Many times the networks ivill react to and concentrate on
som.e phenomenon with a high degree of intensity for a short
period of time. Some of this involves important news such
as rixon's resignation. Other times, this preoccupation
will involve such things as Patricia Hearst or Clifford
Irving. And, sometimes there will be a mutual preoccupation
where both the network news and certain political actors
will key on and react to, the other. This seemed to be
happening during the ^^ixon Administration when press re-
lations were so adverse and intense. Each party was re-
acting to the other which would create more ''news'*—which
would precipitate more reactions.
Journalistic values and technology are other fac-
tors which contribute to the similarity of the three net-
works. Television is a visual medium. Therefore, there
will be an em.phasis on action and that which is '^elevisable .""
This, of course, was very true during the 1960^s—with the
emphasis on demonstrations and other forms of overt behavior.
Also, the network news is only about twenty-three minutes
of actual news. Thus, each program has to be selective.
The m.ore selective the producers are, the greater the chance
of similarity and overlapping—especially since their viev;
of the v;orld would be relatively similar due to the influence
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of journalistic values on corrjnon perceptions of the role of
journalism. Another source of similarity would involve one
form of newsgathering common to all three networks. This is
simply "news by handout" which involves reading announcenents
which have been handed out by the various departments and
agencies of the Executive branch such as the Departm.ent of
State, Department of Defense or the Federal Trade Commission
or ^ood and Drug Administration. All three networks do
devote considerable tim.e to these announcements. Similiarly,
when a major political actor issues a press release or state-
ment in most cases it will be covered by all three networks.
These, then, are some of the factors which function to
explain why there potentially would be great sim.ilarity
between the three major networks' news programs. It does
appear that the news programs are relatively similar
—
especially in the area of political coverage. V.Tiile this
paper argues that com.parative research would document this
similarity, it should be noted that there is still a vital
need for comparative content analysis covering the three
networks over an extended period of time. The differences
may be smiall, but they should be documented.
The patterns of coverage presented in this section
were mieant to provide illustrations of some of the types of
coverage prevalent in CBS News with V/alter Cronkite. It
should be obvious that these patterns of coverage and ex-
amples seem to document journalism which at best can be
termed "non-neutral.'* Does this mean that CBS News is biased?
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Before answering that question, it is imperative to examine
some of the problems inherent in the concept of bias.
Any definition of bias, itself, is going to be non-
neutral. It may be, in the final analysis, best to para-
phrase Justice Stewart's thoughts on pornography and in-
corporate them into the concept of bias: "I can't define
bias, but I know it when I see it." Or, another adage, with
perhaps more fact than fiction, m.ay provide a clue: "Bias
is in the eye of the beholder." This latter thought may be
an important one since it can be argued that there are two
dimensions of bias. One is bias which is documented by
scholarly analysis. The other is bias which is perceived
by the average viewer. This latter process seems to be
more important—especially in consideration of one of the
basic concerns of this type of study—the effects of tele-
vision on public opinion and political behavior.
Still, it is important to discuss some of the conceptual
problems of bias. Most conceptions of bias inherently begin
with some notion of "balance" or miatherr.atical equality. And,
this is what the Equal Tim.e Provision of the FCC Fairness
Doctrine is all about. .As documented in this study, there
were instances where CBS did achieve a mathem.atical balance
and instances where it did not. Hov/ever, it is important to
realize that there is m.ore to bias than "balance," and th^t
there is m.ore to "balance" than r.ere mathematical equality.
The following discussion will expand on this.
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It should, fron the very befinning, be realized thnt
television news, almost by definition, is biased, if bias
is defined as a misrepresentation or distortion of reality.
CRS Mews, and the other network news prof:rams
, have about
twenty-three minutes of actual news. Therefore, three things
are happening. One, the
-view" of reality has to be a selec-
tive one where the selection is dictated by a relatively small,
perhaps philosophically culture-bound, decision-making pro-
cess. Two, this selective
-view^' of the world is not, and
cannot be, a mirror reflection of reality. Three, this
'view" of reality is a superficial one which may function
to distort since it will reduce complexities to concrete
generalities; thus, reinforcing prejudices rather than pro-
moting understanding.
It can be argued then that to present a selective 'View'*
of reality is to present a distorted "view" of reality. This
may be belaboring the obvious, but it does raise important
questions concerning the forms of information which are pre-
sented on televisionnews
. For example, who selects what will
be shown? V/hat are the values of those who select what will
be shown? V/ould different values produce different content?
lA/hat are the effects of this selective view of reality?
Consider CBS^ coverage of the Support and Opposition Towards
the Vietnam V/ar. This study suggests that CBS, in the selec-
tive view of reality, om.itted a substantial segment of opinion—
ss opinion which supported the war. \'!ho made this decision?ma
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V/hy was it made? V/as it an error of commission or omission?
V/hat were the effects of this coverage on public opinion?
During the turbulent 1960's, the television view of youth
was primarily only liberal college youth attempting to
change the system—even though non-college youth outnumbered
those in college. \'/hat were the effects of this selective
view of youth? The same points can be made in respect to
the television portrait of Blacks during the 1960's. There-
fore, to say that television news is selective should only
be the beginning of im.portant questions relevant to the
nature of the content—and its effects.
In its analysis of the content, this study has dis-
cussed two forms of bias. Other forms can also be detected.
The two forms of bias already discussed are ideological and
institutional bias. The former involves an imbalance of one
political or ideological point of view. The coverage of the
Ervin Subcom.inittee on Freedom of the Press illustrated this
form of bias. The second form, institutional bias, involved
such things as 1) the limits of television coverage, 2) the
philosophy of television news toward action and events which
are visible and '^televisable." The comparison between the
reaction to It. Calley^s conviction and the Vietnam Veterans'
demonstration, which has been discussed, illustrated the
nature of institutional bias.
Other forms of bias deserve discussion. The very nature
of news stories, though presented in a balanced manner,
cr.n
3U
constitute a form of bias. For example, if CHS v;ere to do
a series on political corruption involving; only Democratic
candidates, it could be argued that this does constitute a
form of bias, even though the coverage itself might be bal-
anced, since there was no coverage of corruption among
Republican candidates. Therefore, the nature of news stories,
especially in a series or taken as a group, can, irrespective
of internal balance, reflect a form of bias.
Balance, therefore, cannot always be the primary deter-
minant of bias. Other examples will further illustrate this.
Coverage of an issue or controversy can be "balanced,^' but
the reporter can be either objective or subjective. As
previously discussed, newscasters and reporters are sources
of opinion and also have the capacity to raise issues—or
questions—and place the story, or aspects of it, within a
certain context. Also, the type or quality of coverage is
something that exists relatively independent ofbalance.
For example, coverage of opinion can be "direct'* or ^'indirect.'
Direct coverage is important as illustrated by the coverage
of the Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration. Direct coverage, in
some instances, especially if it involves som:ething dram-
atic, may be more advantageous than ''indirect" coverage in-
volving a favorable imbalance. And, "balance"' is not always
contin.^ent by an equal distribution of opinion, since the
sources of opinion, themselves, are not always equal in
stature, prestige, reputation or sophistication. This,
until recent events, was especially true with opinion sources
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competing against the President who, because of both the
aura of the office and his access to vital information, has
at his disposal built-in credibility of various sym.bols in-
herent in the office of the Presidency vvhich competing
sources of opinion cannot m.atch. Sources of opinion,
therefore, are not always equal.
And, what exactly is "balanced''? V/hat is it relative
to? Should each presentation of an issue or controversy
contain an approximate 50-50 division of opinion? Or,
should the balance of opinion be relative to the strength
or composition of each side or position? Suppose an im-
portant bill has just been defeated by a 75-25 vote in the
Senate, Should the distribution of opinion on the subse-
quent news story reflect this ratio? Or, should it try to
approximate the 50-50 criterion of balance? Also, consider
the problem of the active expression of opinion through
group expression. Should this be "balanced" afainst com-
peting opinion even though that opinion is not actively
expressing itself? And, what if the group expression or
demonstration of opinion represents a very minority segmient
of opinion? Constant coverage of minority opinion, no
matter how it is expressed, soon merges into a distortion of
reality. To what extent should television artificially
^balance" group opinion by seeking out opposite opinion?
Remember that CBS did try to "balance" the expression of
pro-Calley oninion, but it did not ^'balance" the expression
of anti-v;ar opinion by the Vietnam. Veterans Against the I'.'ar,
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Another nroblen inherent in the concept of balance
concerns the natural dominance of policy-r.akers
,
esT^ecially
the ^resident. Because they make policy, they have natural
access to television. Should policy-makers, especially those
elected by the people, have unfiltered or uncontested access
to television? Or, should their announcements and justifi-
cations of policy-decisions be automiatically "balanced" by
evaluations of that policy? An apnropriate answer to this
question, of course, would be contingent upon whether or not
one's political favorites were in or out of office. Also,
it should be remembered that there is an automiatic imbalance
here since it is one thing to actually make policy and an-
other thing to be relegated to the role of evaluating policy.
A related problem of balance involves the visibility
of certain policy-makers even in non-policy roles. This
visibility, whether involving the President or any incum.bent,
is im.Dortant and non-neutral for three im.Dortant reasons.
One, visibility through the m.edium of television is an
extension of "seeing is believing" and, therefore, in most
cases, can have the important effect of solidifying or in-
creasing credibility. Two, visibility enhances the recog-
nition factor which, of course, is politically im.portant.
Three, visibility can also "humanize" political leaders--
which may have important payoffs in enhanced credibility,
better recognition and increased supnort.
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It ray be argued, though perhaps cynically, that this
latter factor was an important motivating factor, if not
the motivating factor, in President Nixon's decision to let
the networks televise his farewell speech to the Vfhite House
staff on the day of his resignation. This farewell speech
was not directed to the public. Or, was it? As remembered,
the farewell speech in front of the staff was one of genuine
sadness irrespective of the degree to which the circumstances
were self-imiposed. Also, remember that President Nixon had,
as we learned in television's rediscovery of I^iddle America,
little support in the country, yet he emerged from, the re-
signation x-dth a high degree of support against further
prosecution. The point is that the coverage of Nixon in the
context of the farewell speech to his staff undoubtedly
helped to create com.passion and sympathy for him., which
would be an important commodity in subsequent decisions
affecting prosecution. It is quite possible that further
prosecution vjill, to an important extent, be related to the
national mood. President Nixon was not unaware of this
—
and the televising of his farewell speech helped to formu-
late opinion xvhich could quite possibly work to his benefit.
In most cases, television ''hurianizes . " This is im-
portant since we all see into people what we want to see.
Television m.akes this process much easier. Visibility,
through the medium of television, is not neutral and any
discussion of bias and balance m.ust keep this in mind.
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The above discussion should function to demonstrate
sone of the complexities involved in trying to operational-
ize the concept of bias. Based on this discussion, it can
be argued that it would be more appropriate to understand
"bias/* not as a single entity, but as a plural one. Per-
haps, the concept should be changed to '^biases," since there
is not just one form of bias, but many. Therefore, any
assertion that television news is '^biased" should be followed
by the question: '^'/hat form of bias do you mean?"
This question should also be applied to the following
discussion. V/as CBS Tews with V7alter Cronkite "biased"?
Based on the results of the seven different subject areas
analyzed in this study, it would appear that CBS News did
contain many '^biases" in its coverage of the areas studied
during the period of analysis. This conclusion seems in-
escapable after reviewing the results documented in this
study. But, two important points should be made. One is
that this conclusion involves only one aspect of CBS News
—
those subjects which were analyzed, plus the quantitative
analysis. Two, the biases docum.ented in this study are not
all consistent. They do not always ''flow" in the same direc-
tion. Some flow "liberally;" sor.e do not. For example, the
coverage of the Son Tay Raid and the extensive coverage of
President Nixon^s role in Cam.paign '70 contain "biases" which
were quantitatively and qualitatively "pro-Administration"
in nature. Also, som.e of the coverage of the individual
319
races of CamDaicrn '70 favored Administration-supported
candidates. On the other hand, some of the coverage, as
documented, favored anti-Administration positions, opinions,
and causes. Examples of this would be the coverage of the
Ervin Subcommittee, the Vietnam Veterans Against The V^ar
Demonstration and portions of the Support and Opposition of
the Vietnam V/ar. And, as discussed, there were other biases
present in CBS' coverage.
As it should be clear by now, bias is relative. This
is true of the ''biases" found in CBS Evening Mews V/ith
Walter Cronkite. The documentation of these "biases" is
important because it helps to answer the major question of
this research: '^iThat kinds of information are being pre-
sented?" Thus, the discovery of biases'* should be integrated
with the other findings of this study to give a more accurate
picture of the nature of the content and the kinds of in-
formation which are presented.
Even though this study has only analyzed one network
over a certain period, it has helped to answer questions
relevant to content and kinds of information which are
presented. The answers provided here, however, are only a
preliminary to the more significant questions concerning the
effects of television on public opinion and political be-
havior, Subseouent research in the area of effects will
have to integrate the results of studies such as this with
investigation into audience perceptions, attitudes, and
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behavior. This study has, in a limited v;ay, documented
the nature of the m.essage. The reception, internalization,
and subseouent political effects of that m.essage still
have to be exar.ined. This study, hopefully has provided
both a unique insight into television news and a found-
ation for subsequent research on the effects of television.
321
APPENDIX
RELIABILITY TEST OUESTIOm^AIRE
Directions: Read the rules for each subject before classi-
fying the paragraphs. Having read the rules,
simply read each paragraph and classify it
+
, 0, DK - according to the '*rules."
I. Reactions to the conviction of Lt. Galley.
+ = Any statement, opinion or behavior which
opposes the conviction of Lt. Galley,
Ex. '^I oppose the conviction.^
0 = Neutral.
- = An3^ statement, opinion or -behavior which
supports the conviction of Lt. Galley,
Ex. I support the conviction.'^
DK = Don't know.
1. George Latimer, his civilian lawyer, came out a few
minutes later and talked to reporters
o
LATIT'TER: I think it's a horrendous decision for the
United States of America, the United States Army,
and my client. (.97^)*
2, CRONKITE: f-ood evening. A nationwide protest,
taking many forms, is building up against the
conviction of Lieutenant '-^illiam Galley, for the
My Lai massacre. CBS NE\-JS has learned that the
X'Jhite House has been bombarded with telegrams at
the rate of 250 an hour since shortly after the
guilty verdict. (.40/0
3, r^DINA: The verdict that was brought out by the
jury was very harsh and very severe. I think we
were all surprised by that. At the time that I
heard the verdict over television at 4:30 yester-
day afternoon, my reaction was maybe a little bit
^
of bitterness. {.93;3)
^Indicates rate of agreemento
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SP/5 JOHN TREDANAY: Well I feel that it's wrong in
a sense, because they sent him out there to do-
te do a job, you know; he was sent out there by
Medina to do a job, that particular purpose. And
I don't understand why the Army would send some-body out there to do something like that and then
turn around and prosecute him for it, {,97%)
SP/ MICHAEL CLIIX'^OM: Well, I think it was very
unjust, and the man was just doing his job, and
it's—that's what we're over here for, and it
just seems very unfair that he'd have to get that
kind of a penalty for doing what he thought was
right. {.93%)
FIP.ST LTETTTENAMT TOM SHUGRIJE: I feel the con-
viction was just. You know, I can't—I can't see
any m,an using those types of actions, you know,
actually killing civilians like that, lining them
up together and giving the order, coning back again
and demonstrating himself what he needed—what he
wanted done, as far as murder. (.93^)
CRONKITE: In angry House speeches today, a half-
dozen J^outhern Congressmen challenged the convic-
tion and appealed to President Nixon to intervene.
{.53%)
The objection to the verdict also took other forms.
The Illinois legislature considered a resolution
urging the President to grant clemency, and the
Alabama legislature will take up a similar measure
tomorrow. The five members of the Athens, Georgia,
draft board said they are resigning because they
can no longer in good conscience send young men
into service. Radio stations in V/ilm.ington , North
Carolina, and Riverhead, New "^ork, stopped broad-
casting Army public service announcements. And the
American Legion in Columbus, Georgia, began a drive
for a 5100,000 apoeal fund for Galley and a ten-
million signature petition against the verdict .(. 73/3)
LA'^ir^R: Another one: "'^his verdict is the worst
injustice I know. We are sorry and angry with the
United States Government, who let this come to trial.
I feel cases like this have happened in every war.
It's sad that in this society this was brought to
trial. If I have my way, my son will never see the
service. I want no' hippie, but any time something
like this can hapoen, I want no part. I am sending
President "^ixon a letter to this effect. I wish I
could do more for you than say I'm sorry.'* (.»7rO
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10, CRONKTTK: The furor touched off by Galley's con-
viction continued unabated today. Thousands of
citizens made their objections known in a flood
of telegrarns to the \''h±te House, Congress, and
the Pentagon. Many demanded clemency. ( .yof?)
11, The ^/Tiite House said its telegrams v/ere running a
hundred-to-one in Galley's favor. The Army said
it had received several hundred telegrams—all
favoring Galley, (.73^)
12, CROMKITE: A rally in Golumbus
,
Georgia, last night,
organized on three hours' notice, mirrored the in-
tensity of the public support for Lieutenant Galley.
Phil Jones was there.
DEMONSTRATORS; Free Galley. Free Galley. Free
Galley. Free Galley.
JONES: A rally, for Galley, held in front of the
Columbus, Georgia, stadium. More than 500—old
men, young, women, children, and babies. They
all came out to show their support for Galley. ( ..^0^)
WOMAN: Damned if you do and damned if you don't.
It's not fair.
DEMONSTRATORS: Free Galley. Free Galley. Free
Galley.
13. JOl^TES: And while the rally for Galley was in
progress, downtown Columbus, hundreds of telegrams
were pouring into the ^.'estern Union office, most
all of them' protesting the conviction of Galley,
and promising their support. (.SOfO
14. GRONKITE: The sentence of life imorisonment instead
of death for Galley has had no measurable effect
in calming the public outrage. Pro-Galley rallies
continue. At least eight st^te legislatures have
received or will get resolutions seeking clemency.
At Fort Benning, Georgia, some of that public
anger is being turned toward the six officers who
decided Galley's fate, each of whom got a new,
unlisted telephone number during the night. (.67/5)
15. JO^^ES: Are vou worried now over the verdict?
It's over, technically, but the public reaction--
does it bother you any?
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MAJOR HAPA^Y G. BROV/N: It bothers ne from the
ThPv'r.^w?-^'' ^''^ ''''^ stopping; to think.ey e letting their emotions rule their mindsat this point. They haven't sat through fo-or
and a half months of trial, and heard the facts,
and been able to scrutinize the evidence as wehave. They feel morally that what we did is
wrong, but then when you look at the legal stand-point, were we wrong? ^^ere we wrong? ^ell
, thisIS, as I said before, I'll have to live with itthe rest of my life and for that reason alone,we—we gave Lieutenant Galley every benefit ofthe doubt.
^ gO^)
CROMITE: Criticism of the Galley verdict camefrom all parts of the political SDectrum, andfor varied reasons. For instance, Vice-President
Agnew has been quoted by the Chicago Tribune as
criticizing those who would make heroes of mili-
tary deserters and demand punishment of com.bat
soldiers who err. Although denying that he was
talking specifically about the Galley case, Agnew
called it oversimplification to believe that
persons involved in something such as My Lai
should be punished for a war^ crime, (.70^)
SECOMD MAN: He only did what he was told to do,
what he was asked to do, what he was trained to do,
and what millions of the rest of us did in V/orld
War One, Two, and the Korean War.
An example is a floor speech today by New York
Republican Senator Jacob Javits. If Americans
really believe that Galley did nothing wrong and
is indeed a hero, then, in Javits' words: '".v'e
have changed as a people during the course of this
tragic v/ar even more disastrously than I had
im.agined.^ And Illinois Democratic Senator Adlai
Stevenson III told a news conference that if Galley
murdered- v;omen and children, he m.ust pay the pen-
alty. Stevenson added, in these words: and so
must others, if their consciences—in their con-
sciences or in the courts. {
TAYLOR: I think to reject the guilty verdict en-
tirely would be a most unv;ise course of action.
I hope that won't hapoen. I think a reduction of
the degree of the offense, and a reduction of the
sentence, would be very much in order, and v/ere I
in the position of reviewing authority, I think
that's what I would do. But I '^ould onlv repeat
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that I think an acquittal here would be—wouldbe disastrous. One thing about it which I thinkpeoDle should keep in mind is that there \s nodenying that the laws of war were grossly violat'^dhere, ^.'^e have our own prisoners in the hands of^the rorth Vietnamese. \^!e have repeatedlv demandedthat they be treated in accordance with the GenevaConventions. V.Tiat is protecting those prisoners is
not a total but at least a partial observance ofthe--the rules of war to the extent, at least,
that they are not being killed, or at least some
of them are not being killed. (.77%)
20. In Daniels' words: "For this nation to condone
the acts of Lieutenant Galley is to make us nobetter than our enemies and to make any pleas
for the humane treatment of our prisoners meaning-
less. (J3^,)
I. Ervin Constitutional Rights Subcommittee: Hearings
on Freedom of the Press,
+ = Statemients or opinions which support "Freedom, of
the Press" and the press itself. And, statements
and opinions opposing any form of governmental
pressure on the press. Ex. "Nixon is out to
get the press."
0 = Neutral
- = Statements or opinions which argue that the Nixon
Administration is not pressuring the Dress and
that there is no threat to "freedori of the press."
Ex. "^fixon is not threatening the press."
DK = Don't know.
21. SENATOR S. ERVIN- Our founding fathers under-
stood that however incom.plete, unfair and even
vicious the press may be in its attacks upon
government and government officials, the press
cannot be censored or punished without under-
mining one of the cornerstones of free thought
and expression. {,&7fo)
22. NORFAN ISAACS, Editor in Residence at Columbia
University's School of Journalism., decried v;hat
he called persistent Administration pressure on
the press and its effect in eroding press forth-
rightness. (.90^)
326
I coTild use a less polite v;ord, Mr. Chairman.
I could say the press was lied to, which it
was. I can only consider this another broad-
side fron an Administration determined tolower the public regard for the press, and to
seek to create a public mood by which the news
media can be forced into a subservient role.(.97f0
Later, Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler
said the Vice President has every right to ex-
press himself, that the Administration is not trying
to intimidate the press, and that the press is too
sensitive to receiving the kind of criticism it
likes to hand out. (.Syfo)
Representative Ogden Reid, former president of
the rew York Herald Tribune, said the press is now
under the most serious atLack in its history. He
proposed legislation to restrain government control
over broadcast news, plus a law to protect all
newsmen from subpoenas of their notes and confi-
dential sources.
The least that must be done, therefore—and really,
it's only a minim.al rem.edy—is to legislate assurances
that no restrictive laws or government decrees in-
terfere with broadcast journalism's full exercise
of those freedoms of press and speech guaranteed
by the First Am.endment. ' ( .97^)
Well, there's no reason at all that the press
should not be criticized, that broadcasting should
not be criticized. But, sir, v/hen a high official
of government, that holds the power to appoint
the Federal Communications Commission, says that
unless we put our house in order, that the broad-
cast medium must be exam.ined, when another high
official says that unless we put our house in
order we must be called to account—account to
whom, is the suggestion—and must be brought down
from our ivory tov.-er, by whom? Under what circum-
stances? That—that to m.e is a clear intimidation.
HEPi'AN: Senator Kennedy again today wondered if
the Administration attacks on broadcast news had
any effect.
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CRONKITE:
. .
.is, indeed, an insidious thine:,
even as intimidation itself is. It's like a
poisoned gas in a room, or it's like the—
perhaps the first effects of narcosis on a
deep sea diver. He's not aware of it, exactly.
You're not sure you're dying, but you may have
a sense that something's wrong. { ,^0%)
III. Demonstration of ''Vietnam Veterans Against the War."
+ = Statements, opinions and behavior which supports
the basic message of the anti-war veterans - that
the war is wrong. Ex. "Veterans demonstrated
against the war.'*
0 = Neutral
- = Statements, ooinions or behavior which opposes
the message and actions of the anti-war veterans.
Ex, "I think they are a disgrace.'*
DK = Don't know.
29. JOHN KERRY: Congress is—is starting to listen.
They're going to listen. I think they saw the
fact that you can't talk to these veterans about
bombing statistics, 'cause these men dropped the
bombs, or were underneath them. You can't
—
they're just not going to listen to peace talk.
They want peace action, and I think they're
angry now. I think they're really very angry, and
I think they're justified in their anger, because
what happened at Arlington is disgraceful. These
are the m.en
—
you knovj—these are the men who v/ent
out there, risked their lives, to pack those
bodies up into body bags, to send them, back here
so that they could be buried in Arlington. These
are the m.en who did that. And to tell them, they
can't go in there and honor those m.en is a dis-
grace, and—and they're right in being angry.
{.90f,)
30. CRONKITE: Commenting on the veterans' protest.
Senate Republican Leader Scott said they are,
quote, *'A minority of one-tenth of one percent
of our veterans. I'm probably doing more to get
us out of the war than these marchers." {•77%)
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McnOTON: I think what they're demonstratin^ this
week represents the very highest form of patrio-tism. I think sometimes it requires more cour-
age to speak up for the national interest when
one is here at home facing the political pres-
sures of this nation, and I'm honored and" pleasedthat they're here this morning to hear the de-liberations before this committee, {.93fO
VETERAN: ^-.'e're veterans of this war. This is
the first time that veterans of a war that is
still being fought have come back to the war
m.achine to tell it to stop that war because weknow that they're lying about it—we know it's
being fought on a racial, imperalistic basis,
and we want that stopped, (.93'^)
JOHN KERRY: V^e are here to ask, and we're here
to ask vehemently, ',Tiere are the leaders of our
country? \Jhere is the leadership? V^e're here
to ask where are McNamara
,
Rostow, Bundy, Gil-
patrick and so many others? V/here are they now
that we, the men whom they sent off to war, have
returned? These are com.manders who have deserted
their troops, and there is no more serious crime
in the lav/ of war. The Army says thev never leave
their wounded; the Marines say they never leave
even their dead. These men have left all the
casualties and retreated behind a pious shield of
public rectitude. They've left the real stuff of
their reputations bleaching behind them in the
sun in this country. And finally, this Admini-
stration has done us the ultimate dishonor.
(.77fo)
HERBERT RAP-^'M^ER: Their organization is little
more than an ad hoc cor:mittee which by its own
admission represents som.ewhere between three
and twelve thousand veterans. Yet the group
here, perhaps 1,000 in all seems to be generating
news way out of proportion. I realize that rem-
nants of uniform.s, toy guns and spilled red ink
are colorful and considered newsworthy by sor:e
of the media. But I question, and very seriously,
the value of this type of publicity to the Ameri-
can people over an extended period of time. All
this unwarranted attention leads many to believe
they represent the average Vietnam veteran, and,
as I said before, nothing is further from, the
truth. (.87fO
329
CRONKITK: Vietnam veterans, demonstratine; arainstthe war, discarded on the Capitol steps today,
decorations they won in service, (.50^?^)
Number of Respondents = 30
Total Average of Agreement = 81.
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